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"How do we think?" is a question which has fascinated mankind for many 
centuries. This book is not an attempt to answer that question, but it does 
look at one aspect of thinking. An aspect which is just a tiny fraction of the 
whole field of research on thinking, yet an enormous field in itself, namely 
medical diagnosis: the way in which doctors try to find out what is wrong 
with their patients. 
This task is not performed logically, although logical, scientific methods 
have been worked out to mimic, improve or even replace it. Yet although 
humans do not perform this task in a very logical way, they do perform it in 
some way, following some rules, and being prone to certain types of error. 
It is very hard to know what goes on in the human mind. The invention 
of the computer, the "thinking machine", has greatly contributed to the 
interest in the way we think and to research into mimicking thought pro-
cesses. This research has yielded many successes and surprising results, yet 
the "artificial intelligence" displayed by current machines is not very impres-
sive from a human point of view. The developing field of neural network 
research, by attempting to copy to some extent the hardware in our own 
heads, may offer additional insights into thinking. 
This book is the description of an attempt to improve the diagnostic 
process, by combining human and machine capabilities into a close partner-
ship. It is a report of the underlying philosophy, design, implementation, and 
a first test of a diagnostic decision support system for general practitioners. 




Chapter 1. The doctor and the diagnosis 
LIThe concepts of disease and diagnosis 
It is curious that most medical curricula do not explicitly teach the student of 
medicine the meanings of the words 'diagnosis' and 'disease'. The student is 
assumed to form his or her own mental picture of what is understood by 
these terms. A result of this is that most doctors have a largely intuitive idea 
of the meaning of these concepts, as they find out when they start thinking 
about them. In the next sections we will discuss some of the points which 
have been brought up with regard to this problem. 
Stefan and McManus showed that the concept of 'disease' changes with time 
for students working their way through medical school, and that the interpre-
tation of the concept gradually gets broader. Fifth-year students regarded 
significantly more conditions as diseases than third- or first-year students 
[Ste891. 
The reader should take note that the word 'disease' may stand for 'a disease' 
or for the totality of all diseases, and keep this difference in mind when 
reading the next paragraphs. 
L LIThe concept of disease 
Having a disease, in other words, being a patient, confers a number of 
important privileges on a person in our culture. He or she is excused from 
work, and may be remunerated for treatment and lost time by his/her 
insurance companies; and he or she will probably be cared for more than 
would otherwise be the case. Having a disease has far-reaching economic 
and social consequences. This is why society is so concerned that the 
decision of whether a person is ill or not should be made strictly and 
correctly by a doctor. The patient who feels ill is ill until proved otherwise -
by the doctor. But the doctor does not relate to this decision in the same way 
as society does; he does not have the sense of strict demarcation between 
health and disease which society would like to have him endowed with. His 
concern is rather with the patient and with influencing the patient's symp-
toms and complaints in a favourable direction. The doctor's concept of 
disease concerns prognosis and outcome, rather than the legitimation or 
otherwise of the sick-role which the patient has assumed or which has been 
conferred upon him. 
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There have been attempts to define disease in terms of (the absence of) 
health, and attempts to define disease directly. An exponent of the first 
school is Boorse [B0077] who argues that health can be defined as a value-
free theoretical notion, based on biological function and statistical normality. 
In his view disease is the complement, or absence of health, and likewise 
definable with value-free definitions. Many others have taken up this chal-
lenge and argued that the notion of normality is always dependent on the 
viewpoint of the observer [Whi8!] [Whi81a] [Mer86] [MiI85]. 
If we attempt to define disease itself rather than trying to delineate it by 
describing its opposite, we can distinguish several schools of thought. 
On the one hand there is a group of somewhat sociologically-oriented writers 
who stress the arbitrariness of any definition of disease, or a disease, and the 
extent to which it depends upon cultural values. In their view a disease is 
composed of a number of defining characteristics, added to which is the 
notion of the defining body or agent that this is an undesirable situation, and 
that we would like to influence the situation of the person who is then said to 
be 'suffering' from these characteristics. 
Many authors have attempted to formulate strict definitions of disease that 
would tally completely with such intuitive opinions as are generally held by 
doctors. None of these efforts can be said to have been completely success-
ful, although the discussion has brought a number of interesting tacit 
assumptions and differences into the open. Most authors agree that in any 
definition of "disease" or "a disease" there is an arbitrary judgement of 
abnormality [Mar76] [Eng76] [Kra80] [Sca80] [T008!] [MiI85]. 
On the other hand, we would like to expose another quite different duality of 
opinion with regard to the concept of disease. This has been discussed by 
Ridderikhoff [Rid89] [Rid92]. 
There are two opposing views already present in what is possibly the 
oldest recorded medical thinking, that of the Hippocratic age. Hippocrates 
himself was an exponent of a way of thinking, which we will call Coan, 
after the island of Cos where his medical school flourished. In his writings, 
the patient and his or her symptoms and other circumstances which are 
deemed relevant are described minutely. From these circumstances a progno-
sis is made, based on the experience of the doctor. No specific name is given 
to the disease; the patient's symptoms are the disease. 
"Remarkably, modern readers cannot make any sensible diagnosis from 
the Hippocratic descriptions. The description is too much patient-oriented 
and not - as we are accustomed nowadays - disease-oriented." [Rid92] 
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This view has percolated through the ages, and its vestiges can still be found 
in homeopathic medicine. But the idea that the patient's symptoms by 
themselves may sometimes constitute the best description of his disease is 
widespread among general practitioners and is also very important in 
psychiatry; indeed the currently popular "DSM m R" classification of 
psychiatric disorders is nothing but a collection of lists of symptoms. 
The other school of thought may be called Cnidian, after the island of 
Cnidos, which is close to Cos, but where in ancient times a different view of 
medicine prevailed. The Cnidian school adheres to the idea that a disease 
should be clearly defined. Galen (Galenus) is an exponent of this school. 
According to this philosophy, a disease is a predefined entity with specific 
composing elements, and a new case can be diagnosed by comparing the 
symptoms of the patient with those of the disease. 
"Modern readers will be astonished to find the portrayals of Galen very 
much comparable to current descriptions of diseases as found in text-
books.[ ... J In fact, the Cnidian conception was the first attempt to 
systematize and classify diseases into a taxonomy." [Rid92] 
This concept is still the mainstay of current clinical medical thought, 
although the taxonomy of diseases which has sprung up in the last few 
centuries is characterized by fragmentation and haphazardness: different 
systems are used concurrently, based on pathology, pathophysiology, 
etiology, biochemistry, microbiology, etc. 
And although this Cnidian standpoint is taught in medical schools 
nowadays, there is, as noted above, still a gap between theory and practice, 
especially in the cases of general practice and psychiatry. 
This gap is caused by lack of knowledge. In many cases we simply do 
not know what causes the complaints or symptoms of the patients, and we 
are reduced to descriptions of the symptoms for want of an underlying 
systematic theory. By combining these and assigning a name to them, such 
diseases as "sudden infant death syndrome" and "irritable bowel syndrome" 
have come into being. They are often referred to by acronyms, which serve 
better, perhaps, to hide our ignorance: SIDS, IBS. 
"Diseases without a real substrate, correct legitimation, or proper classifi-
cation. They are convenient names without explanatory or predictive mean-
ing" [Rid92J. Another way of coping with such patients is by using the 
Hippocratic patient-oriented or complaint-oriented approach of diagnosing the 
patient's illness as a unique disease. However, this puts the doctor in a 
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difficult position when he has to give a diagnosis to placate the insurance 
company. 
Campbell, Scadding and Roberts did a survey of medical men and lay people 
on their interpretation of ' disease', and from the results argued that the 
general public's definition was 'essentialist', where diseases are specific, 
well-defined entities with a single cause. In contrast to this, doctors per-
ceived disease more as a description of an aggregate of abnormal biological 
phenomena without implying a specific etiology [Cam79]. However, the 
disease as-an-entity notion also has a considerable hold over the minds of 
many doctors. In an editorial in the British Medical Journal the anonymous 
author writes: 
"Unfortunately, many doctors remain blissfully unaware of this logical 
structure and continue to be influenced by outmoded assumptions. One 
still hears eminent physicians say "I'm sure he is a schizophrenic even 
though he doesn't yet show any of the typical symptoms. "; and chest 
physicians still argue whether a patient has chronic bronchitis (a clinical 
syndrome) or emphysema (a structural abnormality). "[An079] 
The former doctor still thinks of an underlying disease model in a case 
where medicine has, temporarily at least, given up the position of a specific 
entity 'causing' the patient to suffer schizophrenia, and retreated into a list of 
defining symptoms. In the latter case doctors argue on the assignment of the 
patient to groups belonging to different taxonomies. 
For our current purposes in this work it is sufficient to define a "disease" as 
the coincidence of one or more specific circumstances or conditions in a 
person. While we will commonly use the term "symptoms" in this work for 
these circumstances, it is important to keep in mind that they may include 
signs, symptoms, tests, x-ray investigations, behaviour, or whatever else 
makes up the disease. This definition completely sidesteps the important 
questions of who is to define the circumstances which make up a disease, 
and what criteria this person or agency should use to select these circum-
stances. But it has the advantage that such a concept of disease can be made 
fully operational. To determine whether a patient has any given disease or 
not, we look for the set of circumstances which define it. If they are present, 
he or she has the disease by definition. If they are not, he or she has not. 
Finally, the available information may be insufficient to warrant either con-
clusion. This position also has the advantage that either the 'Coan' or the 
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'Cnidian' viewpoint of 'diagnosis' may be used, each where most appropri-
ate. 
1.1.2 Nosologies: taxonomies of disease 
Taxonomy is the combination of classification, nomenclature and identi-
fication [Jac92] [Jac92a]. Classification is the ordering of diseases (in the 
case of nosologies) into groups, on the basis of both similarities and dissimi-
larities between them. Nomenclature assigns names to these groups according 
to more or less formal rules. (Rather less than more formal, in the case of 
medicine.) Identification is the assignment of a new specimen (disease or 
patient) to one of the predefined groups on the basis of the observed similar-
ities and differences. 
Classifications of objects may be made on the basis of a single distin-
guishing characteristic (monothetic classifications), or on the basis of several 
(polythetic classifications). Sometimes the objects to be classified fall 
naturally into several completely disjunct groups; in other cases there will be 
a considerable overlap and any line of demarcation drawn between the 
groups must to some degree be arbitrary. All varieties of this spectrum occur 
in current medical taxonomies of disease; examples are e.g. infections by 
different species of bacteria, and degree of malignancy of tumours. 
(Although even in the case of bacteria there are disputes between bacteriol-
ogists over the classification of closely related groups. It is not so easy to 
find any disease which has absolutely no marginal examples, no cases where 
there is not room for doubt somewhere.) 
The objective of nosology is to describe classes or entities which enable 
the doctor to predict as accurately as possible what a particular patient 
belonging to that class can expect in the future, and in what degree the 
natural outcome of the disease can be influenced by medical science. Predic-
tion of outcome, and then the attempt to influence that outcome favourably, 
is the real objective of diagnosis. 
The development of nosologies in the last few centuries was made possible 
by the advance of medical knowledge. When, in the renaissance, doctors 
started to examine the human body after death, gross morphologic abnor-
malities came to light and these led to a pathological nosology. The subse-
quent rise of physiology and pathophysiology gave birth to a patho-
physiological nosology. The discovery of bacteria led to a nosology of 
infectious diseases. The current 'total' nosology of medical science hardly 
deserves this name, because it is a combination of all of these, with a few 
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additional classifications thrown in for good measure. Every disease is 
placed in the classification in which it seems to fit best, but it may also exist, 
with slightly different connotations, within another system, e.g. the example 
of emphysema vs chronic bronchitis given above. Medical science suffers 
from a lack of knowledge and accordingly frequently has to shift its frame of 
reference to fit the diseases it endeavours to classify. 
In practice, the doctor is forced to work with these nosologies, however 
inadequate they may be, and with his inadequate knowledge of them. His 
knowledge is a personal knowledge: apart from what he remembers, or 
thinks he remembers, from the lectures at medical school, he uses a large 
body of acquired knowledge in the form of his own experience with patients 
and with diseases, which is different from that of every other doctor, even if 
the scientific medical education is not. There is no 'gold standard' definition 
for most diseases, although in recent years such definitions are being 
attempted with ever increasing frequency. There is no general consensus 
between doctors over what the characteristic points of any disease are. There 
are large differences between the frequencies of even the commonest diseases 
in different countries; diagnoses which are extremely common in Germany, 
e.g. "Kreislaufschwache", ("weakness of the circulation"), are practically 
unheard of in Anglo-Saxon countries; and vice versa. The journalist Lynn 
Payer gives a number of amusing examples of diseases which seem to be 
specific to certain countries. [Pay88] 
1.1.3 Diagnosis 
The word "diagnosis" can also be used to mean several things, the most 
important of which are a process, and the conclusion of this process. 
[Fei73]. We use it in both these senses: The process of diagnosis is the art of 
finding all diseases which can be established in the patient; the conclusion is 
the disease which seems most likely after sifting as much information as 
possible. But the raison d'etre of a diagnosis is not simply to 'find the 
disease': it cannot be viewed as completely distinct from the goal of treat-
ment for the patient [Whi8l]. Diagnosis has also been defined as "a provi-
sional formula for action. "(Cohen) 
Although there is some truth in this, regrettably this dictum is too often 
viewed as a license to stop thinking about the nature of the patient's problem 
too soon. Such 'diagnoses' as "lBS" (irritable bowel syndrome), "COPD" 
(chronic obstructive pulmonary disease), and "PID" (pelvic inflammatory 
disease) are examples of this. While it is clearly (?1) not necessary to 
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determine which particular virus, out of many dozens of species, is respon-
sible for the patient's 'common cold', on the other hand if we label the death 
of an infant with the term "SIDS" (sudden infant death syndrome), we are 
liable to forget that this 'diagnosis' is nothing but a testimonium paupertatis, 
just another way of saying that we do not know what caused the death, and 
to think instead that 'SIDS' is a disease in itself, something you can die of. 
Making a diagnosis is a process of identification: we lump the patient 
together with a number of other patients, under the heading of "disease" X, 
which is usually called "the diagnosis" for short. But the diagnosis need not 
coincide with any recognized disease; it may be the point at which the doctor 
stops his inquiries for the moment [Fei73]. In that case diagnosis is con-
sidered a judgement. 
Of course, there is always the possibility that the patient does not have a 
disease at all. This is a frequent occurrence in general practice [Mec78] 
[KeI76]. If we are to attempt pattern-recognition as a method of assigning 
patients to disease groups, as we will in this book, there will always be 
patients who do not conform to any of the patterns we know. According to 
the taxonomy, these patients then do not have a disease, which is not to say 
that they do not suffer, or do not feel ill. If any taxonomy is used statically, 
and . not reviewed from time to time, no progress in the classification of 
disease can be made. The cases which cannot be classified within a taxono-
my are just as important for its development as the cases that can be, and 
perhaps even more important, because they point out the imperfections of the 
system. Such patients should stimulate the doctor to step out of the system, 
and consider the system of classification itself. 
1.2 Diagnoses based on different types of evidence 
Diseases are rather arbitrary entities, although they should always be made 
up of a specific set of circumstances, such as symptoms, signs, laboratory 
measurements, and x-ray investigations. As we have seen, these circum-
stances shift and change with the time, the place, and the person of the 
doctor. 
To be useful, any defmition of a disease should be able to be operat-
ionalized: it should always be possible to determine unequivocally whether a 
particular patient does, or does not, suffer from the disease. This may often 
or even generally not be practical, but it should at least in principle be 
possible if a disease definition is to be useful. In the final analysis, a disease 
definition without such a decision procedure is a meaningless entity. 
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However, from a more practical point of view, there may be a number of 
different symptoms and signs which are not part of the definition of a 
disease, but which are known to be associated with it in a sufficiently high 
degree to be usable for a probabilistic diagnosis, especially if the strict 
determination meets with problems of a practical nature. For instance, to 
diagnose a myocardial infarction the principal requirement obviously (from 
the name of the condition itself) is that a portion of the patient's heart muscle 
has died. Since this is very hard to determine directly, at least without doing 
more harm to the patient by cutting him open, the diagnosis in hospital is 
made by a number of 'in lieu' arguments, i.e. a history of chest pain, 
characteristic findings in the ECG, and a rise in the blood levels of certain 
enzymes. It should be borne in mind that a diagnosis of 'myocardial 
infarction' reached by this path does not necessarily correspond to the actual 
disease state of necrosis of a portion of the heart muscle: there may be some 
patients who do not have the dead heart muscle but who do have the other 
symptoms; likewise, there may be patients who do have the dead muscle 
cells but not the chest pain, ECG findings, and rise in enzyme levels, or 
maybe just one or two of these. This phenomenon of incomplete overlap 
provides us with a strong argument not to name diseases after hypothetical 
causes: if the hypothesis is later revised, the old name will probably persist 
and cause much confusion. [Ash72] 
For the general practitioner, enzyme measurements and an ECG are usually 
not immediately available; he will have to go by such information as he can 
gather from the patient during the consultation, such as the chest pain, 
sweating, possibly irregular heartbeat, shock, irradiation of pain to arms or 
neck, etc. These signs and symptoms do not constitute strict evidence of 
myocardial infarction at all, but they are all the information that the doctor 
has available when deciding to call for the ambulance on suspicion of an 
infarction, or not. 
The criteria by which doctors arrive at conclusions differ with the circum-
stances and with the person of the doctor. Different general practitioners can 
have entirely different ideas about which signs and symptoms are the most 
important indicators of what seem to be clear-cut examples of disease. 
Ridderikhoff found that for a patient with acute myocardial infarction, 20 
physicians who correctly made the diagnosis agreed with one another on the 
presence of just one symptom: pain. On both the symptoms of blood pres-
sure and perspiration, the next two most mentioned symptoms which were 
found in the patient, only 11 of the twenty agreed with one another. All 
other symptoms were mentioned eight times or less [Rid86][Rid86a]. 
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1.3 The goal and the process of diagnosis 
The purpose of the diagnosis is one of categorization: we want to group 
patients together on the basis of similarity, and we want to group them not 
just for the sake of this similarity in their signs and symptoms, but because 
we know, suspect, or at least hope that in doing so we will also group them 
together in terms of cause, prognosis and optimal treatment. 
The process of diagnosis will therefore in this work be viewed as a task of 
categorization: the patient is assigned to a disease name, which is the 
patient's diagnosis. As many signs and symptoms as possible in the patient 
should be explained or at least covered by it, and conversely the patient 
should minimally show other signs and symptoms which do not agree with 
that diagnosis. Finding a solution within the limits of both these constraints 
is one of the main difficulties in finding a diagnosis. 
1.4 Different types of diseases/diagnoses 
A disease entity, a grouping within the classification of diseases, may be 
based on widely different kinds of arguments. It may be, in its most 
primitive form, a single symptom, or a small group of symptoms. In the age 
of Hippocrates, this was a common occurrence: e.g. fever. Nor has this type 
of diagnosis entirely disappeared in our time: Cough, IBS. 
On the other end of the spectrum, we have the highly specific diagnoses, 
e.g. diagnoses which point to the exact location on the chromosome and the 
exact nature of a genetic defect or to a specific germ to explain the cause 
and effects of the disease in question. 
Most diagnoses/diseases find a place somewhere in between the ends of this 
scale. Diagnoses tend to move from one status to the other: they start out as 
syndromes, collections of signs and symptoms that are observed to occur 
together in many patients, gradually acquiring more specific causal overtones 
as more becomes known of the mechanisms at work. This process of 
refinement continues until the problem seems to be understood and solved to 
the degree necessary to cure the disease, or else to explain the cause of the 
disease and the reason why it is not curable. 
Due to this natural process of refinement the exact definition of the disease 
might become blurred. While some doctors may still work with the old 
definitions, others who are more in touch with the forefront of science, or 
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who are perhaps just in a position to order the latest tests, will have replaced 
their own private definitions of the disease in question with a more advanced 
one. This may be the cause of many medical misunderstandings. Traditional-
ly there is no agency which defines the current standard for a diagnosis, 
although in the last decades some progress has been made in this respect as 
groups of experts set out to define diagnostic criteria for diseases. 
1.5 Summary 
We have discussed different views of disease, diagnosis and the current state 
of nosology. It is argued that the prime purpose of diagnosis is the classifica-
tion of the patient into a group of similar patients, thus allowing an accurate 
prediction of the outcome and the identification of methods to influence this 
outcome favourably. We try to classify the patient on the basis of similarities 
and dissimilarities between his or her signs and symptoms and those of a 
pre-defined pattern called a disease. The standardization of these patterns and 
their classification into a nosology at present is chaotic at best. 
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Chapter 2. Computers in general practice 
2.1 Introduction 
When computers were first invented, many people predicted them to be able 
soon to perform all kinds of complicated tasks that had hitherto been the 
exclusive domain of man. The world champion chess programme has been 
predicted many times "within a few years from now" since before 1960. And 
although nowadays even chess Grandmasters are occasionally beaten by a 
computer, and the goal no longer seems to be so far out of reach as to be 
ridiculous, the prediction has not yet come true. 
The goal seems to recede with every step taken toward its realisation, yet 
there is undeniably a steady progress in the quality of chess-playing pro-
grams. 
The development of programmes for other difficult tasks like understand-
ing natural language, or diagnosing an illness, seems to be in a similar situ-
ation. So far, tasks that can be reliably performed by computers are especial-
ly those tasks that can be exactly described in formal terms, e.g. database 
management. Computers can outperform humans by a very large margin in 
sheer speed and volume of the data they handle in these instances. 
But for many problems of a more complex nature we are still forced either 
to oversimplify the problem or else to reduce the solution domain to a very 
small area, e.g. the causes of high blood pressure. Within these small 
domains, and even in some quite large ones, computers are indeed able to 
compete with human experts. Yet we fmd that these programs are rarely, if 
ever, used in practice, even if studies have shown them to be very reliable, 
at least in a laboratory setting. The reasons are complex and multiple, e.g. 
cost, (un)availability, difficult access, distrust, unfamiliarity with computers, 
and unfamiliarity with the programmes themselves. 
2.2 The use of computers in general practice. 
Even before the advent of personal computing, there were attempts, e.g. by 
Preece et al. and Bradshaw-Smith, to use the computer in general practice. 
[Pre70] [Bra76]. The latter describes a system for a group practice, operat-
ing on exclusive telephone lines from a local hospital computer centre. It 
was intended to replace the NHS envelope system. Gruer even describes a 
very early off-line batch processing system, which aimed at bringing together 
all medical data of a patient in a single computerised record. [Gru72] The 
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record was split into permanent data and episode data. The records were 
extracted at regular intervals using a special output programme for each 
purpose, and the resulting lists could be studied by the doctor. The main 
applications of the system were considered to be patient surveillance, 
morbidity registration, drug use, work-load analysis and use of services such 
as lab tests. 
As personal computers became generally available in the early nineteen-
eighties, a few enthusiastic family physicians who were ahead of their time 
started using them. Within a decade, a computer became a commonplace 
item in general practice, rather than a rarity. These early machines were by 
today's standards extremely limited in working memory (RAM,ROM), mass 
storage (floppy disks or, rarely, hard disks), and display capabilities (monitor 
screen). 
Yet within these limitations physicians were soon fmding useful applications 
for these machines. One of the first applications was the electronic address 
book and appointment scheduler; once this was implemented, doctors started 
to look for ways to extend the benefits of this newly acquired level of 
organization of their information. One of the first countries to experiment on 
a major scale with computer systems in general practice was Great-Britain, 
which had been ahead of the rest of Europe in the use of personal microcom-
puters. (The BBC microcomputer project was designed to provide both a 
cheap personal computer and training on how to use it.) 
Around 1982, there were systems available for applications such as an 
appointment system, population register, disease or risk register, repeat 
prescription register and 'various other logs'. [Met82] 
Doctors started to use their computers to write prescriptions (preece) or 
monitor repeat prescriptions (Difford) [pre84] [Dif84]. Note that by 'writing 
prescriptions', what is meant is that the doctor determined what to prescribe; 
the computer just printed the recipe. 
There was some debate about whether doctors should program their 
computers in BASIC or Pascal [MuI84]; that they should program their own 
systems was fairly natural, as there was very little software readily available. 
If you needed something, you either wrote it yourself or went without. This 
of course soon started to change. 
A number of studies emerged reflecting the increasing use of fledgling 
administrative systems by general practitioners, ego monitoring a population 
at risk for a specific disease or other factor: high blood pressure, cervical 
smears, flu shots. 
Computers in general practice 15 
There were already some early concerns about increasing computer usage, 
too: 
Would not the computer form an impediment to the doctor-patient 
interaction? 
Answers to this question could at his stage only be intuitive; Metcalfe 
thought it would not. [Met82] 
How reliable is the computer technology? 
Emrys-Jones gives a tale of mistakes not to repeat when installing a 
computer. From this we can conclude that any doctor or practice acquir-
ing a computer needed in that period a remarkable single-mindedness, a 
willingness to learn programming skills, a close working relation with a 
reputable dealer to solve the numerous hardware problems, and a fair 
amount of money to achieve an acceptable result. [Whi82] 
It is not enough to have the computer keep the records: they must be 
entered and updated meticulously to be of any use. 
Sprackling lists a number of problems encountered [Whi82]. 
He found that it was hard to motivate personnel to keep the database up-
to-date if they were not trained well and were not involved in the use of 
the database. He found that after one year, quite a lot of patient records 
contained either errors, especially wrong addresses, or omissions, 
especially missing diagnoses, or both. 
Reading these early publications, one feels that buying and maintammg a 
computer system at that time must have been worthwhile at least as much for 
the sense of adventure and pioneering as for the actual medical benefits, and 
probably more so. 
Metcalfe made an important point about the use and usefulness of computers 
in general practice: 
"The step to the narrative record will not be worth the investment in 
resource or energy if it is purely to store the current undisciplined paper 
record in electronic medium. It will only be worthwhile if two precondi-
tions are met: firstly, that some standardized form of recording such as 
problemorientated medical records are accepted and, secondly, if it is 
accepted by the doctor that he is handing over a certain amount of 
control to the system which will prompt, cue and remind him of things 
that have to be done". [Met84] 
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Of course, long before the first computer was installed in a general practi-
tioner's office, much had already been said about the application of computer 
technology to medical problem solving, and much research had been done in 
academic centres where large mainframe computers were available. Shortliffe 
et al give a review. [Sh079] 
2.3 First use of the computer as a diagnostician 
From the use of the computer as a fast and reliable record-keeper to its use 
as a diagnostician is a big step, even a bigger one than was at first thought. 
It presupposes an accurate medical description of patient symptoms and 
disease entities, knowledge about diseases, together with machine with the 
speed and memory capacity to handle both. There turned out to be a big gap 
between AI research on the one hand, and medical knowledge and medical 
problem solving on the other. Mcmullin points out a number of obstacles to 
various methods which might be used [Mcm83]. Attempts to simulate the 
thought processes of the clinician disregard the fact that we do not know 
accurately what they are. They are not learnt from a manual nor are they 
ever set out explicitly in the ordinary exercise of the skill [pol58]. Pattern-
matching approaches work only in well-defined and limited areas of medicine 
where the classification of data presents no serious problems [Mcm83]. 
In the early period of research in medical computing, the most common 
approach to the problem of making a diagnosis was pattern recognition 
[And68] [And68a] [Boy68] [BoI75] [Led59]. 
Even before computers were actually used, there were some pattern-recogni-
tion based approaches using mechanical sorting devices. [Br059] 
However, this method was soon eclipsed by the artificial intelligence tech-
niques that were rapidly being developed. The two fields of common origin 
grew apart and each came to have its own domain: Pattern recognition being 
used mainly for mechanical tasks that could be transformed to fit the method 
as closely as possible, such as ECG interpretation or white blood cell 
recognition in smears, while AI concentrated on more 'fuzzy' problems like 
diagnosing illnesses in specific domains [GeI89]. 
The type of AI research done in university centres was very often limited to 
small specialty domains. The broad range of complaints the general practi-
tioner sees was felt to be too large and too ill-defined to be harnessed by 
programs using the AI approach. Furthermore, the transfer of research 
results to the family practice setting has always been strongly limited by 
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available technology and cost. It is only now that cheap powerful systems are 
within reach of the average general practitioner that research into computer 
use in general practice has really taken off. The possibility of a computer in 
the doctor's office has given the GP a potential direct benefit from such 
systems - he does not have to wait anymore for the results to be mailed back 
to him after evaluation on the large computers of a university research 
centre. 
2.4 Modern developments 
As has been stated countless times, the power of personal computers has 
dramatically increased in the last decade. Instead of at 2 to 4 MHz they now 
run at 20. or 40; instead of using an 8 bit databus, they now use 16 or 32 bit 
databuses; instead of 20 to 64 Kilobyte of memory, they now have 1 or 4 or 
more Megabytes; instead of 160 Kilobyte single-sided floppy disks they use 
1.2 and 1.44 Megabyte ones; and instead of no harddisk at all, 100 
Megabyte harddisks are now quite common. In lay terms, this means that a 
personal computer in the year 1992 may be from ten to a hundred times 
faster and more powerful than one from 1982, as well as being considerably 
cheaper. 
By this development much more ambitious applications came within the 
reach of the personal computer. Problems which used to require large 
amounts of data space and processor speed, incompatible with contemporary 
personal computer technology, can now easily be implemented on a fast 
personal computer. 
But there are other obstacles to be overcome. 
Shortliffe [Sh089] cites a number of psychological obstacles to implemen-
tation of decision-support systems, as apparent from from surveys of 
physicians' attitudes. Among these obstacles are: 
Fear of loss of rapport with patients. 
Physicians do not like to sit behind a terminal interrogating the patient, 
having to divide their attention between the two. 
Fear of loss of clinical control. 
The doctor wants to be responsible for the patient, and not to delegate 
this responsibility to a machine. 
Inertia: physicians feel their lives are complicated enough already without 
having to learn a new and complex computer programme and/or system. 
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Nonacceptance of machine capabilities. 
Doctors just do not believe that a machine can help them do things which 
they find difficult. 
Suspicion of Artificial Intelligence. 
Human experts do not trust the data that have been fed into an expert 
system, and are keenly aware of differences between human experts. 
Fear of legal liability. Who is responsible for managing the patient, and 
who is liable in case of errors? 
The challenge of data entry. 
Doctors do not like typing; and they do not like rigorous menu systems 
which present questions that must be answered. A free-format voice data 
entry system might be ideal. 
Age. Most physicians regard support systems as something for younger 
generations. 
As Shortliffe [Sh087] also points out, any medical computer programme can 
in a wider sense be viewed as a medical support system. He goes on to 
define three subcategories, ranging from generalized to patient-specific: 
a) Tools for information management. e.g. A hospital information 
system. 
b) Tools for focusing attention. e.g. A clinical laboratory systems that 
flags abnormal values. 
c) Tools for patient-specific consultation. Such programmes provide 
customized assessments or advice based on sets of patient-specific 
data. They may follow simple logics (such as algorithms), may be 
based on statistical theory and cost-benefit analysis, or they may use 
numeric approaches only as an adjunct to symbolic problem solving. 
It is with this third type of programme that we will be mainly concerned in 
this study. 
As has been said earlier, in many cases administrative systems are also used 
to store medical data about patients, and this area is growing quickly. This 
medical information is usually typed in by the doctor in a free-text format, 
generally under a few different subheadings. This has the advantage of 
legibility over the old written record, but it is still of limited use for research 
purposes. 
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2.5 The development of computer use in general practice in the N ether-
lands. 
General practitioners in the Netherlands are still among the Dutch pro-
fessional groups with the lowest usage of computers in their daily work. But 
the number is rising rapidly: in 1983 about 0.6% of practices used a com-
puter, in 1988 about 20%, and in 1990 about 35%, mainly for administrative 
purposes. [Hiip90] 
In 1989, The Dutch association of general practitioners (NHG) published a 
set of standards for patient registration database systems, specifying a full 
relational data model, coding tables, and response delay times. This standard 
was based on experiences since 1983, when experimental projects had 
started. This standard has been updated a number of times. A number of 
conforming or near-conforming database systems are now available [Hiip90] 
[Wes89]. The model is called WCIA-HIS. 
Although in 1992, about 50% of general practitioners were estimated to use 
a computer with a conforming HIS , only about 1 in 10 of these was esti-
mated to use a medical module in addition to the basic administrative 
module. These numbers are expected to rise with the introduction of finan-
cial incentives in the future. [Has92] 
2.6 Modern programmes used in general practice 
Systems currently used in general practice are typically used for admi-
nistrative purposes: to record names, addresses, telephone numbers, visits, 
medication, and insurance data of patients. Moreover, they are used to write 
bills and prescriptions, to schedule appointments, and to generate reminders. 
They offer the possibility to enter medical data about the patient in a free-
text format, usually with some structuring (the POMR, or Problem-Oriented 
Medical Record, is popular.) 
They are also rather expensive, both in purchase price and in maintenance 
fees, at least when compared to off-the-shelf applications used in business. 
This is due to the high cost of software design for a relatively small market, 
and the need for instant repair and backup facilities if the system should 
break down. Maintenance is typically a large part of the budget for software 
and hardware. 
One of the most popular systems in use today in the Netherlands is 
MicroHIS. Another system in use today in the Netherlands is ELIAS, an 
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administrative system for general practice which has been designed in a 
modular fashion. A core system may be introduced in the practice, with the 
option of adding modules later as needed. It offers interfaces to existing 
hospital information systems. While it was originally an administrative 
system, there are now modules available for drug treatment, medical data 
record keeping, etc. 
2.7 Problems with the free-text approach 
Free-text medical records suffer from the following disadvantages: 
1) Personal terminology: 
Every doctor uses his own terminology; what one doctor calls a 
myocardial infarction, another may refer to as a coronary infarction, 
ischaemic heart disease, a heart attack or just MI. 
2) Ambiguous terminology: 
If two doctors use the same word or term for a disease or symptom, they 
do not necessarily mean the same thing. There are many terms that are 
so ill-defined that it would be better not to use them at all. 
3) Varying precision of description: 
Doctors use widely differing levels of description of diagnoses; one may 
content himself with describing a patient as having COPD (Chronic 
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease), while another may diagnose the same 
patient as having bronchitis superimposed on existing asthmatic constitu-
tion due to a bacterial infection. Both intend to describe the same thing 
but one of them takes much more trouble than the other to write it down, 
and also gives a much more accurate representation of the patient's state. 
4) Unstructuredness of records: 
The information about the patient is often written down in a more or less 
unorganized way, with symptoms, complaints, problems, diagnoses and 
solutions interspersed. Most computer systems make at least an attempt 
to split the data into sections. e.g. problem, findings, evaluation and 
plan, but this is only a first step on the road to structuring medical 
information. 
S) Use of the keyboard. 
The text approach requires typing skills from the general practitioner, 
who must sit facing the computer, rather than the patient, in order to 
type. Typing takes time and attention, and the typist is liable to make 
errors which take time to correct. 
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These are major obstacles to extracting, structuring and using the medical 
information on a patient in free-text format. The more structure a pro-
gramme forces on its users, the less flexible it becomes and the more the 
users will feel constrained by the programme, but the better the generated 
data can be used and evaluated by other programmes, e.g. for research. This 
is an example of a trade-off where it is hard to find an optimum. 
2.8 Structuring patient data 
There are basically two ways In which structured patient data may be 
obtained: 
a) The data may be entered into the system by the doctor in a structured 
way. This is the easiest type of system to design and implement but it 
has the disadvantage that it is more work for the doctor. This is not 
necessarily a bad thing if the doctor (or rather his patient) also benefits: 
if the doctor has to think a little before writing things down, this may 
improve his patient management. But the burden of proof for this lies 
with the systems designer, and the doctor will frown upon anything that 
makes his work more complex or time-consuming. 
b) Attempts can be made to increase data structure by processing unst-
ructured data. This is an area in which especially in the last decade a 
large amount of research has been done. 
Various ways of manually structuring or flagging the information in patient 
records have been tried. Three examples: 
1) There is sometimes a possibility of putting an electronic "tab" on a record 
if the patient has a specific disorder or complaint: for instance high blood 
pressure. In this way, the doctor can manually mark a few specific diseases 
for patients he wants to keep track of. This requires both an explicit judge-
ment from the doctor: I want to keep an eye on this one, and a specific 
action: press a key, or select a menu to put a tag on the patient. Doctors 
may forget to do this, or just not care enough to bother. It does not modify 
or structure the data in the record, just flags it. 
2) There are also systems that attempt to standardize the terminology used by 
doctors by offering them lexicons and coding systems in which they can look 
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up terms to find a preferred one. There are currently classifications available 
for diseases, reason-for-encounter, and medication [Lam86]. 
3) Structured data entry. 
The data the doctor enters into his system may also be structured right from 
the start. This may take the form of questionnaires: the programme must 
have an answer to a number of questions it poses, and the doctor or the 
patient has to provide these. This is a considerable limitation of the doctor's 
freedom. He may resent having to fill in lists of symptoms that may seem 
completely extraneous. 
The work of the Dombal is a good example of this; in a number of experi-
ments using the computer to diagnose acute abdominal complaints the 
methodology used was to gather data by means of forms, with lists of 
questions that should systematically be answered. [Dom78] 
On a related note, there have also been attempts [Qua86] to transfer this 
burden to the patient by letting patients fill in electronic questionnaires 
before seeing the doctor in a hospital. Though most patients did not mind 
this and were perfectly able to do so, a few of them could not learn to 
handle even the simplified data entry machinery. Also, the questionnaire was 
necessarily a global screening one, checking the performance of a number of 
bodily functions and general well-being. These data were not specific enough 
to base a diagnosis on; rather they were meant to alert the doctor to possible 
problems that might not otherwise be discovered in a specialist consultation 
where questioning is generally in the line of the expected problem field. 
Automatic structuring of patient data. 
As an example of b), there have also been systems developed that attempt to 
extract structured information out of the 'raw' patient records by analyzing 
their contents with lists of synonyms for medical terms. These lexicons 
quickly grow to enormous size, and cannot deal with the problem of doctors 
not meaning the same thing when using identical terms. Nevertheless, some 
success has been achieved in this direction, especially when used on hospital 
records for retrospective research. 
2.9 Use of structured data by other programmes. 
2.9.1 Hypercritic. 
Some programmes process medical information extracted from patient 
records in order to evaluate .the medical treatment of patients and alert the 
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doctor to mistakes or omissions. One example of this is Hypercritic, a 
critiqueing programme for the management of high blood pressure in general 
practice [Lei91l. 
The purpose of this system is to advise general practitioners on the treatment 
of patients with hypertension. 
Hypercritic uses data stored in the patient records, thus avoiding a consult-
ing-style interaction with the user. It examines the patient record in an 
attempt to discover the physician's actions and decisions. These are called 
events. The events are then scrutinized and where appropriate, comments are 
assigned to them. These comments are called critiqueing statements or 
recommendations. They are all suggestions to the physician to modify his 
actions. To generate these statements, Hypercritic has its own medical fact 
database where information about hypertension and its treatment is stored. A 
main characteristic of this system is therefore its background activity: the 
user does not have to call it, it does not ask questions, it just monitors the 
doctor's actions from available data. This makes it very easy to use: just 
install it and forget about it. If the user makes a perceived mistake, 
Hypercritic will pop up and remark upon it. This is just a private reminder 
to the doctor, who is free to follow it as he likes and is not belittled or put to 
shame before a colleague or a patient. These are all big advantages. 
Problems with this approach are that doctors must enter the data before they 
can be monitored, and that Hypercritic must be able to fit the actions of the 
physician to its database of the known actions. There is a considerable 
translation effort, and the data may be incomplete. The knowledge domain is 
extremely limited. Hypertension, though common, is just one health prob-
lem, with a fairly standardized management which has been researched 
extremely thoroughly. 
To generalize this effort to other medical problems would be a huge task. 
2.9.2 Use of structured data by other programmes. 
Expert systems, which use production rules and an inference engine to draw 
conclusions from data, are highly dependent on the availability of specific 
data: if a rule states "if x and y then z", the programme has to know 
whether x and y are present before it can conclude z. Such programmes 
often require specific information to be entered before any conclusion can be 
drawn at all. Furthermore, a number of these systems use Bayesian reason-
ing to produce probability estimates for specific diagnoses, based upon 
prevalence data and diagnostic predictive value of test results. 
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In general practice, often very little is known about the prevalence of 
diseases. Such figures are usually based upon hospital frequencies, which do 
not reflect the prevalence in the population. Diagnostic tests which are quite 
accurate in a hospital setting, may have little or no value to the general 
practitioner because of high false-positive rates and low prevalences; also, 
the false-negative rate in general practice may be much higher because 
patients come to their doctor before the disease has had a chance to evolve to 
its full-blown form; the general practitioner may see the early, hard to 
recognize signs and symptoms of a disease. 
Besides, especially the general practitioner is faced with a limitless number 
of conditions, many of which are not 'medical' at all in a strict sense. 
Accuracy figures for the diagnostic performance of doctors are hard to come 
by and difficult to interpret. How should a diagnosis be judged ? 
Let us suppose that a patient suffers from anaemia caused by excessive 
menstrual blood loss, causing an iron deficiency. She goes to see her general 
practitioner, who diagnoses 'anaemia', not otherwise specified, and stops at 
that point. He is not wrong, but he could have done much better. How much 
should we subtract from his score for not inquiring into the cause of the 
anaemia? 
Besides the accuracy of 65 % quoted by De Dombal [Dom72] for acute abdo-
minal complaints, others have found similar values. Ridderikhoff found an 
accuracy of 47% for general practitioners solving a common disease pres-
ented to them in the form of a simulated patient [Rid86]; and an only slightly 
higher accuracy for general internists solving the same problems. 
Such figures indicate a large potential benefit from improvements in diagnos-
tic thinking. Whether this benefit is attainable in practice remains to be seen. 
One possible approach is to try and use the possibilities of the computer to 
improve diagnostic accuracy. 
We propose a method of using a computer in general practice for diagnostic 
decision support, which is much different from all systems which have been 
described above. It is based upon three principles: 
a) Strictly structured coding of patients' symptoms, complaints and test 
results. 
b) A very simple user-interface which offers the doctor complete freedom in 
deciding which symptoms to enter and in which order. 
c) An extremely simple, yet robust algorithm for generating a differential 
diagnosis. 
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2.10 Evaluation of decision support systems. 
If a diagnostic decision support system is to be accepted, it should be 
evaluated for its adequacy first. According to Taylor [Tay90], most evalu-
ations of decision support systems are still limited to diagnostic accuracy, 
whereas in a real-world setting, usefulness and acceptability should be taken 
into account too. The programme for diagnosis of abdominal pain com-
plaints, designed by de Dombal and others in the early 1970s, has been 
tested extensively over the years and was shown in 1972 to have a 91.8 % 
accuracy compared with 79.6% for clinicians. However, in a prospective 
trial involving 6962 patients, accuracy fell to 42-59 %, compared with 65 % 
for the physicians [Dom72] [Sut89]. 
The cases in this last study were from very different populations, and the 
programme did worse than any of the physicians in the comparison. This 
phenomenon is often called 'brittleness': programme performance deterio-
rates spectacularly when the input is taken from a different source than was 
used in the development environment. 
One suggestion to explain this discrepancy is that many of the benefits in the 
previous trials may have come from standardization of terminology and 
feedback to physicians rather than from the decision-making power of the 
programme itself. This theory is supported by the finding that physicians 
using the programme improved their own diagnostic accuracy of the acute 
abdomen while they used it, and that this accuracy fell again when they 
stopped using it. [Dom87] 
The above may be seen as evidence to support that 
a) general practitioners see a different kind of patient compared to emerg-
ency room doctors; and 
b) standardization and structuring of terminology in itself may have a 
beneficial effect on diagnostic accuracy. 
2.11 The doctor-patient-computer triangle. 
Some writers have voiced concern over the patient's attitude to the computer, 
and the disturbing influence the computer may have on the consultation. 
Moser wrote: "I do not want to have to glance up from a computer printout 
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as I address my patient. I want eyeball-to-eyeball contact." [Mos75]. This is 
of course a legitimate concern. However, if the doctor can refrain from 
looking at his paper record in those first five minutes he can also refrain 
from looking at the computer printout (or rather the computer screen, 
nowadays). One might say that if the doctor does not find it a hindrance to 
work on his notes while listening to the patient, there is no reason why he 
should not work on his notes with the aid of a keyboard. But this presup-
poses that working behind a computer screen is a task of a complexity 
comparable to writing notes on paper. For many physicians, this is clearly 
not true. 
Furthermore, patients may dislike the idea of the computer in the doc-
tor's office; however, research shows that the large majority of them does 
not. Some even consider it a positive development, showing that their doctor 
is abreast of modem developments. There is also concern about the level of 
confidentiality of electronically stored patient data. Experiments where 
doctors made their entire record system available to their locum while they 
are absent on holiday, even after getting approval from the individual 
patients concerned, have been criticised as an unnecessary breach of confi-
dence.[Hop90] 
Although the locum could theoretically look up any patient in the old paper 
record system, if he went through the trouble, this is not quite the same 
thing as having the entire administration of a colleague on a compact-
cassette-size tape in your pocket. There is no guarantee against illegal copies 
being made, which would be unpractical with paper records but which is a 
matter of a few minutes with electronic media, and which is also 
undectectable. 
2.12 Use of medical information of patients for other purposes 
There is a conflict which always crops up sooner or later when patient data 
are stored in a computer. Although the original aim of record-keeping is to 
help the doctor manage the patient's problems more efficiently, there is 
always the temptation to use the information for other purposes. This is a 
process that should be recognized and monitored carefully, as patients' 
privacy may be in jeopardy; also there is the more fundamental question of 
whether a patient's medical data should be used for research at all without 
his or her informed consent. 
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There is no consensus on this point. The feeling of the author is that it is 
allowable, but only if the patient's privacy is guaranteed and he or she is in 
no way inconvenienced or disadvantaged, and there is a clear benefit from 
this research for medical science or patient care. Many others hold stricter 
views. 
The system described in this work is partly justified by the possibility of 
using the patient data for research. However, actually using patient data in 
this way may tum out to be problematic because of ethical constraints. 
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Chapter 3. Modelling the diagnostic process 
3.1 Introduction. 
The diagnostic problem-solving process may be viewed in two ways: 
a) As the identification of the patient with a predefined entity within the 
taxonomy of diseases with the goal of prediction. 
b) As a process of reasoning to justify the assumed resemblance. 
Both views are objects of study in this chapter. They represent the processes 
which can usually be observed in human problem-solvers. After all, it is the 
problem-solving of physicians which we want to improve. Not by attempting 
to make radical changes in the physicians' behaviour, but by supplying 
nudges and hints which may help the doctor avoid making errors on the 
difficult path from patient's complaint to diagnosis. 
Many models have been proposed for the diagnostic process; models orig-
inating from various disciplines such as cognitive psychology, philosophy, 
information and decision theory, and artificial intelligence. Some models are 
intended to simulate what actually goes on in the doctor's brain; others are 
cast in a form so as to represent a way in which computers might arrive at a 
diagnosis. These latter models represent a logical way of reasoning which 
seems rather remote from the day-to-day working pattern of the physician. 
The first results with the use of these formal approaches were very impres-
sive in the achieved level of diagnostic accuracy [Dom72] [Dom72a] 
[Dom87]. In day-to-day practice however, the effects were less striking. 
Howell complains that attention is focused too much upon the methods 
people ought to use, and not on how they use them. "We should concentrate 
on what people actually do and develop descriptive models to account for 
decision processes. This, then, has been the trend of late: from normative to 
descriptive modelling." [How82] 
The principles of modelling, including the principles of normative modelling, 
have contributed greatly to the understanding of processes that are used in 
medical problem-solving. We shall proceed to discuss a number of these 
models. 
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3.2 Medical Decision Making 
Several attempts to gain insight in the medical diagnostic process and to 
optimize it have been made and are still being made. Among these attempts 
are the Problem-oriented-medical record, medical audit, protocols (how to 
diagnose and act in certain cases prescribed by experts), flow charts, and 
several variations of medical decision making. So far, the results of all these 
methods are discouraging when applied in practice. 
Medical decision making is based on Decision Theory, a group of related 
constructs that seek to describe or prescribe how individuals or groups of 
individuals select a course of action when faced with several alternatives, 
having a variable amount of knowledge about the determinants or the 
outcomes of those alternatives. The theory can be divided into two types: on 
the one hand, a theory concerning descriptive behaviour (how people do 
behave), and on the other hand a theory concerning prescriptive behaviour 
(how they should behave). Decision making can be defined as the process of 
thought and action involving an irrevocable allocation of resources that 
culminates in choice behaviour. 
The decision-maker invariably has to choose from a number of alternatives, 
either diagnoses or therapeutic actions. The quality of the decision depends 
on how well the decision maker is able to acquire information, analyse it, 
and evaluate and interpret this information so as to discriminate between 
relevant and irrelevant bits of data; it also depends on how well the decision 
maker is able to cope with the stress which invariably accompanies important 
decisions. 
People are inclined to reduction and simplification, in order to avoid data 
overload, a tendency which after Mischel is called "cognitive economics." 
[Mis79] 
Cognitive economics produces several dangers such as: erroneous routes of 
simplification, unpredictable growth of self-knowledge, and unchecked rules 
for self-regulation with maturation. 
Medical decision making is based on a theory which has not originated 
within the medical world. It can be viewed as a multi-step process which 
culminates in the selection of one alternative in preference to another. It 
delineates the steps a physician ought to make in order to arrive at an 
optimal decision. These steps can be described as: 
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1) ascertain the need for a decision; 
2) establish decision criteria; 
3) allocate weights to the criteria; 
4) develop alternatives; 
5) evaluate alternatives; 
6) select the best alternative. 
A basic thought behind this approach is the assumption that medicine as a 
discipline starts from clearly defined entities (like the elements in chemistry) 
which can unequivocally be distinguished. It assumes causal relationships 
between the composing elements such as symptoms and signs, and a clear 
notion of the probabilities of the distribution of diseases as well as symptoms 
and signs. As we have discussed in chapter 1, this notion applies to only a 
few groups of diseases and certainly not to the majority of i1lnesses as they 
are presented in the consulting rooms of general practitioners. The lack of 
success of medical decision making in this field must partly be attributed to 
this deficiency in the discipline of medicine itself. It is essential to both the 
disciplines of medical and information science, to strive for one line of 
research, one common view of the medical process, one shared language. 
Both disciplines have to analyse their methods and contents in a rational and 
objective way. For the medical part we may agree with Taylor when he 
states: "It is, therefore, more promising to begin projects of this kind with an 
analysis of the decision made by physicians in the appropriate area of the 
health care system so that from the beginning the proposed system will fit as 
closely as possible to the needs of the existing system and to the physicians 
who will use it." [Tay76J 
3.3 Cognitive science 
Cognitive science is a complex of disciplines, among which are cogrutlve 
psychology, (artificial) intelligence, problem-solving and reasoning pro-
cesses. They all attempt to describe what actually goes on in the human brain 
during intellectual processes. Cognitive science is mainly approached from 
the viewpoint of problem-solving, but intelligence tests and the justification 
of outcomes also belong to this domain. 
Within the context of this book we are mainly interested in the problem-
solving activities of the medical doctor when facing a patient's problem. 







The first step in the diagnostic process is certainly one of observation. It is 
one of the doctor's foremost abilities: to listen and observe, to sense and feel 
what is wrong with the patient. In away, observation is the essence of the 
physician's art. The Oslerian concept: "Listen to the patient, he is telling you 
the diagnosis" is still largely valid. Regrettably, the art of observation seems 
to become more and more eroded as a method of fact-finding [Rei78]. Many 
doctors rely more and more on lab tests, and place a higher trust in 
millimoles than in their senses. But most diseases and syndromes are defined 
by their specific configuration of detectable phenomena as they may be 
observed in the patient. Identification of a disease in the patient requires 
clear and unbiased observation, looking and listening. 
Traditionally the taking of a history has been viewed as the most import-
ant part of the diagnostic process. It is also the part in which the patient has 
the opportunity to express his sensations, interpretation, views, fears and 
needs. It is the part in which the doctor generates diagnostic hypotheses 
which may subsequently be tested. This part of 'fact-finding' has been 
somewhat neglected during medical training. Apart from the vocational 
training for general practitioner, hardly any attention is paid to this important 
aspect of the diagnostic process. It is perceived as time-consuming and less 
rewarding in terms of fact acquisition, at least of facts relevant to the doctor 
[Rid93]. 
During the training of doctors, much emphasis has been put on the obser-
vation of the body. Inspection, auscultation, percussion and palpation are 
methods by which the doctor can glean valuable information from the 
patient's body. In various studies these methods appear to be less reliable 
than would be desirable. Many signs are difficult to interpret and variable in 
their presentation. But the observer, the doctor, is also prone to error. 
As Popper said, observation is 'theory-laden': we observe particular things 
in a situation because we have theories which assign relevance to some of 
them and not to others [Pop72]. There cannot be a purely neutral and 
indifferent collection of clinical facts. Each observation is person, time, and 
place-based. What is really worrying in the construction of a reliable 
database is that these highly personally-coloured data give rise to several 
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kinds of errors in the data-acquisition and -processing operation. These 
errors can be of many types: 
1) errors of omission: 
2) errors of detection: 
3) errors of interpretation: 
4) errors in recording: 
5) errors of memory recall: 
6) errors of retrieval: 
7) errors of identification: 
8) errors of terminology: 
neglecting to observe; 
failing to observe; 
dependance on the definition of cut-off point: 
the point where the calibration changes from 
normal to abnormal; 
symptoms only relevant to the task and doctor 
are memorized and recorded (Nobrega et aI., 
[Nob77]); 
inaccurate recall of assumed similarity of clini-
cal patterns; 
failing to find memorized and recorded symp-
toms and signs, test-results, therapies, etc. 
incorrect classification of the patient in the 
medical taxonomy (inaccurate diagnosis); 
the use of homonyms and synonyms in describ-
ing illness phenomena of the patient. 
Errors of detection are hard to compensate. Several factors may cause the 
failure of observation such as short nights, fatigue, bad temper, noisy 
circumstances, time pressure, annoying patients, but also a lack of interest 
and training. The best observer is a trained observer: he who knows what 
and where to look for. Observation requires an open eye, skilful hands and a 
perceptive mind: being alert to all findings whether they fit your precon-
ceived ideas or not. 
But it is very difficult to follow the line of an open mind. As the philosopher 
Blaise Pascal stated: "We impose our conceptions, our ideas and thoughts 
upon reality which creates prejudice. Prejudice precedes our view, our 
observation, and will determine what we shall see." The first diagnostic idea 
the doctor gets in mind may guide him in his observations. It makes observa-
tion not 'neutral' but 'hypothesis-driven', which narrows the scope of his 
investigation. 
In physical examination many valuable facts can be discovered by careful 
inspection, auscultation and palpation. Time pressure may detract from an 
optimal search for relevant clinical phenomena. Protocols and guidelines, 
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therefore, may serve the doctor in these circumstances. These protocols may 
also help the doctor to overcome the error of omission. By offering hints for 
observation the doctor may become attentive to several phenomena that 
otherwise would have been overlooked. Hints may also help in recalling 
certain test procedures or particular questions. The offering of lists of 
possibilities may assist in decreasing these types of observational errors. 
Clendening and Hashinger put it in the following way: "How to guard 
against incompleteness I do not know. But I do know, that in my judgement, 
the most brilliant diagnosticians of my acquaintance are the ones who do 
remember and consider the most possibilities" ([Cle47], as quoted in 
[Led58]) 
Interpretation errors depend on the distinction of health and disease. Since 
this distinction can scarcely be made, interpretation errors in terms of 
specificity (defining non-patients) and sensitivity (defining patients) have a 
strong impact on health care. 
The term "recording errors" applies not just to the written statements of 
doctors but also to their memories. The unreliability of people's judgement 
when based on memory recall was convincingly proved by the studies of 
Kahnemann & Tversky [Kah72]. 
Apart from some forms of "forgetting", sometimes information does not get 
full attention. Certain facts, which appear to the doctor to be the leading 
facts, are given with much emphasis and in detail by the patient, while other 
facts, which appear to be subordinate or trivial, are partially suppressed. 
However, it will commonly happen that the leading facts turn out to be the 
ones that had been passed over as negligible. 
Wagner et al. collected about 1000 papers on errors in medicine, of which 
383 about errors in diagnosis. [Wag78] "Although we know it (making 
errors), nevertheless, we hold the most striking judgements, data and 
findings for pure gold, and build with these elements our judgements, albeit 
in general their range is unknown to us." [Wag64] 
The main problems of observer errors can be summarized as: 
a) what is the magnitude of observer error? 
b) how can this error be minimized? 
c) what is the significance of the residual variation? and 
d) what are the effects of observer variation? 
[GiI73] 
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Transfer of data can be regarded as 'information transfer" if and only if the 
meaning of the data is the same to the sender and to the recipient. As 
medical terminology lacks overall consistency and uniformity, the abstract 
terms used in clinical medicine often hide a multitude of individual meanings 
and thoughts. In order to overcome the lack of a uniform and consistent 
terminology, several attempts have been made to set guidelines for the 
preparation of monolingual vocabularies. A classified vocabulary is the first 
step towards standardization of terms and concepts. These guidelines are just 
a means to an end: to ensure that words are used in such a way that readers 
and listeners understand them to mean what the author or speaker had in 
mind when he used them - or, as Young put it, "to get an idea as exactly as 
possible out of one mind into another". [You821 For the sake of under-
standing and retraceability, standardization of terminology is a prerequisite 
for sound and accurate medical practice. Such a standard will ensure data 
integrity, consistency, security, reliability, and ownership. 
Validation 
Information gathering is the accumulation of a profile of data about the 
patient. There are innumerable "facts" to be gathered and there are many 
reasons why physicians can go astray or misinterpret the results of their 
labour. But "facts" are only "facts" if they carry a particular meaning to the 
doctor at particular moments in a particular process. There is evidence that 
symptoms are not the elementary pieces in this process, as is usually 
assumed. Depending on the nature of the symptoms and the context in which 
they are found, their meaning may vary. Patients can notoriously be vague 
and inconsistent in their descriptions, the doctor's perceptive facilities may 
be sub-optimal, doctor-patient misunderstanding, language problems, misin-
terpretation of physical findings, and many more aspects may distort com-
patibility and consistency of physicians' databases. The suggestion that back-
feeding the information to the examining physician would help both to 
reduce the differences between physicians, and between the separate record-
ings of one physician can barely be sustained [Lah781 unless the problem of 
inconsistency can be solved. 
The variability and inaccuracy of data [Kom791 made physicians turn to 
information which appears more stable and accurate such as graphs, pictures 
and chemical tests. Unfortunately, this will not bring us much further, 
because diseases are described by their clinical picture, the specific configur-
ation of symptoms and signs, as was discussed in the first chapter. 
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In the theory of clinical decision analysis the relevance of a symptom is often 
expressed by its degree of contribution to a particular disease. The diagnostic 
value of a symptom is disease-dependent and its relevance is likely to be 
different for different diseases. [Cum76] This relevance is often expressed in 
a weight to each symptom for each disease. The disease which produces the 
largest ratio of the patient's weighted symptoms to the weighted sum of aU 
characteristics for that disease is considered the correct diagnosis. The 
scoring process (the measurement of the weight) uses numerical values which 
reflect the likelihood with which various clinical findings will occur in a 
given disorder. [W or72] The mathematical theory starts from the principle 
that symptoms are the atoms of medicine. When we know the configuration 
of the disease we only have to weigh the symptoms and everything can easily 
be fitted in the right place, using only a programme to find the "goodness of 
fit". Regrettably, it is not as simple as that. Every physician knows that the 
same symptom can have different meanings not only in different diseases but 
also in the same disease. Pain in the chest in a young person can be indica-
tive of a pneumothorax, whereas in an elderly person it may point to a 
myocardial infarction. It can make a lot of difference whether a symptom 
presents itself in an acute, an intermittent or an insidious way, even if it 
concerns one and the same disease. 
The present habit of doctors to order multiple tests does not seem to con-
tribute to a clearer understanding of the problem or to help in diagnosing. 
Test results are only helpful if: 
a) they are aU normal, thus tending to exclude a disease; 
b) they are aU abnormal, thus tending to confirm a disease. 
They are least helpful when some are positive and other negative [Gri81], as 
is often the case in real-life situations. The interpretation of the results is 
also influenced by the definition of the cut-off point, the point where the 
calibration changes from normal to abnormal. When this point is moved 
towards the range found in diseased people, specificity (defining non-
patients) increases but sensitivity (defining patients) decreases, and when it is 
moved in the opposite direction, the reverse is true. 
Another source of error is formed by the process "massing of data". [Lic78] 
If a doctor is confronted with a patient's complaint of stabbing pain on the 
chest with exertion he mentaUy completes the picture with aU data concern-
ing Angina pectoris. "Massing of data" (defining syndromes) enables the 
doctor to economize his information recording and processing but is liable to 
lead to "missing of data". The validity of such a procedure depends on 
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whether the doctor will actually complete his picture by testing his hypoth-
esis. 
"Massing of data" also influences people's estimation of occurrences espe-
cially when the occurrences have a catastrophic character. People respond 
strongly to emotionally charged events. The media dwell on potential catas-
trophes and not on successful operations ("fear sells"). The more there is 
published about the same disease, the more the physician tends to diagnose 
it. The studies of Tversky & Kahnemann [Tve74] made clear that people 
tend to estimate weights of events and their frequency by a number of 
erroneous heuristics. Estimates play an essential role in medical decision 
making. The validity of most estimates in clinical practice is still matter of 
debate. 
Identification 
Of this process Ledley and Lusted tried to give one of the first systematic 
accounts: 
"First, I obtain the case facts from the patient's history, physical examin-
ation, and laboratory tests. Second, I evaluate the relative importance of 
the different signs and symptoms. Some of the data may be of first-order 
importance and other data of less importance. Third, to make a differen-
tial diagnosis I list all the diseases which the specific case can reasonably 
resemble. Then I exclude one disease after another from the list until it 
becomes apparent that the case can be fitted into a defmite disease 
category, or that it may be one of several possible diseases, or else that 
its exact nature cannot be determined." [Led59] 
While this is not a bad description of the way in which the diagnostic 
process is described in clinico-pathological conferences in medical journals, 
(CPCs in the New England Journal of Medicine were part of the authors' 
study material for their article) it has obviously little to do with the daily 
activities of doctors when seeing a real patient, and the authors admit that it 
is obviously "greatly simplified". We think Sober is right in stating that "The 
clinician's description of his clinical diagnostics is no more than rationaliz-
ation. It is false to the facts of his own psychological processes". [Sob79] 
According to Pauker et aL [pau76] this description represents the difference 
between the expert in practice and the expert as often depicted in literature 
or folklore. The epitome of the expert in fiction is the detective who, 
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through superior deductive powers and by sheer force of logic, organizes the 
facts at hand in a way that leads to a single, inevitable conclusion. By 
contrast, the real-world physician seems to rely much more heavily upon 
"guessing", his initial hypothesis typically being based on precious little data. 
These "guesses" are apparently prompted by pattern of clinical findings or 
by specific complaints which bring to mind particular diseases. The phys-
ician then tries to demonstrate the correctness of his "guesses", moving to 
new hypotheses only if his initial impressions prove untenable. 
One of the most striking phenomena in the medical problem-solving process 
is the early generation of (diagnostic) hypotheses. "Specific diagnostic 
hypotheses were generated often with little more information than presenting 
complaints" (Kassirer, [Kas78]). This phenomenon was generally found in 
various different studies of physicians' problem-solving behaviour ([Barn], 
[Boh7S], [Els78], [Gr08S], [Nor88], [Rid89]) and seen as part of the 
(specific) diagnostic strategy of the physician. This strategy, which is 
observed in actual experiments, seems to be characterized by the early 
generation of an hypothesis, in a process similar to that of template match-
ing, followed by a search for symptoms to complete the template (current 
hypothesis). Obviously, this type of hypothesis should not be confused with a 
scientific one. It must be viewed as a reflection, an idea, a thought, based on 
many sources among which are presented evidence, background knowledge, 
specific experience referring to analogies with familiar pictures and configur-
ations. Since these hypotheses cannot come from the stimulus perceptions, 
they have to come from the doctors themselves. This type of hypothesis, 
therefore, involves a personal investment, a sense of commitment. These 
hypotheses must be viewed as highly personal "patterns" like the ones we 
know from pattern recognition. 
Pattern recognition may serve as the main characteristic of the behaviour of 
the doctor's strategy. It can be identified as a process of matching a patient's 
symptom configuration with one that the physician has memorized either 
from literature or through personal experience [Rid8S]. 
The rationale behind the identification process is to search and find a 
disease entity, defined within the taxonomy of diseases. Identification will be 
defined as the allocation or assignment of additional unidentified objects 
(patient cases) to the correct class, once such classes have been established 
by prior classification. The definition of classification is the ordering or 
arrangement of cases into groups or sets on the basis or their relationships. 
[Sok74] All classifications aim to achieve economy of memory. The world is 
full of single cases. By grouping numerous individual cases (objects) into a 
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class, a taxon, the description subsumes the individual description of the 
objects/cases contained within it. By grouping the cases into a taxon we are 
already aware that, although not all the patients may yet have been grouped 
there, eventually all the patients within the taxon measles will get spots. If 
we combine 100.000 cases of measles into one taxon the average course of 
the disease can be deduced from such a taxon. The cases are arranged in 
systems in which the several taxa can be easily named and related to one 
another. The paramount purpose of classification is to simplify these relation-
ships in such a way that general statements and predictions can be made 
about classes of objects/cases. 
Prognosis is the ultimate goal of medicine. Prognosis permits the choice 
of the proper treatment and its evaluation. But preceding any prognosis there 
must be a correct identification of the disease-taxon. 
Classifications that describe relationships among cases should generate 
hypotheses. In fact, the principal scientific justification for establishing 
classifications is that they are heuristic and that they lead to the statement of 
a hypothesis that can be tested [Rid891. 
But it is at this point that problems arise. As in all biological classifications 
there is variability between the elements that make up a taxon. As the 
distinctions between the various disease-taxa are rather vague, the art of 
diagnostics is very much complicated by this variability. Individual differ-
ences may account for much uncertainty. Symptoms which clearly belong to 
one disease may appear in another disease. Disease of the lungs and disease 
of the heart may be very similar in their clinical picture but very much 
different in cause and course. Any medical diagnosis bears the possibility of 
alternative explanations. It is up to the practising physician to test and judge 
the various possibilities. 
Another obstacle in the identification process is the variability of staging. 
Illnesses present in various disguises, depending on their stage of develop-
ment. The first symptoms of a disease may be less distinctive than the 
symptoms with which it presents in its full-blown stage. The task of a 
general practitioner is complicated by his position. He is the gateway to 
more specialistic medical aid and, therefore, one of the first to see the 
patient. Moreover, a taxonomy of diseases in their first stages does not exist 
yet. General practitioners have to derive their clinical pictures from the 
knowledge of the full-blown equivalents as they are taught in medical schools 
and described in textbooks. General practitioners have to operate in that 
particular domain where symptoms and signs are vague and variable and 
disease-descriptions very much overlapping. More than their fellow-phys-
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icians in the world of specialized medicine, general practitioners have to rely 
heavily on their intuition and personal experience. 
A commonly heard statement is that general practitioners do not arrive at 
a specific diagnosis, but usually dwell on such entities as: headache, belly-
ache, something wrong in the chest, or describe the illness by its dominant 
symptom such as: dizziness, diarrhoea, fatigue. But such a description is 
beneath the mark of any professional management. The goal of every doctor 
is to heal the patient by means of a treatment of which he knows all the 
secrets. It means that he has at least some idea about the kind of disease and 
the patient's immediate future. Any prescription is a justification of this 
thought. Unfortunately, most of these ideas remain beneath the surface of 
consciousness and certainly beyond the reach of any recording. This makes 
the doctor's activities vulnerable and un-reviewable. It does not permit the 
retracing of his mental steps and these therefore become incorrigible. 
A logical stepwise diagnosis may be performed from two starting points: 
the identification process itself and the process of justification. Starting from 
the taxonomy of diseases it seems plausible to begin the identification 
process with a tentative hypothesis which covers a broad class of taxa. 
Taxonomy itself is hierarchically layered. In a biological taxonomy, for 
instance that of Linnaeus, several levels of specification can be distinguished. 
It begins with the two kingdoms (plants and animals, botany and zoology) 
and follows in increasing detail with phyla, classes, order, families, genera, 
and species. Attempts in this direction for the medical taxonomy have been 
proposed by Doroszewski [Dor80] and Ridderikhoff [Rid91]. The latter 
author defined a hierarchical partition ranging from global descriptions, like 
"anything wrong with .. " to specified bio-pathological states. 
Levell: Human being. 
Descriptions referring to global states comprising the total human being. It 
refers to descriptions like ill/not ill, mental/somatic. serious/not serious. 
Level 2: Multiple organ dysfunction. 
This class refers to psychopathological states comprising more than one 
organ system. It includes diseases of body systems or body parts. This class 
can be typified by examples like: unspecified infectious diseases, unspecified 
neoplasmata, unspecified ailments of body parts ("something in the chest"). 
Level 3: Organ system. 
This class follows the normal medical distinction of organ systems. For 
instance: respiratory tract, digestive tract, musculo-skeletal tract. 
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Level 4: Organ. 
This class refers to specified organs and tissue entities. It includes the 
nearest explanations to the specified disease entity. It can be typified as gall-
bladder disease, anaemia, eczema, etc. 
Level 5: Cellular. 
This class describes a specified biopathological state. It refers to all specific 
diseases generally described in medical textbooks. It provides an exact 
circumscription of the lesion and its cause. 
The idea that doctors will follow this hierarchical line of reasoning in their 
diagnostic process, by moving through a number of hypotheses of increasing 
detail, was tested in a study with 60 general practitioners and 8 internists 
solving 253 simulated patient cases [Rid86]. No such reasoning was found. 
The more specific the first hypothesis, the narrower the scope of investiga-
tion. In fact, 23 % of the early hypotheses belonged to the levels 1 + 2 
(respectively 6% and 17%), whereas 77% pertained to the levels 3+4+5 
(respectively 14%, 34%, and 29%). Not every diagnostic process ended up 
in very specific diagnoses. Of all final diagnoses 8 % scored in the levels 
1 +2 (resp. 1 % and 7%) and 82% of the diagnoses were more or less 
specific (resp. level 3: 11 %, level 4: 35%, and level 5: 47%). Less than half 
of the clinical processes ended with a diagnosiS allowing precise prediction. 
This sums up the general practitioner's dilemma with the imprecise medical 
taxonomy in his domain. He is more or less groping in the dark; fortunately 
however, things generally turn out well. 
The doctor's process of identification can be conceived as a sequence of 
"diagnostic guesses", each of which is subjected to justification. The "diag-
nostic guesses", however, usually follow a single line: a line within one 
tract. To generate a hypothesis in another tract seemed to require a larger 
leap of imagination than to look within the same tract. [Rid86] 
Justification. 
Once we have arrived at some diagnostic ideas, the next step is to make a 
choice and to justify that choice. Much research, and even more speculation, 
has gone on into the question of how a doctor selects a diagnosis for a given 
patient who presents himself, or is presented, to him. It is also one of the 
key issues in this study. How does the doctor decide what is wrong with the 
patient; why does he select any particular diagnosis in preference to another 
which may be objectively just as likely? The diagnosis is a decision which is 
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of crucial importance for the patient. Does the doctor take this decision 
optimally, or could it be improved? If the diagnosis is correct, the accepted 
treatment may be looked up in a medical book. If the diagnosis is wrong, the 
patient will have to get better without the benefit of a correct treatment, and 
perhaps despite the treatment for another disease which the patient does not 
have, and which may well harm him. 
But making a correct diagnosis is prime creative challenge; and that there is 
room for improvement is shown by the fact that many diagnoses made by 
doctors, in fact many more than suspected by the general public, are wrong. 
According to Wardel & Wardle, Rosenblatt found only 44 % accuracy for 
cancer of the lung; Gwynne found 33.4% false negative diagnoses in a 
sample of 1627 patients; Prutting found more than 50% inaccurate diag-
noses in various series; in France, in a report of 100 autopsies, in 55.4% of 
diagnoses were missed ([War78]; Garland reported an accuracy of 44 % for 
myocardial infarction. [Gar60] This is consistent with the findings of Lubsen 
and v.d. Does. [Doe78] Ridderikhoff found in a population of general practi-
tioners a diagnostic accuracy of 47 % for common diseases [Rid86], and de 
Dombal found an accuracy between 40 and 60% for acute abdominal condi-
tions. [Domn] 
These low numbers may seem more alarming than they are in practice: most 
health problems presented to the general practitioner are over by next week, 
whether the patient takes an aspirin, or any other drug, or not. If the 
condition does not improve sufficiently, the patient will probably be back 
and the doctor can have another go. But the efficiency of the medical system 
improves if we "get it right the first time". And of course there do exist 
cases where the patient comes to serious harm because of a wrong diagnosis. 
The quality of medical diagnostics has been subject of many studies. The 
subject has been approached from different angles of which the most import-
ant are: Decision theory, cognitive science and philosophy. Decision theory 
has already been discussed in the first section of this chapter. 
3.4 Problem solving 
Before a person can attempt to solve a problem, he must understand or 
'assimilate' a description of the problem. The presentation of a complaint 
does not automatically imply its understanding by the problem-solver. 
Cognitive psychology attemps to describe what actually goes on inside the 
brain when the subject is solving a problem. 
There are at least two conditions to this understanding: 
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a) it is only a problem if it puzzles or worries somebody (assimila-
tion)(polanyi, [poI68]); 
b) a translation of the problem can be made in such a way that it becomes a 
familiar type of problem to the problem-solver, for which he has means 
within his repertoire of techniques to solve it. (acquisition) (Mettes, 
[Met80]). 
In order to be able to attack a problem the problem-solver translates the 
problem into a familiar one and he defines a problem space. The doctor's 
problem space can be described as his particular medical knowledge relevant 
to the case and his/her particular way of reasoning in order to solve this 
clinical problem. As the physician's medical knowledge is partly experiential 
knowledge and the rules of the problem-solving are more or less idiosyn-
cratic ones, the problem space also includes the prejudices and prejudgem-
ents of the doctor. Chapman and Chapman [Cha76] demonstrated how prior 
expectations can lead to erroneous observations and inferences. 
Familiarization of problems may create bias. It means e.g. that the doctor 
translates the patient's problem into a task he can understand within the 
context of medical science and health care. For example, many doctors, 
especially general practitioners, are often confronted with problems beyond 
their special competence, e.g. problems of a social, educational or psychO-
logical nature. Frequently they try to translate these problems to domains in 
which they feel more confident, e.g. a clinical domain. 
Animal studies led to the belief that problems are solved by trial and 
error. In medical practice there is very little room for trial and error. 
Perhaps because of this the solving process is often assumed to originate 
differently. 
(I) Sequential: the solver always appears to search sequentially, adding small 
successive accretions to his store of information about the problem and 
its possible solution (Simon & Newell, [Sim71]). This process is assumed 
to take place in normative medical decision making. 
(2) Configural (Gestalt psychology): the mind has the tendency to organize 
and integrate and to perceive situations, including problems, as total 
structures. In the Gestalt view, the insight that leads to a solution stems 
from the perception of the requirements of a problem [Sch63]. 
In Gestalt psychology the perception of the solution of a problem is like the 
perception of a hidden figure in a puzzle picture. It means that: 
a particular disease pattern existing in the memory is called for; 
between the call and the 'jumping to mind' no (logically) (re)traceable 
steps can be formulated, nor observed; 
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the disease pattern does not necessarily represent an exact replica of the 
memorized pattern: it shows a number of gross characteristics which 
mirror the original one. [Rid89] 
The implications of this view are decisive. Because of its irreversible and 
non-retraceable character the solution of the problem is perceived by the 
problem-solver as an actual discovery. But a discovery is only accredited as 
such when we believe that it comes from sheer induction, 'out of the blue'. 
The discovery makes the subject believe that the element is a "real fact" 
existing outside himself. "Any presumed contact with reality inevitably 
claims universality" (polanyi, [PoI68]). While the sequential process can be 
made explicit by following the steps, the configurational one is unique, 
, einmalig'. This view is corroborated by the finding of the absence of 
falsifying behaviour in problem-solving processes by physicians. ([BaI80], 
[Rid89], [Was77]). 
3.5 Clinical judgement 
Clinical judgement is an important human cognitive activity, typically carried 
out by a professional person, with the aim of the prediction of significant 
outcomes in the life of another individual. It is suggested that the clinical 
judgement of a physician is, at the very least, related to his underlying 
intellectual ability, to the quality of medical education and to the depth of his 
clinical experience. Knowledge that is gained by experience is not reducible 
to explicit rules, recipes, or basic principles, however. [Eng79] Even some 
single data and the notion of frequency evokes the physician's judgement on 
only a few alternative outcomes. Barrows & Bennet were amazed that in 
almost all physicians the judgement was reached before all the available data 
from the patient were obtained. [Barn] Kleinmuntz demonstrated that data 
not related to the physician's mental hypothesis or diagnosis are totally 
forgotten by the physician. [Kle68] Physicians tend to cease further inquiry 
when a stereotypical pattern has come to mind. The doctor is satisfied with a 
marginally verified pattern and he feels quite certain about his judgement. 
Goldberg comes to the conclusion that clinical judgements are: 
(a) rather unreliable; 
(b) minimally related to confidence and amount of experience; 
(c) relatively unaffected by the amount of information available; 
(d) rather low in validity. [GoI68] 
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Ridderikhoff summarized the fmdings of cognitive psychology with respect 
to medical problem solving as follows: 
"The rise and development of the cognitive science has given some 
insight and understanding of the mental processes involved in problem-
solving. A number of theories have been developed ranging from the 
classic introspection method to the current theory of information process-
ing. In the latter approach the process may be sketched as one of collect-
ing data in a sequential order, interpreting and analyzing these data, and 
performing some kind of analysis upon them, which may eventually lead, 
by force of logic, to a valid judgement. However, the process as such 
was found to be virtually non-existent in routine clinical practice. Cogni-
tive biases, uncertain and unreliable clinical data, sub-optimal and 
prejudiced data acquisition, early reduction of possible states of affairs, 
and the communication and interaction of problems between patients and 
doctors make the thought of a strict and rational process of information-
handling rather unrealistic. "[Rid93] 
3.6 Philosophical approaches 
Philosophy has since time immemorial tried to examine and define how we 
know something, and how we can proceed to something else, given that we 
know it. And how we are able to know whether the something else repre-
sents the 'Truth', or a real 'law of Nature'. "The aim of science is to find 
satisfactory explanation of whatever strikes us as being in need of explana-
tion" [pop83]. It is assumed that valid inference and logical reasoning from 
theories or from observations will help us find the Truth. To this end two 
main ways of reasoning have been defined: the inductive and the deductive 
way. Another method has been developed during the previous century and 
was called after Whewell(l837): hypothetico-deductive. [Whe37] 
3.6.1 Inductive reasoning 
Inductive reasoning starts from unbiased observation of Nature which, by 
force of our creative facilities, leads to a hypothesis which is then verified by 
the observation of Nature. This leads to what Braithwaite [Bra68] calls "a 
circular reasoning": verifying hypotheses based on some evidence with 
evidence derived, or at least related, from this hypothesis. It can be illus-
trated by the following dialogue: "Why is this person so pale?" - "Because 
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he is ill." - "By what evidence can you support your statement that the 
person is ill?" - "Oh, can't you see he is pale? And is that not always the 
case when people are ill?" [Rid89]. 
Moreover, unbiased observation is seriously questioned by many authors. It 
is best illustrated by a Popperian anecdote: "My experiment consists in 
asking you to observe, here and now. I hope you are all co-operating and 
observing! However, I fear that at least some of you, instead of observing, 
will feel the strong urge to ask: 'What do you want me to observe'?" [Joh73] 
Inductive reasoning concludes from detailed observations to general state-
ments. If we have seen 5 white swans and we observe another white speci-
men we believe in the statement that all swans are white. If we have seen 5 
patients with cough and fever, all suffering from pneumonia, and another 
patient presents himself with cough and fever we believe the patient to suffer 
from pneumonia. 
But as Russell states: "however many cases of coherence between A and B 
we have observed, it cannot be a reason for their coherence in the future. 
Therefore, induction by simple enumeration cannot be a valid way of 
reasoning". [Rus56] 
Inductive thinking, as a generalization from specific instances to higher 
rules, in the words of Medawar 
"cannot be a logically rigorous process. It cannot (as deduction can, 
properly executed) lead us with certainty to the truth. Mill believed it 
could do so, but John Venn and C.S. Pierce and others flatly disagreed 
with him, and it is their opinion which has prevailed. I shall waste no 
time attacking a position that is no longer defended. No process of 
reasoning whatsoever can, with logical certainty, enlarge the empirical 
content of the statements out of which it issues." [Med67] 
Although the disadvantages and drawbacks of the inductive method as a 
method of science were broadly advocated, its overall existence cannot be 
negated. It is practised as an ordinary way of reasoning in daily life. People 
usually infer general statements from particular elements or single observa-
tions. We are so accustomed to this type of reasoning that it happens without 
our noticing. Inductive reasoning is a way of surviving in a world full of 
information and uncertainty. Rephrasing Bacon, we could say: "The last 
thing anyone would be likely to entertain is a state of uncertainty". 
In the uncertain world of medical practice the doctor must be creative as 
well as economical with his time. Pattern recognition and a parsimonious 
testing of mental ideas are instruments for quick judgement. "This judgement 
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may very well be true and may serve as a guide in action, but it cannot be 
shown to be true. The fact that it works says little about its truth; it just tells 
us that it works, and the explanation why it works may be very different 
from what we think it is" (Brehmer, [Bre80]). In the inductive reasoning the 
diagnosis is based on the analogy of the clinical picture of the patient with 
the one remembered from experience or learned from the classical taxonomy 
of diseases (see chapter 1). The elusive way in which the analogy is 'sensed' 
from the (possibly biased) observation, combined with the extremely per-
functory testing of the 'clinical picture' forms a major obstacle to feedback, 
evaluation and retracing of mental steps in the problem-solving process. 
The inductive process of medical problem-solving may be sketched as one of 
successive "diagnostic guesses"; guesses based on presumed similarity of 
(parts of) the clinical picture of the patient with a memorized one. As was 
mentioned before, the memorized picture is mainly based on experience 
[Koc83] and is therefore a personal one which is expressed in individual 
terminology. It is also very personal in so far as people adore their own 
brainchild and are very reluctant to reject it. 
The testing procedure in inductive reasoning is guided by the mental hypoth-
esis. Informational cues and testing elements cannot be distinguished in the 
clinical process (Elstein et aI., [Els78]). The acquisition of symptoms which 
test the generated hypothesis are used to generate another hypothesis in 
reverse [Rid89]. In his study of the problem-solving behaviour of general 
practitioners Ridderikhoff found that 75 % of the acquired symptoms were 
directly related to a hypothesis. But if a hypothesis is the dominant force 
behind the acquisition of patient information, alternative explanations of the 
collected data will compete less successful\y for the attention of the problem-
solver. As had been already mentioned by Kleinmuntz [Kle68], in this study 
it was also found that doctors completely "forgot" non-hypothesis-related 
data; data which might have served the doctor in finding alternative explana-
tions for the presented problem. 
Sage [Sag81]) listed some of the concepts induction-led people employ. The 
concepts: 
(a) are drawn from personal experience; 
(b) involve elementary classification and generalization concerning tangible 
and familiar thoughts; 
(c) involve direct cause and effect relationships, typically in simple two-
variable situations; 
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(d) can be taught or understood by analogy, algorithms, effects, standard 
operating policy, or recipe; 
(e) are 'closed' in the sense of not demanding exploration of possibilities 
outside the known environment of the perceived data. 
Retraceability is a chief condition of a verifiable diagnostic judgement. 
Another doctor, or the same doctor at another time, should be able to retrace 
the reasoning which led him to his conclusion. If this is not possible, no 
learning from experience can take place. This quality of retraceability can 
only be found in two other ways of reasoning: deductive and hypothetico-
deductive. The 'reasoning' of the DDSS, conforms most closely to the 
inductive variety, just like the doctor's. It is our philosophy to stick as 
closely as possible to the usual deeds and thinking of the practising doctor. 
The system is eminently retraceable, however: consecutive runs with the 
same data are guaranteed to produce the same result, and the reason why this 
diaguosis is suggested and not another may be immediately inspected. 
3.6.2 Deductive reasoning 
Deductive reasoning is a different method of inference. Instead of making 
general statements (diagnoses) plausible from the observed evidence, the 
deductive reasoning starts from the opposite side. "If a general statement or 
theory is true, then I must fmd some evidence to justifY the hypothesis by 
simple testing". Deductive reasoning may start from bold and brave asser-
tions and proceeds by a strict logical process of detailing and specifYing 
inference. Deductive reasoning is usually exemplified by a syllogism: 
All Greeks are mortaL 
Hippocrates is a Greek. 
Hippocrates is mortal 
The reasoning is one of the "if ... then" type. It is sequentially and logically 
constructed so that the steps of the mental processes can be retraced. A more 
detailed argument must unequivocally follow from the preceding one which 
in its tum comes after a more generally stated argument. The most finely-
grained argument (hypothesis) is open to testing by a controlled experiment. 
This particular hypothesis can either be verified or rejected. As a conse-
quence of its logical reasoning in argumentation-steps [Sad74] the result of 
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the testing is valid for the complete construction, including the preceding 
general statement. Any mode of reasoning which ends with more than one 
hypothesis left (as some other plausible explanation) is contradictory to 
deductive inference. 
An example of such an inference is given in the following: 
I) According to the evidence the underlying disease is of origin A (the 
pathophysiology of an organ or organ system). There is, e.g. a lung 
disease; 
II) The observed evidence (symptoms and signs) can only be explained 
by explanation B of the A origin. The disease can only be explained 
by e.g. an inflammation of the lungs; 
rna) In case of explanation B there must be a C test of D level 
confirmative of the B, e.g. demonstration of the presence of 
pneumococci in the sputum of the patient; 
IDb) In case of explanation B there must be a C test of E level (E! =D) 
refutative of B, e.g., when microorganisms of the type Bact. 
pneumococci are demonstrated to be present there cannot be an 
increasing antibody titre for a different microorganism. 
Tested against this particular case: 
fl: In all cases of disease A the level D of test C is within the range R; 
e.g. over a certain number of microorganisms; 
gl: In this case the level D of the test C is within the range R. (from 
[Rid89]) 
Variability of diseases and their causal relationships often prevent a clear 
deductive reasoning in practical medicine. Although this method should be a 
preferred one in scientific reasoning, the limitations of medical knowledge 
and the practical situations in which doctors find themselves interfere with 
such ambition. 
Hypothetico-deductive reasoning 
With the theory of hypothetico-deductive reasoning a bridge between the two 
antithetical conceptions seemed to have been built. Originating in the 19th 
century the method combines inductive and deductive reasoning into one 
single process. It starts with the inductive act of generating hypotheses from 
observation and in the second part justifies these hypotheses by deductive 
inference. This mode of reasoning is fairly generally assumed to be used by 
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doctors, although this has been seriously questioned by others (McCormack, 
[McC86]) 
Medawar listed a number of positive features of this method. 
1) A clear distinction is made between discovery (a creative thought) and 
justification or proof; 
2) The hypothetico-deductive scheme provides a theory with a special incen-
tive. Our observations no longer range over the universe of observables; 
they are confined to those that have bearing on the hypothesis under 
investigation; 
3) It allows also for the continual rectification of the hypotheses by the 
process of negative feedback; 
4) Error is simply explained; scientific error is now an ordinary part of 
human fallibility; 
5) The hypothetico-deductive scheme gives due weight to the critical 
purposes of experimentation: we carry out experiments more often to 
discriminate between possibilities than to enlarge the stockpile of factual 
information. [Med69] 
It is our contention that a severe limitation of the search for hypotheses takes 
place. The search is limited to what is previously within our experience, 
which then determines the relevance which we ascribe to characteristics of 
the case at hand. We are not so sure that a restricted hypothesis generation 
does not influence the process by which a conclusion is reached. When this 
'act of proof is assumed to follow the ritual of deductive inference, the 
falsification of the generated idea is the logical implication. However, this 
presumes that our observations will be made with the goal of falsifying the 
hypothesis: either we may come to think that our observations may them-
selves have been faulty, or that they may have been made against a back-
ground of misconceptions, or our experiment(s) may have been badly 
designed. It is very unlikely that individuals would reason in this way. We 
follow Harre [Har72] in his statement that in essence the hypothetico-deduct-
ive method is an inductive method. 
Several authors, however, believe the hypothetico-deductive method to be "a 
nearly universal characteristic of human thinking in complex, poorly defined 
environments" (Elstein et ai, [Els78]). Needless to say, these authors 
consider medicine to be such an environment. These authors, however, have 
not provided a general scheme for such a conviction. Conversely, 
McCormack considers the claim of a hypothetico-deductive method in 
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clinical practice to be a myth to season the clinical decision process with a 
scientific flavour.[McC86] 
When looking for the landmarks of the hypothetico-deductive method, 
Ridderikhoff found no such cases in his material. [Rid86] 
3.7 Probabilistic approaches 
The number of techniques to analyse data has increased enormously over the 
past decades. These techniques are almost all based on probability theory and 
they have been developed so as to end up with some kind of inference, some 
statement about the real world. The concept of probability, however, is 
rather abstract and hence the question arises: what is the interpretation of the 
notion of probability in real-world situations? When we try to answer this 
question we reach the foundations of probability theory and, as in many 
sciences, it is precisely here that differences in opinion appear. The founda-
tions of this concept have been object of much discussion [Rid89l. Different 
interpretations have resulted in different axiomatic systems. 
The usual distinction in probability theory is: 
I) objective probability; and 
II) sUbjective probability (also called: inductive probability). 
The former meaning refers to the mathematical type of probability, or 
statistical probability. In its simplest form it can defined as "the relative 
frequency of an event 'a' occurring within a reference class (also called 
'population') 'b'; in formula: 
p(a,b) = r 
Sometimes another formula is used: 
pea) = r 
or, the (absolute probability) of 'a' being 'r', also called the 'prior' or 'a 
priori' probability, when a specific reference class is taken as 'understood'. 
For this type of probability there is no place in general practice. For there is 
no point in saying "measles is a common disease" unless you specify "in 
childhood", and even then not every child with symptoms similar to those of 
measles has the disease and not all analogous symptoms refer exclusively to 
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measles. The expression p(D), the 'absolute' probability of disease D, cannot 
have any relevance within the framework of objective (statistical) probability, 
unless a conditional reference class is taken as understood or will 
subsequently be added. In daily medical practice such a reference class 
cannot be adequately defined, hence the objective type of probabilistic 
reasoning cannot be a basis for the justification of certain hypotheses in 
routine practice. 
However, the notion of randomness (patients and diseases present themselves 
in a completely haphazard way) and uncertainty (as a consequence of any 
problem-solving process) led several scientists to believe that the decision-
making process has something to do with probability. Given a prior probabil-
ity of a certain hypothesis and the weights of the evidence related to this 
hypothesis we will eventually be led to some notion of strength (posterior 
probability) for the decision. But this notion of probability is not identical to 
the definition of objective probability. It refers to the other form of probabil-
ity: subjective or inductive probability. Inductive probability is a measure of 
the strength of support given to a hypothesis (h) by the evidence (e). In the 
notation of Carnap [Car60] it takes the form 
C (h,e) = r 
which is the degree of confirmation (C) of 'h' on the basis of 'e'. The 
hypothesis may be any statement of an event, e.g. a diagnosis. Any set of 
known or assumed facts may serve as evidence; it consists usually of the 
results of observations which have been made. In this sense, inductive 
probability theory, as it is developed by Carnap, is a principle of learning 
from experience which guides, our inductive thinking in everyday affairs and 
in science. It expresses in quantitative terms our confidence in the outcome 
of a particular process. This kind of probability, which must not be confused 
with the objective probability of statistics, should be understood in the 
context of a defmed virtual sequence of events. We have to assume an 
orderly trend which is not assumed to be present in objective probability. 
Inductive probability is a way of judging hypotheses concerning unknown 
events. It is guided by our knowledge of observed events. The greater the 
relative frequency of an event the more plausible an assumed hypothesis. It 
seems plausible in daily practice, that from observation of what has in the 
past been the consequence of a certain course of action, one may make a 
judgement as to what is likely to be the consequence of that course of action 
another time. Our confidence that a certain therapy will work in a present 
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case of certain disease is higher the more frequently it has worked in past 
cases. But this inference is logically false to the facts. The outcomes of the 
various types of probability (objective or frequentistic and inductive) are not 
interchangeable as was shown by Feller (see [pop83]). It disregards sources 
of evidence unrelated to the particular hypothesis; and assumes orderly 
trends where real life provides us with randomness and sometimes chaos. 
This means that replacing probability estimates from research in (diseased) 
populations into a formula intended for subjective (inductive) probability, or 
vice versa, is very hazardous. It creates one of the more difficult problems to 
be solved in medical decision-making. If one is not aware of differences 
between the two types of probability, decision-making can produce outcomes 
far removed from reality, apart from the variations due to the personal 
knowledge and backgrounds of the physicians. 
Various flaws and weaknesses may occur in the diagnostic process of the 
practising physician. Unlike the structured and well-prepared discussions of 
medical judgements as described in the clinico-pathological conferences in 
various medical journals, the practising doctor is unpreparedly confronted 
with a large number of patients with a multitude of ailments. Eddy & 
Clanton propose a multistep model based on these clinicopathological 
conferences, but they must admit that "It is impossible to state precisely the 
extent to which the diagnostic methods displayed in CPCs are used in 
practice. The CPC is an artificial forum." [Edd82] Besides, the general 
practitioner is the one who has to decide about the least documented diseases 
in their vaguest forms. The worrying statistics of diagnostic accuracy, 
however, must be a good reason to strive for improvement. If modern 
equipment and methods can present a helping hand, by all means let us grasp 
it. 
This is the raison d' etre of the Diagnostic Decision Support System. It 
endeavours to help the practising physician in the various stages of the 
diagnostic process: observation, validation, identification and justification, 




Chapter 4. Problem formulation 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we will outline the problems we face when designing a 
system to assist the doctor, and further we shall enumerate the main prop-
erties of a well-designed system and its expected benefits for the physician. 
The job of the doctor consists for a large part of taking decisions concerning 
his patients. In this process, the doctor uses among other things an amount 
of patient information that should be accessible at all times. As a problem-
solver and a data processor, man is restricted by factors such as: 
a [mite memory 
an imperfect registration 
a subconscious preference for current and recent events 
a limited rationality caused by (over)simplification of reality 
a personal, unique knowledge 
stereotyped patterns of taking actions 
a number of prejudices which may blur observations 
Especially in the work of the general practitioner, as opposed to clinical 
medicine, these limitations are hard to avoid because the doctor is hardly 
able to use options such as consulting colleagues, reading all new literature, 
taking time to reflect before acting, etc, when solving a patient's problem. 
Nevertheless, the patient demands from his doctor at all times a responsible 
and reliable decision, in spite of the above limitations. 
Another problem is that doctors tend to be rather disorganized. The registra-
tion of their patients and contacts is usually incomplete (in the sense that 
another doctor probably would not be able to do very much with the 
records), and their ability to create chaos out of order is notorious. The 
reason for this may be that compared to his patient's problems, administra-
tion seems quite unimportant to the doctor. This lack of organization, 
however, may cause problems when a new doctor takes over the patient, or 
when a replacement sees the patient in the doctor's absence. Other problems 
arise when the patient has not visited the doctor for a while, and the doctor 
cannot remember exactly the medical history of this patient, which might be 
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of great importance for the current diagnosis. What is needed is a system 
that will: 
a) keep an administrative record of the 'raw' patient data, i.e. his or her 
complaints, symptoms, signs, test results, etc, stored in a structured and 
uniform way, and 
b) be able to use these structured data to aid the doctor in arriving at a 
diagnosis. 
4.2 Problem definitions and requirements. 
From the earliest beginnings of the project, three prime requirements have 
been set for the system to be developed. 
1) It should be used Simultaneously with the patient-doctor contact. 
This starting-point is in contrast to the traditional state of affairs: most 
diagnostic systems are meant to be used especially or exclusively in difficult 
cases, and after the patient has been seen. But most doctors struggle particu-
larly with the so-called 'easy' cases: cases which present little hard evidence, 
cases hardly mentioned in the textbook literature, cases easily passed over as 
negligible. It is not so much the rare disease which is difficult, but rather the 
vague and nebulous presentation, which is very frequently seen in general 
practice. Consequently, separate diagnostic support programmes are hardly 
used at all, as most doctors do not even take the time to stand up and consult 
a book from the shelves in their consultation room. Many errors are made, 
and perhaps especially in those cases which at first sight seem to be easy and 
not to warrant special attention. This simultaneity of the doctor-patient 
contact with the use of the DDSS is an essential part of our strategy to 
capture the patient data at the earliest possible moment, before rationaliz-
ation, reasoning, and memory recall errors of the doctor have a chance to 
distort them. 
2) It should be a logical extension of the problem-solving process of 
the doctor, not a replacement of it. 
This means that the system must follow the lines of thought described in 
chapter 3. There is no sense in pushing people into a type of behaviour 
which does not come naturally. The system is meant to adapt itself to the 
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usual method of diagnosis as has actually been observed in general practice 
[Rid86]. 
3) It should include a full administrative system, replacing the paper 
record and obviating the need for it. 
In the absence of an overall theory for such requirements, the basic prin· 
ciples had to be developed within the proper framework of the health care 
system, or in our case the general practice. 
From this, we derived the following requirements: 
Because of the position of family medicine in health care, the system 
should cover very broad areas of medical diagnostics. 
The construction of a medical taxonomy for general practice being in 
its infancy, the system has to overcome the problems of varying 
terminology and nomenclature. 
The system should provide the possibility to detect and flag errors in 
reasoning and judgement. 
Through a number of successive refinement stages, these have been the 
guiding principles from which a large number of other consequences nat-
urally follow, such as the required simplicity of the user-interface and real-
time performance, which means that results are available immediately 
without the doctor having to wait for them. 
Our goal in the widest sense is to improve the prognosis for our patients. But 
the prognosis can only be accurate when an accurate diagnosiS has been 
made, and an accurate diagnosis depends on a large number of factors, some 
of which can be influenced, while others cannot. We want to improve 
accuracy, but we cannot change human nature: we cannot fundamentally 
alter the reasoning modes of the doctor. We must take into account the 
circumstances under which the doctor has to work: any system that increases 
the time needed for a patient will be very hard to defend, even if substantial 
benefits can be shown. Our formulation of the main problem then becomes: 
How can we best design and use the DDSS to improve diagnostic accu-
racy of doctors without distracting from their overall efficiency? 
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4.3 Further analysis of the problem statement 
From this overall question two concepts may be selected: Use and Design. 
Use concerns the user and his environment, clinical as well as situational. 
It also concerns the patient. We may call this the clinical part. 
Design encompasses the software in connection with the equipment 
employed; it is mainly the technical part. We shall elaborate on these two 
themes in the next sections: 1) clinical and 2) technical aspects. The clinical 
aspects pertain to the user's (doctor's) view of the system, while the techni-
cal aspect represents more the view of the software engineer and program-
mer. Inevitably, there is some overlap between the two views. 
4.3.1 Clinical aspects 
From the doctor's point of view, we want to assist the diagnostic decision-
making process in four main areas: 1) data acquisition, 2) data storage and 
retrieval, 3) the reasoning process, and 4) the knowledge base used. In 
addition, there are a number of 5) constraints, deriving from the nature of 
clinical practice. 
4.3.1.1 Data acquisition 
The system should avoid bias of observation and perception in data 
acqUisition. 
In our view data acqUisItIOn IS composed of observation and validation. 
There are two approaches: 
1) A normative approach such as in clinical decision making, protocols, 
etc. This means a particular way of sequential data acquisition and a 
structured manner of handling data in connection with frequency 
distributions of the relevant data; and 
2) A human, subjective approach in the realization that data acquisition 
is subject to several types of error as described in the preceding 
chapter. 
As stated before, we have opted for the human approach, assisting rather 
than directing the practicing physician. Each of the error types already 
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mentioned in chapter 3 has to be faced and met in the system as far as 
possible. 
The problem of the validity of the data (reproducibility, precISIon and 
reliability) is countered in the system by the detailed structuring of the data 
entries. For this a Symptom Coding System (SCS) was developed, to be 
described in more detail in the next chapter. Use of this system at least 
avoids misunderstanding and promotes the use of standard terminology and 
therefore reproducibility. Precision promotes accuracy which, in its tum, 
might be tested by retraceability. In normal practice, observation and 
validation are both guided by the diagnostic hypothesis currently under 
consideration; the results of the observation are formulated in widely varying 
and unpredictable terms. 
1) A very large number of possible observations (symptoms, signs, lab 
results) is defined in the Symptom Coding System (SCS) menu structure, 
thus guiding the doctor's attention and enabling him to observe items 
which might otherwise have escaped his notice. In our expectation, 
doctors will query their patients wider when confronted with the DDSS 
menu system. They are also expected to be able to encode all their 
observations within the SCS. 
2) The validity is enhanced by the level of detail, and there is a greater 
level of detail offered by the SCS is than usually required in general 
practice. The availability of this accuracy should stimulate the doctor to 
probe deeper with his questions, and so to get a more detailed picture of 
the patient. 
3) The terminology used for the description of the patient's symptoms is 
enforced by the menu structure of the SCS, and is therefore invariant 
over time for the same doctor and also between doctors. Doctors should 
be able to handle the standardized terminology which may (and indeed 
certainly will) differ somewhat from their own, without too much 
trouble. 
4) If the doctor is of the opinion that the level of description offered by the 
SCS is not enough in specific cases, he has the option of attaching a note 
to any symptom, and add the required accuracy in the form of a free-text 
field. This should only rarely be necessary if the level of specification of 
symptoms is adequate. 
Bias in validation by letting one symptom weigh heavier than another 
should be avoided. 
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In numerical taxonomy, classes are made up of characteristics which are 
analysed mathematically to yield groups, the members of which resemble 
each other more than members of other groups. For this analysis it is 
important that no single characteristic is weighed more heavily than any 
other; 'all citizens are equal' to the algorithm. In medicine, this is a highly 
unusual approach, because every doctor instinctively assigns much more 
importance to some symptoms than to other ones. However, as in our case 
there is really no satisfactory pre-existing taxonomy, we will have to con-
struct one ourselves. Therefore we will start from the premise that all items 
are to be weighed equally. 
4.3.1.2 Storage and retrieval of data 
An accurate medical record is vital for the retraceability of the diagnostic 
thought process. Memory is usually short and unreliable and paper records 
so summary that they do not serve to reconstruct the reasoning of the doctor, 
but only give the patient's initial complaint and the conclusion. The ideal 
record would retain all information the doctor has used in making his 
decision, and would be easy to recal! and review. The DDSS should be 
designed in such a way that the doctor can enter every symptom, sign or 
complaint as he finds it, without being biased toward the final diagnosis. 
This is important, because it makes it easier to reconsider the diagnosis if 
necessary. The information which did not fit this earlier diagnosis will still 
be there in the record, and may serve as a starting point for reconsideration, 
while it would probably not even have been entered into a paper record. It 
facilitates a critical review of the doctor's decisions - by others, but first and 
foremost by the doctor himself. Quoting McIntyre and Popper: 
"Doctors are expected to learn from their experiences, and from their 
earliest days medical students are exhorted to learn from their mistakes. 
To learn only from one's own mistakes would be a slow and painful 
process, and unnecessarily costly to one's patients. Experiences need to 
be pooled so that doctors may also learn from the errors of others. [ ... ] 
But errors need to be recorded and to be analysed if we are to discover 
why they occurred and how they could have been prevented. "[McI83] 
An accessible record, and especially an electronic one, makes inspection and 
retraceability possible to all who want to learn (and teach) from experience. 
The medical record present in the DDSS allows such a possibility. Absolute-
ly necessary for the practical use of this posibility is the option to anonymise 
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the record, i.e. to strip the personal and private elements from the case 
record. To this end the administrative items such as name, addres, type of 
insurance, etc, are completely separate from the typically medical parts in 
the DOSS. These latter elements are exclusively included in the SCS. For 
compatibility reasons the administrative part of the system follows the 
standard model which has been specified by the NHG, the Dutch College of 
General Practitioners. 
The SCS as a recording system only applies to symptoms and other 
medically relevant information about patients; there are a number of adminis-
trative items, such as patient's name, address, type of insurance etc, which 
have already been implemented in many systems for the general practitioners 
currently on the market. The DOSS is not a full implementation of the NHG 
standard, but the subset it includes does conform to its structure. Given the 
time and resources, a full implementation can undoubtedly be made. 
In summary: 
The medical record present in the DDSS should make errors visible 
(and retraceable). 
4.3.1.3 Reasoning processes 
As we have seen in chapter 3, besides the observation and validation men-
tioned above, the reasoning process proper is especially concerned with the 
problems of identification (of the disease sought) and justification (increasing 
the personal certainty for the correctness of this hypothesis). 
Hypotheses within the reasoning process must be viewed as reasonable 
explanations for the acquired evidence. In problem-solving the doctor is 
assumed to consider the various explanations which arise from the evidence 
so far. By stimulating medical students explicitly to consider several explana-
tions, so called differential diagnoses (DD), they are challenged to reconsider 
all the available possibilities they can find in their repertoire. Regrettably, 
this potential quickly erodes during the years in practice. 
Doctors use a 'configurational' mode of reasoning which is especially 
prone to errors of incompleteness, or oversight. Whereas a sequential 
process can be made explicit by following the preceding steps, a 
configurational one is implicit and therefore not retraceable. The sudden 
'recognition' of a particular disease profile makes the doctor fail to consider 
alternative diagnostic hypotheses. Doctors also let their observation be 
guided by their hypothesis; if the hypothesis is rejected, the symptoms 
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already acquired to support it may easily be discarded as well. Validation in 
medical practice is reduced to finding concordant symptoms for the current 
diagnostic hypothesis. This search for concordant symptoms may even go so 
far that the doctor fabricates 'evidence' which the patient has not given, 
assuming things to be present without having asked for them or distorting 
patient's answers to fit his own ideas. 
The DDSS should be designed to meet the problems in the reasoning process 
in the following ways: 
I) To offer diagnostic hypotheses on the basis of the symptoms entered, 
thus reducing the probability of oversight; doctors should consider 
more hypotheses in their decision making after having seen the 
system's DD. 
2) To offer an objective measure for the likelihood of a diagnosis, on 
the basis of the overlap between symptoms of the patient and symp-
toms belonging to the disease. Doctors should ask for more symp-
toms to confirm the 'diagnosis' = currently considered diagnostic 
hypothesis, if they see the degree of concordance between their 
hypothesis and the symptoms. 
3) To use all symptoms entered in the evaluation of every hypothesis, 
not just the ones only gathered to support the current hypothesis. 
Doctors should reconsider a conclusion that does not explain many or 
most of the symptoms. 
4) To offer the option of looking up symptoms for the suggested hypoth-
eses, to assist the justification process, and the search for evidence. 
Doctors should check missing symptoms in their configuration. 
5) To guard against unwarranted interpretation or even fabrication of 
symptoms by suggesting detailed options for symptoms. The doctor 
should be made aware that there are many ways of stating a symptom 
and should be encouraged to inquire closely to distingUish between 
them. 
6) To improve the reliability of the reasoning: the same data should give 
rise to the same diagnostic hypotheses. 
7) To improve the retraceability of the process by allowing to retrace 
step by step the sequences of hypotheses and symptoms. 
In the experiment to be performed, each of these hypotheses and questions 
should be reviewed. 
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4.3.1.4 The knowledge base 
In order to offer more than purely administrative support, 
the system should provide an extensive medical knowledge base that 
complies with the doctor's knowledge domain, the structure of which 
reflects the natural progress of his decision-making process. 
In order to obtain a suitable knowledge-base that is as complete as possible 
and complies with practice, knowledge must be used from reliable source(s) 
within the appropriate domain of health care, e.g. from a group of practising 
general practitioners. 
The way in which this knowledge is obtained (knowledge engineering) is of 
essential importance to the maximum attainable quality of the results. This 
presents the following problem: 
The individual doctor's medical knowledge is far removed from the image of 
the uniform medical knowledge, shared by all doctors. Instead of being 
uniform, medical knowledge is highly personal and is among many other 
things dependent on and derived from personal experience, recent successes 
and failures, and the field in which the doctor works. "The first thing you 
think of is the last thing you missed". The personal character of this knowl-
edge creates another problem: in practice, each doctor seems to have a 
terminology of his own, and in many cases, he has his own interpretation of 
the medical terms used. If one should ask ten doctors for a medical descrip-
tion of a certain diagnosis, it would appear that there exist ten different 
descriptions of the disease. To make comparison possible, a set of standard 
terms must be used for symptoms, signs, complaints, test, diseases, etc. 
In order to develop algOrithms that make sure that when determining a 
diagnosis, one or more comparable diagnoses are selected from the 
knowledge base in which similar symptoms and signs appear, any 
terminology and nomenclature must be uniform. 
Our task is also to construct a knowledge base which is tailored to the 
specific field within the health care system the user has to work in. 
The DOSS was designed to minimize differences in terminology, while at the 
same time offering the option to create specific knowledge bases for a 
specific medical field, such as general practice. The DOSS can offer a 
standardized database of templates for diseases in the presentations which 
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usually occur in the field where the system is being used. One absolute 
prerequisite for any such undertaking is the standardization of terminology; 
this is enforced by the use of the SCS. Diseases can be defined in terms of 
their observable symptoms, which may differ according to the position of the 
doctor who sees the patient: the general practitioner may have to rely on less 
obvious patterns for his diagnosis than a specialist. Such a target-specific 
knowledge base should ideally be constructed from the collective experience 
of the target physicians themselves. The DDSS was designed with the idea 
that a large number of medical records gathered by different doctors should 
be pooled and extracted to produce such a specific knowledge base. For 
obvious reasons, this knowledge base could not be constructed before the 
first try-out of the system. Instead, we had to make do with a simple ad-hoc 
database constructed from medical textbooks. 
4.3.1.5 Constraints of clinical practice 
As it is the doctor who must use the system, not his secretary or assistant, 
and because the doctor must use the system during the consultation and not 
afterwards, the system should distract the doctor as little as humanly (or 
mechanically ... ) possible, in order not to disturb the doctor-patient contact, 
and the doctor's concentration. 
4.3.1.5.1 Time 
The system should not interfere with the consultation time. 
The system should not require much time to use, and there should be clear 
immediate practical benefits to its use if it is to be accepted at all. The 
doctor should be distracted from his interaction with the patient as little as 
possible. This is a very hard constraint to fulfil. To the inexperienced 
computer user, having to use a computer programme at all is a formidable 
distraction in itself, and only long familiarity with the system can really 
reduce this extra load on the attention of the doctor. In the experiment the 
consultation time is compared with the time usually spent in new case 
problems. 
Using the system should be so easy as to become largely sub-conscious over 
time, completely integrated in the problem-solving process. This degree of 
expertness is obviously not attainable in the sort of experiment we can 
perform for a first test. Nevertheless, it may be possible to draw some 
conclusions about how easy or difficult it would be to reach it. Ideally, 
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doctors would not fmd tbe use of tbe system disturbing. We cannot ask tbe 
patients yet. 
4.3.1.5.2 Ease of use 
As tbe psychological contact witb tbe patient during tbe consultation is of 
extreme importance, tbe machinery should not interfere witb tbis process. 
The DDSS is conceived as an equipment which may even stimulate tbe 
exchange of information between patient and doctor. When botb people have 
become somewhat familiar witb tbe various screens (which is quite possible 
witb the frequent contacts in general practice), they can discuss and specify 
tbe particular symptoms and signs which tbe patient actually experiences. A 
basic principle of tbe DDSS is tbat observations are processed witbout 
interpretations. This contributes to tbe validity of the entered data and may, 
in reflection, serve to remind and to test cues. It is essential for tbe doctor to 
involve tbe patient in tbe process and to give tbe patient the responsibilities 
(s)he deserves. Visualisation of what is sometimes intuitively perceived may 
make vague and nebulous feelings of tbe patient suddenly explicit and 
recognisable. The involvement of tbe patient in tbe data gathering process 
may certainly help to decrease differences in observations and perceptions in 
doctor-patient consultations. As tbe collection of patient information is not 
determined by special circumstances and conceptions, DDSS can be adapted 
to any situation in any environment. 
As tbe use of colour may help to find tbe right patb in tbe right context, tbe 
DDSS should use tbis medium unobtrusively. 
The ultimate goal for data-entry perhaps is voice-recognition. As tbis 
technology is still in its infancy, we chose tbe next easiest metbod: a three-
buttoned mouse witb fixed menu data entries. 
The DDSS should not detract from the doctor-patient contact. 
Needless to say, tbe DDSS should not require so much attention from the 
doctor tbat his ability to communicate with the patient, both on a verbal and 
nonverbal level, suffers. 
4.3.1.5.3 Ease of documentation and information exchange 
In an era of openness and access to data, tbe electronic recording of patient 
data can be a very useful metbod. Patients' requests for inspection of 
medical records and otber relevant documents can be easily complied witb. 
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Information which is relevant to particular purposes, e.g. for specialists, can 
easily be transferred electronically. If anonymised, cases can be pooled in 
knowledge bases for supportive, or teaching and learning functions. Consul-
tation among physicians is very much facilitated by this electronic medium 
and by the use of standard terminology. Doctors do not have to rely on their 
scanty notes and summaries of the case but can peruse the complete story of 
the patient. This may result in a better understanding of the patient and more 
accurate diagnosis. 
The system must be private to doctor and patient but allow easy communica-
tion when necessary. 
4.3.1.5.4 Learnability 
Besides being easy to use, it should be very easy to learn. Ideally, users 
without any previous computer experience should be able to sit down and 
use the system without having read the manual. This is probably not feasible 
in practice, but for a user with some general computer experience the manual 
should not really be necessary in order to be able to use the system. The 
teaching programme and the learning process for the test subjects should be 
scrutinized for points which appear to be difficult to grasp. 
4.3.1.5.5 User documentation 
The system should be self-documenting as much as possible, but there should 
also be a printed manual, in which any difficulties the user might encounter 
are explained. Use of the manual and assistance from the observers of the 
experiment should be carefully monitored. 
The experiment should yield detailed information about all these aspects of 
the system and its use. 
4.3.2 Technical aspects 
By this we mean the "information technology" side of the system. The 
software engineer faces a number of problems with regard to the user. These 
problems may be summarised as follows: I) Ease of learning; 2) Ease of 
use; 3) Reliability and robustness; 4) Tailoring the system to the user's 
needs; 5) Productivity. 
We shall succinctly treat each of these items. 
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4.3.2.1 Ease of learning. 
Rubinstein and Hersh claim a "Ten-Minute Rule", which is that a beginning 
user should be able to learn how to use a system in just ten minutes [Rub87]. 
Part of this exaggeration is the presupposition that users will bring a con-
siderable knowledge they already have of their own field. The ten-minute 
rule emphasises the important condition that architects of systems should be 
aware of what is helpful for the user and know how to adapt the system to 
the customary tasks in daily life. 
The DDSS is based on direct observation of practising doctors, so that the 
user will find a system which (s)he is more or less familiar with. 
Learnability has two aspects: a) ease of learning to handle the hardware; and 
b) ease of learning of the software. 
The learnability of the hardware is directly connected with ease of use (see 
next section). 
The learnability of the software is a matter of 
having an overview of the organisation of the SCS (including termi-
nology); 
understanding the concept of a 'tree' - structure; and 
understanding the screen information. 
This leads to the following problem: 
To create a system in which most doctors will easily find the right data-
entry for a particular observation despite the varying medical nomen-
clature employed in medical practice. 
4.3.2.2 Ease of use 
A number of aspects may be distinguished: a) user-friendly equipment; b) 
user-friendly interface; c) presentation and documentation. 
a) Developments in the computer industry largely determine the choice of 
equipment. The dominant position of (Microsoft) DOS operating system 
computers almost forces our choice here. Most general practitioners who 
already possess an information system make use of this type of computer. 
For reasons of convenience therefore the DDSS was developed for this 
type of computer. Although the personal computers are not traditionally 
thought of as user-friendly, with the addition of peripheral equipment 
68 Ch.4 
such as a mouse and colour screens user-friendly programming has 
become a distinct possibility. 
b) User-friendliness in the software is implemented by simple start/restart 
functions, menu-oriented user interface, uncluttered screens, use of 
colour, and on-line help functions. Simple communication between user 
and machinery is a prerequisite for optimal employment of the system in 
daily practice. This can be reached by adhering to the following rules: 
The user-interface should be extremely simple. The most immediate 
consequence of this is that the user should not have to type in any more 
data than is strictly necessary. This practically forces the system to be 
menu-driven. 
The user should be able to use the shortest path to perform the things he 
would like to do, and he should feel in control of the operations. 
He should have an idea of what is going on inside the programme, which 
need not be technically accurate, but should be consistent with its behav-
iour (the "myth" of the programme). 
The function of keystrokes should be consistent within the programme, 
and where possible consistent with common usage in other programmes. 
It should be possible to summon help at any point in the programme, and 
the help given should be relevant to the context in which it is called. 
The system should guard against user error, without becoming patroniz-
ing. Accidental deletion of data should not be possible. Actions associ-
ated with data loss should be confirmed. 
c) The presentation of the system and its various parts must be connected 
with the intuitive feelings of the user. The various categories and screens 
must follow the customary way of the physician's problem-solving. It 
helps the user very much to be fully oriented as to what is going on 
during the process which strengthens his/her idea of full grasp. 
Screens should be uncluttered, giving only the information the user needs 
at that point in the process. Colour and other graphic devices may be 
used to support the presentation. Colour especially is a powerful director 
of attention, and background colour may be used to reinforce uncon-
sciously the orientation in the menu tree. 
User documentation has already been mentioned in the clinical section. 
In short, 
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the DDSS should be designed in connection with equipment already in 
use with general practitioners and should adapt to rules customary in 
medical problem-solving. 
4.3.2.3 Reliability and robustness. 
The reliability of the system should be high, for nothing is more aggravating 
than the breakdown of a system upon which the doctor is dependent without 
a fall-back system in place. The programme should be tested and be as bug-
free as possible. Ideally, user error should never lead to a system crash. If 
an error-condition occurs, the software should silently and automatically 
recover and allow the user to proceed. If the error is unrecoverable, the 
system should give clear diagnostics which are understandable to the user 
and pinpoint the source of the error to the programmer. There should be 
clear procedures for error recovery and restarting the system if the user ever 
encounters a fatal error. Errors encountered during the first practical testing 
of the system will give an indication of places where improvement is desi-
rable. 
The system should perform correctly, gIvmg reproducible and accurate 
results. Data storage, modification, and retrieval should be possible, 
while accidental data loss should be guarded against. Database integrity 
and consistency should be guaranteed. Any errors in this area should be 
recorded and analysed. 
The system must perform within a specific time, depending on the 
application. The time needed in typical and worst-case applications 
should be measured. 
The system should recover gracefully from error conditions, whether the 
error is made by the user or present in the programme itself. Any 
difficulties in this regard should be logged and analysed. 
The system should perform on a specific hardware platform, the specifi-
cations of which form part of the system. The hardware should be easily 
and cheaply available, and the system should be tested on a number of 
different machines. 
The programme and its infrastructure should, in case of problems, not leave 
the user with a host of subsequent problems. 
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4.3.2.4 Tailoring the programme to the user's needs 
Practitioners of various disciplines populate the medical world. What they 
have in common is a medical knowledge in the form of the taxonomy of 
diseases. Because of its comprehensiveness many special domains have been 
created; each domain having its own special characteristics. 
The DOSS embodies two principles: 
standardisation of nomenclature by strictly maintammg the principle of 
processing patient data without interpretation and valuation; 
every domain needs a specific knowledge base. The support function can 
only operate optimally if the patient data correlate with the domain-
specific disease- and syndrome-descriptions. 
The construction of domain-specific medical knowledge bases is a future 
development of DOSS. For the experiment we made use of disease descrip-
tions as found in various medical textbooks to generate a very simple 
database. 
4.3.2.5 Productivity 
Computer-based support systems may be valuable, but most of these technol-
ogies are not sufficiently adapted to the processes in routine medical prac-
tice. Computer applications have been characterised as inflexible, with a 
poor interface to its user and of no readily perceivable benefit to doctors or 
patients. So far, the use of computer programmes lengthens rather than 
shortens the time spent on a average case. There is little to show for the 
enormous amount of work in this area. [Fri77] [McM83] 
Without obvious benefit in terms of productivity, the use of these systems 
will be minimal. For a practising doctor the system must at least fulfil two 
aspects of the diagnostic process: 
a) it must be supportive in accomplishing the task (or at the very least not 
interfere with it); 
b) it must be quick; time consumption should not exceed the 'normal' 
consultation time. 
The first aspect refers to the customary mode of problem-solving which is 
discussed in the section on reasoning processes. The DOSS allows any 
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specific order of information gathering any individual physician wants to 
employ. 
The second aspect points to two elements: the effect on consultation time and 
the time users have to wait for answers of the system. Nothing is more 
annoying than to wait in front of an empty screen. The software engineer 
should be alert to this impediment. 
The DDSS should enhance productivity in terms of speed and support as 
well as accuracy of medical diagnostics. 
4.4 Summary 
From the descriptions above, we have seen see that the goal of the DDSS is 
to improve the diagnostic process at many points: better observation, both in 
depth and in scope, and a better recording of the observed facts, leading to a 
better hypothesis generation and evaluation, and ultimately to a better knowl-
edge base from which to derive diagnoses. We have also specified a large 
number of constraints for the system. To what extent have these goals been 
met in the current implementation of the Diagnostic Decision Support 
System? The construction and structure of the system is described in chapter 
5, the experiment to test these questions and assertions is described in detail 
in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 5. The design of the DDSS 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we are going to look at a specific decision support system. 
We will review the construction of the DSS that was used in the current 
study and explain the decisions that were taken during its design and imple-
mentation. 
The doctor's diagnostic decision-making consists of two activities: 
(1) determining the exact symptoms, signs and complaints of a certain (ill) 
patient; and 
(2) finding an appropriate diagnosis compatible with the found symptoms for 
this individual patient 
The most important operational demand for the system is that the DDSS can 
be integrated flexibly with the doctor's daily occupations, and does not affect 
the doctor-patient relationship in any adverse way. The responsibility for the 
decision must therefore at all times remain with the practising doctor, who 
must be in control of whether and how much support is given during the 
diagnostic process. When desired, the computer system can be an aid and a 
guide during this process. 
It must be taken into account that for the doctor with a busy practice, 
efficiency and user-friendliness of the automated interactive system are of 
great importance. Therefore, the system should act as a logical extension of 
the usual diagnostic process of the practising doctor. It means that the 
typical succession of events in the diagnostic process must be followed by 
the system. It should contain the same logical partitions of history, physical 
examination and tests, and the usual medical catch- and keywords, standard 
menus with uniform terminology, and 'real time' responses. When seeing a 
patient, the doctor will be able to go through the series of menus, thus 
recording the patient's set of complaints. Based upon these data, the system 
will select a number of possible diagnoses, thus making sure that the doctor 
thinks of all possible diagnoses. The system automatically keeps a log of all 
actions so that the medical files are updated automatically. Other aspects of 
the patient as well as a number of administrative facts can be stored. 
It is also very important for the system to be reliable. Even though it will 
always be the doctor who takes responsibility for the diagnosis, the system 
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must furnish a reliable overview of possible diagnoses. Reliability is also 
important with respect to the confidential data of the patients. The system 
should be sufficiently protected against misuse, while at the same time 
minimally inhibiting legitimate use. The patient data must be protected to 
ensure that no one but the doctor has access to them. The system must also 
be safe to use in the sense that it should be impossible to delete data acciden-
tally. 
As we have discussed in the previous chapter a number of problems and 
requirements have to be conquered in designing a practical and user-friendly 
decision support system. 
5.2 A definition of a decision support system 
The term "Decision Support System" refers to a class of information systems 
that support users in decision-making. "Decision" accentuates the decision-
making: judgement and taking action. "Support" emphasises that the com-
puter is merely an aid, not a replacement of the decision-maker. It promotes 
a dialogne between user and computer without frustrating the creativity, the 
experience and capabilities of the user. "System" refers to a structured 
approach of the problem. Especially in the medical domain with its ill-
structured problems a DSS of the type we have developed provides possibil-
ities which stricter systems such as expert systems cannot offer. 
Decision Support Systems (DSS) have been characterized by van Schayk as 
follows: 
"The jimction of decision support systems is supporting management 
decision-making, especially in ill-structured problems, in order to 
improve its effectiveness. 
The technology that has enabled the rise of decision support systems 
includes on-line accessible database systems, interactive programmes, and 
data-communication. 
The development method of decision support systems is baSically differ-
ent from transaction processing systems and management information 
systems. Since decision-support systems are aimed at ill-structured 
problems, the information needs cannot be exactly defined beforehand. 
Therefore, a linear design method, where the specifications of the system 
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must be given in advance, is not appropriate for the design of decision 
support systems. An incremental design method is more suitable for the 
building of decision support systems. " 
[Sch88]. 
Generally a DSS contains three main components: 
a user-interface for communication between user and system; 
one or more data-subsystems for the various types of data to be stored; 
problem-processing subsystems containing models and programmes for 
processing and generating solutions for the current problem. 
If necessary a fourth component, a knowledge subsystem, can be attached, 
especially in cases where an extensive amount of specialistic knowledge is 
required. This knowledge subsystem might be a knowledge-base or an expert 
system. 
Decision Support Systems in iII-structured problem situations have met with 
little success so far. This lack of success can be attributed to a number of 
factors. 
a) Many DSS have been developed in a way similar to that of well-struc-
tured problem situations, in the belief that more and better information 
automatically will lead to better decisions. The availability of huge 
amounts of data does not guarantee more effective decisions. Successful 
systems should smoothly adapt to the routine practice of the user. 
[Sch88] 
b) Coordination between human decision-making processes and those of 
machines has drawn little attention so far. 
c) There is no visible gain in effectiveness and productivity for the user. 
An effective DSS yields better decisions, which means more than just 
flexibility in data management and overview of the information. However: 
a better decision cannot always be expressed in numerical terms, but may 
be the result of weighing reasonable options intuitively; 
most DSS need a considerable period of experience in order to produce 
the desired effectiveness; 
as most DSS are based on un-analysed decision-making methodS, their 
effectiveness and productivity are not provable to the user. 
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The first step towards developing a DSS is a thorough analysis of the steps 
in the problem-solving process. The more the system fits the real processes 
the better an effective DSS can be developed, especially in the case of 
interactive systems with ill-structured problems as in general medical 
practice. 
Our DDSS is based on previous research into decision-making processes in 
general practice [Rid86]. It fits as closely as possible the actual problem-
solving processes of general practitioners in routine practice. 
5.3 Developing the DDSS 
In the development of the DDSS a prototyping approach was chosen. 
"Prototyping or adaptive design has been suggested as an effective approach 
for developing and implementing DSS. Empirical research has shown this 
design strategy is effective in establishing meaningful user involvement and 
high user satisfaction" (Henderson, 1985). A prototyping approach serves 
various goals such as: 
gradually increasing understanding of what the problem is and how to 
formulate it. 
defining functional specifications in practice; 
verification of the system with users during the development process; 
developing and defining the friendliness of the user-interface in con-
junction with the users; 
finding and defining problems to be conquered. 
realising and testing a preliminary version of the system with potential 
users. 
Next to these items two almost mutually exclusive objectives have been 
formulated: A strictly structured design with standardized terminology and a 
high degree of flexibility for the adaptation to developments in such an 
innovative domain of science as medicine. 
The first attempts, written in a high-level database language, showed that 
such an interface might be feasible, but were much too slow. Interface and 
calculations were speeded up by writing them in the programming language 
'C', while the database structure and -language were retained for those parts 
of the system implementing the existing standard for information systems in 
Dutch general practice. 
5.3.1 Acceptability considerations 
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Because of our prime requirement that the system must be used simulta-
neously with the doctor-patient contact, the primary need of the system will 
be speed and ease of use. 
The system is only acceptable to the doctor if it can operate in accordance 
with his own style and working pattern. As most doctors use a method of 
iterative hypothesis generation with subsequent hypothesis-driven data 
collection, the system should allow the doctor to follow this line of thought. 
It means that he or she must be able to step from one category in the system 
to another and vice versa within the same line of thought (hypothesis). This 
requires short paths, with few actions necessary to perform the things he 
wants to do, a flexible search through menus and options, and he should still 
feel in control of the operations. Any loss of control should be compensated 
by easy access to on-line help functions. 
Further acceptance criteria are: 
the user should at all times In a general sense be aware of what the 
system is doing; 
generally, response times should be limited to two seconds. If more time 
is needed, the system should notify the user and give an indication of the 
progress; 
the time needed to perform a consultation with the system should not be 
longer than without the use of the diagnosis system; 
the system should sufficiently be protected against abuse in a way which 
does not disturb the legitimate user too much. The patient data must be 
protected to ensure maximum confidentiality; 
under strict conditions data might be shared with other health care 
workers for better patient care; 
accidental deletion of data should not be possible. Actions associated 
with data loss should require separate confirmation. 
In the experiment which will be described in the next chapter we will 
concentrate on a number of hypotheses with regard to the programme and its 
users. We would like to introduce some of these hypotheses at this point. 
They all refer to qualities the system should have: 
HI Doctors do not find the use of the system disturbing. 
H2 For users with some general computer experience the use of the 
system is easy to grasp. 
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H3 The use of the manual and assistance of the observers during the test 
is minimal. 
H4 The user is able to find the shortest paths in searching for specific 
items in the SCS tree. 
H5 The user has an intuitive feeling of what is going on in the system. 
The system follows his usual routine. 
H6 The system is proof against accidental erasure of data. 
H7 The use of colours will help the user with his the orientation within 
the menu tree. 
5.3.2 User interface considerations 
The user interface for an application such as the one under discussion must 
combine many, sometimes mutually exclusive qualities. It should be so 
simple to use that a manual is hardly necessary, yet powerful enough to 
follow the user's thoughts. It must enable the user to select anyone of a 
hundred thousand items within a few seconds, without leaving him confused. 
It must show him enough information, but not more than necessary for the 
task at hand. It should be possible to use the programme without resorting to 
the keyboard at all. 
- Menu oriented 
We decided on an interface which we hoped would distract the physician 
from his rapport with the patient as little as possible. 
Faced with a choice between two general interface styles: menu and com-
mand-oriented, we selected the former, for a number of reasons. 
A good user-interface enables the user to apply operations to his or her data 
in the form in which he thinks of both the data and the operations. It 
requires few actions to initiate an operation, these actions are readily 
apparent, and the user can form a clear mental picture of what is happening. 
A good user interface does not overload the user with information he does 
not need, but it must be able to show the state of the data at any time if he 
chooses to inquire after it. 
- PaJient data input and storage 
Input is done largely with the mouse. Although it is certainly possible to use 
the entire system without using the mouse, this is not the normal or recom-
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mended way. The mouse is of the three-button variety, it is used to select 
items from menus and its three buttons allow the user to activate several 
options for each menu item. 
Only for the input of administrative data for the patient, such as name and 
address, a minimal use of the keyboard is needed. The system assists the 
user by checking its database as soon as the user begins to type a name, so 
that it is rarely necessary to enter more than a few letters of the name for 
any patient who has been seen previously. Once the doctor has identified 
himself to the system, he only needs the keyboard to identify the patient and 
to enter data manually which he cannot find in any menu but which he feels 
must be put in the record. This option is only offered as an escape and 
should not normally be necessary. In principle, the medical status of the 
patient is entered entirely by means of the mouse. 
During normal use, the doctor has one hand permanently on the mouse, 
with three fingers on its three buttons, so that he does not need to look at 
the mouse at all, but can instead divide his attention between the patient and 
the screen. The screen is kept simple and uncluttered to reduce the amount 
of attention needed. With a keyboard, such efficiency in data entry would 
only be attainable if the doctor were to be a good touch-typist, which is very 
rare. 
m the symptom data entry phase, the system always presents a menu 
which contains the subnodes of the SCS (Symptom Coding System: 
explained in the next section) node that is currently selected. One of the 
options is highlighted. The highlight may be moved to another item by 
moving the mouse. By pressing the middle mouse button, the highlighted 
node becomes the current node, the old menu is cleared, and a new menu is 
drawn, showing the subnodes of the selected node. If the selected node is a 
terminal node, or leaf node, nothing happens. 
The user can determine from the screen where he is in the SCS tree, because 
every choice he has made to arrive at the current node is displayed in a 
separate window. This window displays the current path in the SCS tree. As 
the maximum depth is about 10 levels, there is no need to scroll this win-
dow: the full path always remains in sight. 
By pushing the left mouse button, the user retraces his previous step and 
returns to the next higher menu level. 
Finally, by pushing the right mouse button, the currently highlighted node is 
added to the patient data, along with any higher nodes which may be 
necessary to attach the selected node to the existing patient data tree. 
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In order to keep the display uncluttered, the user cannot see the full list of 
symptoms he has already entered, but this is available in a scrolling window 
at the push of a single key (F2). 
This display may be purged of items that may have been accidentally entered 
incorrectly, by moving the highlight to the offending items, clicking the 
middle button, and pressing a confirming 'y' key on the keyboard. All this 
happens with instantaneous feedback on screen. 
At all times, the keys that have useful actions associated with them are 
shown in a separate 'info line' at the bottom of the screen. 
By hitting a single key CF4) at any time during information gathering the 
user may call up the diagnostic module, which produces a differential 
diagnosis within a few seconds and puts it on the screen. 
Pre-trial experiments showed that young adult volunteers, even persons with 
no previous computer experience, could be familiarized with this system of 
data entry in about 10 minutes. 
- Use of colour 
For clarity and attractiveness, all menus are in colour. The colour scheme 
that is used most often is light yellow on a green background for all menus, 
and light yellow on blue for the background screen. The background colours 
differ for the main branches of the SCS: physical examination, laboratory 
and x-ray results, and patient history. This was done to provide an uncon-
scious clue as to the current position in the tree. Warning messages are 
displayed in light yellow on a dark red background. For all menus operations 
and messages in the system, a similar layout and operation was used to 
minimize user confusion. 
5.4 The origin of the symptom-coding system 
In earlier research by Ridderikhoff [Rid86], when designing the experimental 
set-up for the research into decision-making of general practitioners, it was 
found necessary to measure the amount of information which doctors extract 
from their patients when they make a diagnosis. For reasons of comparison 
the patient information had to be "frozen" in a preconceived database which 
could be used as a constant frame of reference. To this end every item had 
to be coded to determine the relation of this item to other items asked during 
the interview. For this purpose an ad-hoc system was developed which 
turned out to be quite powerful in retrospect: all information of the simulated 
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patients could be fitted into the system, and more than 98 % of the symp-
toms, signs etc. the doctors enquired after in their patients could be fitted 
into the system by an observer. [Rid93]. 
The coding system itself originally derives from system theory (Weinberg) 
which states that complex structures can be split into less complex sub-
structures, in a continuing process of refinement and increasing detail. This 
was performed using the levels of organ system - > symptom - > symptom-
aspect - > symptom-subaspect as starting points, refined or modified where 
the nature of the symptom at hand made this a necessity. 
An important concession to the modus operandi of the physician was that 
symptoms are not uniquely defined within the system: e.g. a headache can be 
coded in several ways in the current system. This causes some problems in 
the diagnostic algorithms, which can only partially be solved. The advantage 
of this approach is that the user has a simpler programme interface to deal 
with. 
The current study used the same method of gathering data as an earlier study 
into the problem-solving behaviour of doctors [Rid86], i.e. consultations 
with simulated patients. An adaptation and extension of the symptom coding 
system used in Ridderikhoff's research was used in the DDSS computer 
system. Whether doctors themselves could be taught to use this system as 
efficiently as the observer of the experiments in the earlier trial, was of 
course one of the things to be tested, as we will see later. 
5.5 General description of the symptom coding system 
The symptom coding system (SCS) creates a systematic approach to medical 
information about the patient at the symptom level. For 'symptom' in this 
context, and in most of what follows, one should read 'any information 
which may point to a disease or health problem in a patient'. 
The SCS is conceived as a hierarchical system. When expanded schemati-
cally it resembles a tree. (In such a tree diagram, it is customary to speak of 
the "highest levels" of the tree when the part is meant that in a real tree 
would be the lowest, i.e. the stem. The "deepest levels" are the tips of the 
outermost branches) Every node has zero or more child branches, and every 
node has exactly one parent node, except the root node which has no parent. 
The symptom description proceeds from the general to the specific level. 
The data representation is further specified in section 5.7 
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On the first levels (the stem of the tree) a tract is selected, in accordance 
with the usual method of questioning employed by doctors. Examples of 
tracts are cardiovascular, pulmonary, or urinary tracts. Within such a tract 
there is a relatively small number of 'main symptoms', such as pain, feeling 
tired, dizziness, coughing, etc. Some of these are specific to the tract - e.g. 
coughing is specific to the pulmonary tract-, others are more general: pain is 
a symptom that may be associated with any tract. 
Each main symptom has an associated submenu, where the symptom is 
further qualified. For example, the symptom 'Pain' has a localisation, a pain 
type (sharp, dull, aching), an onset, an intensity, etc. associated with it. 
The specification of these symptom-aspects corresponds to the level of detail 
that makes doctors think of specific diseases. "Pain" by itself is fairly non-
informative, but "Pain of a sharp nature, with an onset about three hours ago 
in the upper abdomen" will probably trigger one or two ideas in the mind of 
the average GP. 
Every symptom may be specified to several levels, depending on the 
specific symptom selected. Some descriptor branches are up to 10 levels 
deep, others only 5. There is no strict limit to the extension of a branch, 
beyond the general principle that the tree should remain more or less 
balanced in an informal sense, and that the level of detail attainable should 
be more or less equal for all symptoms. [Wi176] 
The full tree specifying all items of information that may be associated 
with the patient within the system has now grown to about 100,000 items. 
The condition of almost any patient presenting himself to the general practi-
tioner may be approximately described by a collection of branches from the 
tree. One of the points to be investigated is whether this approximation is 
sufficient to satisfy its users, i.e. the doctors. 
Even with this enormous number of possible symptoms, symptom 
aspects, and symptom subaspects, there are large areas where the tree is still 
very limited. Especially the field of psychiatric complaints has proved to be 
hard to encode. We have also restricted ourselves to those symptoms which 
might reasonably be encountered by the general practitioner behind his desk 
during surgery. Only tests usually requested by GP's, and no special investi-
gations were included. Results of x-ray investigations can only be coded in 
the most rudimentary way (preferably normal/abnormal), based on the 
interpretation of the radiologist. 
Pauker and Kassirer estimate the number of medical terms in the field of 
internal medicine at about 4 million. They concluded that this made a direct 
storage and search of the symptom space impossible. [pauxx] Viewed in this 
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light, our efforts toward organization have yielded a remarkable increase in 
efficiency. 
How does it work? The doctor selects items from menus. Each menu is a list 
of all ' deeper' branches attached to a specific node. If he selects a particular 
branch, the next menu consists of the items attached to it, if any. At any 
level of specification the doctor may decide to enter the symptom into the 
database record for that patient. 
It is the doctor who decides how detailed the information should be for this 
particular patient, and this particular symptom. For instance, he may decide 
to code only that the patient has a cough. In other circumstances he may 
decide that the type of cough is important under the circumstances, and he 
may then include information about sputum production, colour of sputum, 
duration of the complaint, amount of sputum, whether coughs come in fits or 
single, whether coughing takes place at night or is associated with a specific 
position of the patient's body, etc. 
It may be argued that the doctor does a lot of interpretation in this way 
already, pre-processing the data of the patient into the forms required by the 
tree structure. This is true, but it is likewise true of every other diagnostic 
system where the doctor enters patient data. And because of the specific 
terminology used by the system, interpretation is less intuitive than usually 
occurs. At least the doctor uses the same term for the same symptom as his 
colleagues. 
The SCS tree was designed in such a way as to minimize observer inter-
pretation of patient data. For example, it is not possible to enter a symptom 
like 'aortic valve diastolic heart murmur' into the system. Such a 'symptom' 
is an interpretation of an observation without the possibility of tracing the 
composing elements on which the judgement is based. 
In the SCS, this is coded in a way to preserve the direct sensory input as 
much as possible, eg: 
heart/murmurs Ilocalisation/thorax, upper left; 
Itiming/diastolic; 
Iloudness/(3/5) 
Such a coding system is more elaborate and slower, but more objective than 
'aortic valve diastolic regurgitation murmur'. 
Any data entered into the system are used by the computer to try to find 
matches between these data and the built-in disease database. (This knowl-
edge base is to be developed for a specific medical discipline over time.) 
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Whereas a doctor is inclined to look for alternative hypotheses within the 
tract to which his attention is currently focused, the computer has no such 
handicap, and it can compare the symptoms against thousands of hypotheses 
in a few seconds. 
5.6 Some difficulties encountered in coding the SCS 
One difficulty is the size of the tree. Firm discipline is required to keep the 
coding scheme internally consistent when the tree grows to tens of thousands 
of nodes. A fundamental change in design for a particular problem may 
necessitate the modification of branches in various other parts of the tree. 
This task can to some degree be automated, however. 
Another difficulty is the problem of the representation of time-related 
phenomena. This is a problem which is not specific to our system, but which 
seems to occur in most diagnostic programmes and related systems, includ-
ing the doctor's written patient records. The solution adopted in our system, 
as in many others, is to regard the current status of the patient as the one to 
be encoded. Intervals, onsets, durations of complaints, etc. are encoded with 
respect to the moment of presentation. 
A third problem is the arbitrariness of encoding data on several levels; 
given two characteristics, each of which might reasonably be selected as the 
higher level, often an ad hoc decision had to be made which level of detail 
should be encoded first. Sometimes it was instead decided to encode both at 
the same level, which gives rise to the fourth point: 
The fourth problem is the ambiguity which occurs in specific cases when 
different instances of the same symptom are to be encoded: e.g. if a patient 
has two different pains, the specification of aspects of these pains cannot be 
retraced unambiguously to the belonging main symptom, i.e. if someone has 
both a sharp pain in the thorax, and a dull pain in the abdomen, then after 
encoding this could not be distinguished from a patient with a dull pain in 
the thorax and a sharp pain in the abdomen. This may seem a big disadvan-
tage, but it is less so in practice; most patients do not have more than one 
such main symptom at a time. The advantage of this way of coding is that it 
makes the tree more accessible to the user so that data entry can be per-
formed more quickly. 
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5.7 Data representation 
The symptom tree is conceptually coded as a tree of varying order and 
depth. A tree is a graph where every node has exactly one parent node and 
zero or more child nodes, except the root node which has no parent and zero 
or more child nodes. 
Any vertex, or node, may have any number of child nodes (within reason, in 
the current implementation the maximum allowed number of child nodes is 
128, the maximum occurring number about 35); any branch may continue to 
any depth. To give a very approximate idea of the current dimensions of the 
SCS tree, the average depth of the symptom tree is about 7 levels; the 
average branching factor is about 6. 
The symptom tree is implemented as a binary tree, which is a tree where any 
node has zero or two children and every node has exactly one parent node 
except the root node, which has none. The symptom tree, of varying order 
and depth, is coded as a binary tree, using the scheme where any right child 
node is the brother with the next higher number, and any left node is the 
first son node. Brother nodes on the same level thus form a linked list of 
right children in the binary tree, and all children of a given node are found 
as a linked list of right children on the left child node of the binary tree. See 
figure 1 and 2. 










fig. 2 Translation to binary tree for-
mat 
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Because of the need to extract subtrees from the main symptom coding tree, 
both for patient and for disease data, the logical structure of these subtrees 
cannot be used to reconstruct the path in the main tree by itself, and every 
node in a subtree has to be numbered. It carries the number of the corre-
sponding node in the main symptom coding tree. See figures 3 and 4. 
fig. 4 Numbering scheme 
used for tree nodes 
Symptom tr<w Resulting extrllcwd 
tC('1' 
fig. 3 Information loss wit-
hout numbering 
Brother nodes are sorted, i.e. higher-numbered nodes are always to the far 
end of the chain. Every node has an associated record of information, which 
consists of a number of fields: 
the number of the child node with regard to its parent; (the first child 
is numbered 1, the second 2, etc.) 
the name of the node, a text field; 
the significance bit; 
a weight; 
a presence bit; 
a comment field. 
The text belonging to a node serves to identify it to the human observer; the 
number to identify it to the computer. The significance bit determines 
whether this node is an 'information-carrying node' or just a 'structural 
node'. (The difference is explained below.) 
The design of the DDSS 87 
The weight can in principle be used (but it is not currently) to assign various 
weighing factors to different symptoms in the context of specific disease 
patterns. But such a valuation assumes an unambiguous notion of the disease 
and a subsequent notion of the importance of its composing symptoms and 
signs. This is not a general characteristic in medicine and certainly not in 
general practice. 
Some envisaged applications require that weighing of symptoms should not 
be used. The (numerical) taxonomic process to determine natural groups of 
symptoms in order to create taxonomic disease classes and entities is such an 
application. Besides, in most cases, too little is known about the weight of 
specific symptoms in general practice to justify weighing of findings at this 
stage. 
The presence bit can be used in patient data sets to determine if an item of 
information has been inquired after. If it is set, it means that the item has 
been entered as present. If it is not set, this means that the item has been 
enquired after but that it was not present. (If the item has not been enquired 
after at all, the symptom does not appear in the tree for that patient.) 
This is important for later extensions: the system could use disease patterns 
to suggest questions which would be able to differentiate between two 
hypotheses in its collection. 
It would also enable doctors to check whether an inquiry had been made and 
found to be normal, or whether the inquiry had not been made at all. In the 
first case, it would be present but with the presence bit cleared, in the 
second case it would not be present in the tree at all. 
In principle, only abnormal findings are entered in the current system. 
In addition, every node has an associated comment field, where the doctor 
can enter a line of text. This text cannot currently be used in any way by the 
system but it can be recalled on screen and if desired modified by the doctor. 
This was included to provide an escape possibility against incompleteness of 
the symptom coding system. 
5.8 A simple description tree as an example 
By constructing a description tree of a simple every day object we may 
illustrate most of the characteristics of the system in a more readily compre-
hensible form. 
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On the left we give the structure of the tree in text; on the right we give the 
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fig. 5 Graphical illustration of ' chair' -tree 
If we want to represent an object with a red wooden seat and four green 



























This gives us a description of our chair that is rather dull but fairly specific, 
and that can be used to identify chairs that look a bit like it. 
Note that there are descriptive and structural nodes in the above tree. An 
example of a structural node is ' object', which exists only to connect its 
branches into a tree. It does not, in itself, convey any useful information 
90 Ch.5 
about our chair. In the same way, the nodes 'colour', and 'material' are in 
themselves non-informative, structural items. On the other hand, 'red', if 
specified with either seat/colour or legs/colour, is an informative item. 
'Seat' is arguably informative: it conveys that the object does have a seat. It 
would depend on the context in which the system is used whether this is 
informative: if there are only chairs, this seat would not qualify as informa-
tive, but if the objects included tables, it would. Whether tree nodes are 
informative or not depends on the context. In OUf system, significance may 
be optionally attached to any node, depending on the disease. 
If we want to generate a template to find similar chairs, we may assign to 
each node a 'significance' status: 
name coordinates significance 
object 1 0 
seat 1,1 1 
colour 1,1,1 0 
red 1,1,1,1 1 
material 1,1,2 0 
wood 1,1,2,1 1 
legs 1,2 1 
number 1,2,1 0 
>=4 legs 1,2,1,4 1 
material 1,2,2 0 
metal 1,2,2,3 1 
colour 1,2,3 0 
green 1,2,3,2 1 
If we give a candidate object 1 point for every matching significant node, an 
unknown object can gain at most 7 points when compared with this tree 
pattern, in which case we can be sure that it has a red wooden seat and four 
or more green metal legs. It is probably a chair. If the comparison results in 
fewer points, there may still be a resemblance. 
A computer, given this template and a number of objects to test against it, 
can easily make a list of objects which match this template, or pattern, to a 
greater or lesser extent, in order of the greatest resemblance. This even 
applies if a fallible human enters the characteristics of these objects, leaving 
out a few. The results become less reliable, but the method still works. This 
is precisely what happens in the DOSS. 
Within the system, there is a collection of 'chairs' which specify charac-
teristic patterns for common diseases. The doctor enters another pattern, 
which consists of his findings in the patient to be tested. The computer 
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compares these findings against the known disease patterns and sorts them in 
order of best match. The more data the doctor enters, the better the chance 
of a correct diagnosis. 
5.9 Implementation decisions. 
An earlier prototype of the symptom-coding system had ' dBase III +' as its 
programming language. This showed the feasibility of the idea to code 
symptoms but suffered from a few drawbacks: 
it was extremely slow, even when compiled with a dBase compiler 
(Clipper) 
it was hard to modify; the initial design called for a number of ortho-
gonal characteristics for every symptom (i.e. every possible subsymp-
tom appeared with every symptom). But many subsymptoms are 
meaningless when combined with a different main symptom, and the 
number of permutations that turned out to be necessary would have 
led to insurmountable problems. 
Accordingly, the decision was made to represent the symptoms in the form 
of a tree. This was a natural choice, as a tree is the natural structure for a 
hierarchical system. For the symptom hierarchy, this design had the advan-
tage of extreme flexibility: any node may have any number of branches 
(within certain limits which are mainly determined by the capacity of humans 
to pick an item from a menu in a reasonable time) and any branch may be 
extended to as many levels as is necessary to code the underlying medical 
information. 
It is possible to represent trees economicaily in terms of system resources, 
and comparison of trees can be done with efficient algorithms. 
The trees with the symptom structure were constructed with an ordinary 
word processor or editor (Wordperfect or Qedit) in a predefined format, and 
then translated to computer data files by a compiler programme. The input 
for the compiler programme must be plain ASCII text. Some slight diffi-
culties were encountered with the translation of special accented characters 
from Wordperfect-format to ASCII format. 
Changes in the tree do not necessitate any changes in the programme unless 
a major restructuring of the upper branches should become necessary, which, 
so far, has not been the case. Usually it is sufficient to change the tree file 
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and recompile it. This has only a local effect on the structure of the tree: 
data gathered with the old tree will become only partially invalid with tree 
updates, namely only if such data contains elements which are part of the 
changed menu and any nodes below that. 
This graceful degradation of performance means that it is possible to correct 
minor deficiencies in the tree without rendering masses of gathered data 
invalid. It is also theoretically possible to transform existing data from the 
old form to the updated one, but a tool to do this has not been written. 
For reasons of speed and economy of memory the SCS system was coded in 
C. A surrounding shell programme was constructed with Clipper 5.1 to take 
care of the more routine database tasks. 
The tree resides on disk, and branches of it are swapped into and out of 
memory as needed; the total space occupied by the tree on disk is about 2 
megabytes, or only about 20 bytes per node. This is a consequence of 
several tricks to economize on the memory needed. The swapping occurs 
with a hardly noticeable delay: any menu is presented virtually instantane-
ously. 
5.10 A user's view of the whole system. 
In this section we will describe the way the system presents itself to the user. 
On typing "ddss" at the MS-DOS prompt, an introduction screen appears. 
systeem 
v~~r huisartsen 
Screen 1 startup screen 
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After the system has been started, its first action is to ask the user, i.e. the 
doctor, to identify himself. If this is the first time the user logs on to the 
system, he is asked to fill in a few identifying fields. Otherwise just typing 
in the first few letters of his or her name will suffice to determine uniquely 
which doctor is meant. 
Wet is uw achternaam? (F1 - help) :CHARLIE 















The system now proceeds with a screen for the selection of the patient from 
the database of all patients. The database structure underlying both screens 
has been designed to conform to the requirements of the national Dutch 
College of General Practitioners (NHG). This facilitates compatibility with 
systems already in use in general practice. 
Achternaam (Fl - heLp) : ACHTERBERG 
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Burgcrlijke staat G 




Screen 3 patient registration screen 
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After looking up the patient in the database, or creating a new record for the 
patient if he was not already present in the database, the system shows the 
mam menu: 
DOSS Clipper ShelL V 0.1 del 14/09/91 (C) 1991 E. van Her-I( & J. Ridderikhoff 
Screen 4 main menu 





Oude Consu t t 




mank een nieuw consult san 




Most patients are already known to the doctor. After verifying the admini-
strative details he is free to start a new consultation, i.e. the current episode 
for which the patient has come to see him. By selection of this option, the 
doctor can gather and store a full set of data for this patient in order to 
arrive at a conclusion. 
Some consultations however may be connected to previous visits of this 
patient to the doctor, e.g. follow-up after therapy, or periodic visits because 
of chronic ailments such as diabetes mellitus, rheumatic disorders, etc. The 
doctor can retrieve the details of past consultations by selecting Previous 
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consultations, and look at the details. (But he cannot modify the data of old 
consultations.) 
It is also possible, when "new consultation" has been selected, to load 
the data of a previous consultation as a starting point, and edit those symp-
toms which no longer apply. This has no effect on the data for the previous 
consultation, as the edited version will be saved only as part of the current 
consultation data. In this way the user has the ease of not having to re-enter 
largely identical data, but the option of retrospectively changing his book-
keeping on the patient, which is generally undesirable [Mar91], is avoided. 
The results of lab tests ordered for the patient during a consultation will 
usually arrive later, when the patient has gone. The "data storage" option is 
meant to offer a separate interface to add these results to the consultation 
data, but is not yet functional in the current implementation. 
Patients sometimes move to another city, or to another doctor, or they 
may die. In such cases the patient data can be deleted from the database. 
Note that it is not possible to delete individual consultations; only the entire 
set of all consultations and other data for that patient can be deleted. This 
option "Erase patient" is of course protected by suitable admonitions of "are 
you sure?" etc, and requires repeated explicit confirmation from the user. 
When the next patient enters the consulting room, the doctor can choose 
"next patient" to go to the patient selection screen and identify the patient by 
typing the first few letters of the patient's name. He can also page through 
the database one record at a time, to verify that the patient record is correct, 
which is especially important in the case of several patients having the same 
name, initials, date of birth, etc. 
Finally, the option "Exit" leaves the programme, after asking for a 
confirmation from the user that this is what he or she wants. 
Normally, however, at this point the user will select "new consultation". The 




In most cases the doctor is unable to arrive at a diagnosis immediately. He 
or she needs information to come to a conclusion. Once this information has 
become available the doctor may decide on a diagnosis. By clicking on the 
option "Diagnosis" a diagnosis may be selected and added to the patient 
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data. About seven hundred different diagnostic names may be selected from 
the menu system under "diagnosis" so far. 
The menu option "Treatment" offers a similar menu system enumerating 
therapies and other types of action (referral, treatment with medicine, etc). 
Finally, the SCS proper can be found under the option "Patient data", 
and this will usually be the first selection the doctor makes at tlris menu. 
Under tlris heading all encodeable information about the patient's condition is 
to be found. The SCS follows the usual order of categories commonly used 
in general practice. The submenu accordingly looks like this: 
Social 




(family, occupation, work, hobbies, etc) 
(vaccinations, old operations, accidents) 
(for the current episode) 
(biological, biochemical, immunological and 
physical tests) 
The menus in each of these categories have different background colours, to 
aid the user in orienting himself within the system. The bottom line of the 
screen shows the options from which the user can select at each point. A box 
on the right of the screen shows the choices he has made to arrive at the 
point in the menu tree where he is currently located. 
If our user now follows the usual order of events, he will first of all select 
"medical history" at this point, which offers a new menu showing a list of 
organ systems of the human body. (Apart from a few mild psychological 
problems the system is currently not usable for mental ailments.) First an 
organ tract is chosen, according to the usual method of questioning the 
patient. Examples of tracts are cardiovascular, pulmonary, or urinary tracts. 
Within each tract there is a relatively small number of 'main symptoms', 
such as pain, feeling tired, feeling dizzy, coughing, etc. Some of these are 
specific to the tract in question: "coughing" can only be found in the respira-
tory tract, but others are more general: "pain" is a symptom which occurs in 
practically every tract. 
Each of these main symptoms now has an associated submenu, where the 
symptom is further qualified. As stated above, the symptom "pain" has an 
associated localisation, type (sharp, dull, aching), type of onset (sudden, 
slOW), duration of onset, intensity and many other facets associated with it, 
some of which have yet deeper levels of description, in submenus of their 
own. Every symptom the patient exhibits may in this way be specified to an 
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arbitrarily deep level, or at least as deep as the symptom tree allows the 
doctor to go. 
At every point in the consultation, the doctor is looking at a screen with two 
windows. The left window shows the current menu, with all selections that 
are available at that level. 
The screen at this point is fully controlled by the mouse. Moving the 
mouse highlights (visually selects) an item in the current menu. Pressing the 
left mouse button undoes the previous selection, returning the user to the 
next higher menu level. In this way, from any point in the tree, the user can 
return to the top menu by a few quick successive clicks on the left button 
without having to think about it. The middle mouse button, on the other 
hand, takes the user to the submenu of the item that is currently selected on 
the screen, thus going deeper into the menu tree. Finally, the right mouse 
button adds the currently highlighted item in the menu to the data gathered 
for the current patient. 
When all complaints of the patient have been communicated to the doctor 
and stored in the dataset for that patient (in so far as they represented 
abnormal findings) the doctor usually proceeds with the physical examin-
ation. He returns to the top menu by clicking a few times on the left mouse 
button, then selects "physical examination". 
While the menu system under "medical history" was organized by organ 
system, because that is how a doctor usually performs his questioning of the 
patient, the menu system under "physical examination" is organized topo-
graphically. Again, this structure was chosen because this is the way most 
doctors perform a physical examination: they listen to heart and lungs of the 
patient, both on the thorax, before proceeding to the abdomen. The body 
parts are arranged alphabetically. Let us suppose the item "abdomen" IS 
chosen. The submenu associated with the abdomen shows the items: 
general 
organs 
rectum and anus 
muscles and tissues 
skin 
signs, reactions, tests 
If from this menu, "general" is selected, the system first offers a selection of 
the method of examination to be used: inspection, percussion, auscultation, 
palpation, or some specific instrumental measurement or investigation such 
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as the circumference of the abdomen, or skin fold measurements, or 
rectoscopy. If the doctor selects "palpation", the next submenu shows a 
number of signs which may be detected by means of palpation, such as 
localisation, form, structure, dimensions, single or mUltiple lesions, pulsa-
tions, and symmetry, among others. 
In general, for every type of measurement, a special dimension scale is 
available. In this way lenghts, heights, weights, circumferences, angles of 
joint movement, deformities, temperatures, reflexes and sensibilities, 
acuteness of vision and hearing may all be measured. Every measurement is 
stored in a category, not as the actual value found, although this may be 
added to the data in the form of a comment. For instance, systolic or 
diastolic blood pressure can be either very low, low, normal, high, or very 
high. 
In the "Laboratory results" partition of the menu system the user may 









Most of these are subdivided into three partitions in the next menu layer. 
Below them are about three additional levels of menus to allow accurate 
description of many laboratory test results. The item "imaging techniques" 
refers to radiology, scans, etc. 
After the doctor has selected from all menus those items which together give 
an accurate representation of the patient's condition, he will probably want to 
make a diagnosis, a judgement. Going back to the top menu, the user selects 
"diagnosis" and looks up the item sought in the diagnosis menu system, 




diseases ordered by organ system 
mental and social ailments 
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"general impression" refers to such general statements as ill vs not-ill, 
serious vs not serious, somatic vs mental. 
"multi-organic, non-specific" refers to three separate groups: 
Symptoms/complaints, i.e. "diagnoses" which are nothing more than 
a repetition of the patient's main complaint. These 'symptom diag-
noses are usually just working-hypotheses for the doctor. 
assorted i11nesses sorted by group without further qualification, like 
allergy, neoplasm, trauma, intoxication, growth disorder. 
diagnosis by localisation: "something wrong with" head, abdomen, 
breast, leg, and so on. 
"diseases ordered by organ system" offers the most specific descriptions of 
diseases, by the names under which they are documented in the medical 
literature. 
As was mentioned before, the system is not currently applicable to serious 
mental illness e.g. psychosis and depression. Nevertheless, the system does 
provide the doctor with a few names of the more prevalent disorders with a 
large psychological component found in general practice: tension headache, 
fatigne, hyperventilation, dyspepsia, etc. 
When the user finally returns to the top menu, he can choose the "treatment" 
item. Three main branches are offered: consultation, referral, and treatment 
by the GP himself. Consultation and referral lead to different alternatives 
ranging from specialist consultation to alternative medicine healers to 
physiotherapy to abortion. Under "treatment by GP" we find advice, diet, 
surgery, and drug treatment. The drugs are arranged by organ system, 
following the lead of most pharmaceutical books, and are present only as 
generic names. This was done because including brand names would unnec-
essarily expand this part of the tree to a multiple of its present size. Every 
drug is represented only once, helping to reduce the chance of double 
prescription. 
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Now the consultation is over. The user returns to the main menu by repeat-
edly pressing the left mouse button or the < esc> key, and is asked to 
confirm that he wants to close this consultation and that he wants the results 
saved. (the default for the first question is no, the default for the second 
question is yes.) 
Now that we have described the system from the user's view we would like 
to introduce at this point a number of additional testing hypotheses for the 
experiment to be performed with it. They are concerned with the behaviour 
of the doctor. 
H8 By the presentation of the menus doctors will question their patient 
broader (more categories of symptoms and signs) than when unguided 
by the system. 
H9 Doctors will be able to encode all their observations within the SCS. 
HlO By the presentation of the menus doctors will be stimulated to probe 
deeper with their questions, and so to get a more detailed picture of 
the patient. 
Hll Doctors are able to handle the standardised terminology without 
trouble. 
H12 It will only rarely be necessary to make specific notes in the free-text 
field for specifications beyond the levels of specification within the 
SCS. 
H13 The doctor will be able to retrace his previous steps of data acquisi-
tion at any moment of the process. 
5.11 The system's reasoning process 
In the first chapter we have argued that there is not much evidence for the 
often postulated logical and systematic approach to the diagnostic problem in 
doctors, as described in an ideal form by e.g. Ledley and Lusted, Elstein 
and by Blois. [Led59] [Els78] [Bl083] There are however grounds to suspect 
a much more haphazard approach. 
As argued before, doctors employ a more heuristic way of problem-solving. 
A number of standard steps can be observed: hypothesis generation based on 
little data, hypothesis-driven data acquisition, and a mixture of probing and 
testing cues. The process impresses as one of iterative pattern recognition. 
This pattern-recognition approach was quite common in the early days of 
computing, both because it is easy to implement for simple cases and 
102 Ch.5 
because the limitations of the machinery at that time made more elaborate 
programmes impractical. Moreover, the theory for other approaches was still 
being developed. Such programmes, applied to well-circumscribed areas, like 
kidney disease syndromes, enjoyed a modest popularity until they were 
generally displaced by the more modem expert-system approaches. Examples 
of programmes that operated mainly on some form of pattern-recognition, 
sometimes completed with weighing methods of some kind, are RECON-
SIDER [Bl08I] and DXpiain [Bar87]. 
Like ours, these systems do not produce diagnoses, but rather lists of 
differential diagnoses based on the quality of the match between patient 
symptoms and its knowledge base of disease characteristics. 
In family mediCine, the range of possibilities for diagnosis is practically 
unbounded. People come to their general practitioner with extremely diverse 
complaints and conditions, many of which are not medical in a strict sense. 
To set up an exhaustive differential diagnosis, then set about eliminating 
them one by one from the list is simply not practical under these circum-
stances. 
With the current state of formalized knowledge, it is also quite impossible to 
catch the work of the general practitioner in the rulebase of an expert 
system. Therefore, the expert-system approach to the work of the general 
practitioner as a whole seems unpractical. 
On the other hand, if it were possible to standardize the description of a 
patient's symptoms to a sufficient degree, it might be feasible to let a 
computer scan the symptoms for matching diseases, and thus to generate a 
first-approximation differential diagnosis. 
Such a standardized symptom description is one of the main characteristics 
of the DDSS. 
Pattern recognition is a bag of tools for a bag of problems (Kana!). [Kan681. 
Template matching is a robust method, in the sense that it is not very 
sensitive to missing or partially incorrect data. When implemented efficient-
Iy, it can be fust, because the basic operation, comparison, can be done very 
efficiently on a digital computer. This is an advantage over reasoning 
systems which need all elements in a chain of reasoning in order to be able 
to arrive at a conclusion. A pattern search may still produce a reasonable 
match, when the chain of reasoning has broken. 
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5.12 The pattern recognition algorithm on symptom trees 
Given two trees, the pattern recognition algorithm consists of determining 
the common nodes in them. Comparing trees is a well-known procedure 
which has been studied extensively. Research by Day has shown that optimal 
algorithms exist which require O(n) time, where n is the number of nodes 
common to both trees to be compared [Day85]. 
In the case of the DDSS, the trees to be compared are both subtrees of the 
complete SCS tree. 
The algorithm currently implemented is recursive, and can be described in 
pseudocode as follows: 
"X. nr" is a notation that refers to the number of X in the sequence of 
all its possible brothers. 
Brother (X) is a function that returns the next higher-numbered brother 
(right node) of x. 
Son (X) is a function that returns the first son (left node) of x. 
Valid{X) is a function that returns TRUE if X exists 
Informative(X) returns TRUE if X is marked as an informative node. 
A and B are pointers to nodes. At the start of the algorithm, A is 
initialized to the root of the first pattern to be compared, and B to the 
root of the other pattern. 
The integer variable Counter keeps tally of the number of matching nodes, 
and is initialized to O. 
compare (A, B) 
{ while{valid(A) and valid(B» 
{ while(A.nr < B.nr) 
{ A = brother(A) ; 
} 
} 
while(B.nr < A.nr) 
{ B = brother(B) ; 
} 
/* otherwise, a dead end was *1 
1 * detected * 1 
1* The preceding sequence synchronizes A and B until a match is found or 
none is found to exist. 
} 
*j 
if(valid(A) and (A equals B» 
{ if(informative(A}) 
} 




1* we have a match *1 
1* same process recurSively with */ 
1* left and right subtrees. *1 
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Performance of the comparison algorithm. 
For the synchronization part, (first half of the algorithm) all nodes on the 
same level of A and B are scanned, requiring in the worst case a time 
proportional to the number of nodes on that level for A plus the number 
nodes on that level in B. (Since the nodes are sorted, the algorithm never has 
to go back to a node already seen.) In the typical case where one node in 
tree A has to be compared with one, two or three in tree B, on average half 
that number of comparisons are necessary. Only for the matching nodes, the 
lower levels are evaluated. The time needed for a full comparison between 
two whole trees A and B therefore depends on the number of brother nodes 
at each level where at least one match occurs and the number of matches, 
and is the product of both. As the average number of brother nodes is a 
small fixed number, even in the larger of the two trees, the time needed by 
the algorithm is proportional to the number of matching nodes in the two 
trees. 
Since there are only rarely more than a few nodes selected at any level, it is 
reasonable to estimate the time required for a comparison of two trees as a 
function of the number of matching nodes, mUltiplied by a small constant, in 
the order of two to three. For example, if there are 5 matching nodes in the 
tree, (a fairly typical value), the algorithm has typically to visit about 10 to 
15 nodes to determine this. From this we see that the comparison algorithm 
by itself can be extremely fast. 
However, in the current implementation, the speed of comparison is I/O 
bound and depends mainly on the speed with which tree data can be read 
from disk. The current system compares the data of a typical patient, as 
entered by our test subjects, with its database of diseases at a rate of about 
10 diseases/sec; (80386 cpu, 25 mhz, hardddisk 16 ms access time). 
But since profiling the programme execution showed that rather more than 
80% of this time is currently spent in reading single bytes from the tree into 
memory, with a few very simple optimizations (block reads, disk buffers) we 
expect that this can be raised to at least 50/sec, and with a bit more 
optimization effort to 100 or 200 per second on similar hardware - which 
should be enough to check a database of 1000 or 2000 diseases against the 
current patient within a few seconds. 
The results of the matching process are kept in a list, and sorted in order of 
decreasing score. The disease pattern with the highest score is presented 
first. There is a minimum necessary score which must be reached for a 
diagnosis to be shown at all. Currently this is set to three, but this arbitrary 
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choice should perhaps be set higher. If no diagnosis matches the patient's 
symptoms to at least that score, a message appears on screen to the effect 
that there are insufficient data for a meaningful conclusion. Besides the 
matching score, the highest possible score for that diagnosis is also shown. 
Not all diagnoses have equal numbers of symptoms which can be matched; 
some may consist of 20 items, others of 200. A matching score of 5 might 
be more significant for a disease in the former category, but this is not taken 
into account currently. We decided that neither the absolute number nor the 
proportion of non-matching nodes should be taken into consideration. On the 
one hand, in absolute numbers this result may vary widely with the 
extensiveness of the description of the disease itself; on the other hand the 
proportion of symptoms which do not match will generally exceed 90 %. 
Diagnoses found are presented in a menu and the definition of such a 
diagnosis may be examined by the user. The nodes that make up the data-
base definition of the diagnosis pattern can be viewed in the same format as 
the symptoms for the patient during symptom gathering. 
Matching items could be highlighted on screen, thus giving the user a better 
feel for the quality of the match, but this is not implemented presently. (A 
suggestion from one of our test subjects.) 
Whether the subject decides to accept a diagnosis is his own affair; the 
purpose of the system is to give him ideas and to guide his data collection. 
Having introduced the diagnostic algorithm, this is a good point to introduce 
the remaining hypotheses related to the diagnostic support which will be 
tested in the experiment: 
H14 The doctor will consider more hypotheses in his decision making 
after having seen the system differential diagnoses. 
HIS In undecided cases doctors will ask for more symptoms in order to 
confirm or reject particular hypotheses. 
Hl6 By offering the degree of concordance (number of analogous symp-
toms) between the symptoms of the patients and symptoms belonging 
to a disease, the doctor is will be driven to ask for more symptoms of 
the patient (Confirmation = hypothesis given the evidence (Carnap). 
HI? Doctors will use the option of looking up symptoms for suggested 
hypotheses to assist in their justification process and check for 
missing symptoms. 
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5.13 The DOSS knowledge base. 
General practitioners have their own domain of medical knowledge, as they 
operate in an area of the health care system which is mainly populated with 
vaguely defined illnesses and disorders. Therefore most general practitioners 
carry their own part of medical knowledge and their own vocabulary. 
Regrettably, all this knowledge, predominantly based on personal experience, 
has not been condensed into a generally accepted and tested domain-specific 
taxonomy of diseases. The support function of the DOSS operates optimally 
only when the patient data can be compared with domain-specific versions of 
the disease- and syndrome-descriptions. 
Developers of computer-based decision-support tools frequently adopt pattern 
recognition techniques as the basis for their programmes. The principal 
challenge in the creation of any clinical consultation programme lies in 
creating a computational model of the application domain. The difficulty in 
generating such a model manifests itself in symptoms that workers in the 
expert systems community have labeled "the knOWledge-acquisition 
bottleneck" and "the problem of brittleness". [Mus89] The process of 
knowledge acquisition traditionally concerns the elicitation and encoding of 
given professional's relevant expertise to create the knowledge base of an 
expert or decision support system. Brittleness refers to the failure of such a 
system to offer appropriate advice on specific classes of cases not used in the 
construction of the knowledge base. 
The problem of the knowledge acquisition is that experts (in our case, 
experienced general practitioners) simply cannot explain what they know or 
how they solve problems. Knowledge engineers who try to communicate 
with the medical experts have great difficulty in extracting the specific 
elements of expertise. And even if they succeed, they still cannot be certain 
about the general validity of this expertise. Brittleness also refers to the 
difference of one expert to another in particular cases. In the ill-structured 
world of primary health care exact definitions of ailments and illnesses (most 
problems seen in general practice have not yet evolved to the recognisable 
diseases described in textbooks) are hard to find. In our view this situation 
will last for many more years. 
To bypass the problem of applying pattern-recognition methods to undefined 
illnesses we had to adopt another option. As was common in earlier times, 
we elected to define illnesses by their specific symptom configuration. A 
disease is recognised as such when it is predefined in the taxonomy of 
diseases. How can doctors diagnose a particular disease? Because they look 
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for some analogy between the symptoms as presented by the patient and the 
constituent elements of a predefined disease. The greater the similarity, the 
more a diagnostic hypothesis may be confirmed. 
By means of the presentation of the alternative diseases in their symptom 
configuration the doctor is enabled to judge the value and the accuracy of his 
diagnosis. It will give him ample opportunity to (re)consider all the possibil-
ities offered in the differential diagnosis, "lateral thinking." [Bon70] 
This conception differs in two ways from other expert or decision support 
systems. 
(I) Most (medical) knowledge systems are directed at reStrIctIOn of the 
possible alternatives, preferably to the best one. DDSS takes another 
approach. It will confront the doctor with as many explanations for the 
present symptom-configuration as possible. It leaves the doctor to decide 
which one is the best fit. 
(2) By the presentation of alternatives in their constituent composition of 
symptoms DDSS can offer the doctor an encyclopedic function. 
Since the knowledge representation as is foreseen in the DDSS knowledge 
base is of the type of "frame representation", the knowledge base (and its 
subsequent pattern recognition process) is not restricted to particular 
domains, but can be adapted to any area in the medical world. A "frame" is 
a structured representation of an object or a class of objects. A frame 
represents an entity which may contain a number of descriptive attributes, 
also called "slots". In a hierarchically more detailed level attributes may be 
defined by so-called "facets". With help of such a representation a taxonomy 
for a specific knowledge domain can be formulated. 
The Symptom Coding System is a perfect mechanism and interface to 
process and store symptoms and attributes automatically. The number of 
symptoms and attributes is variable which makes the system very flexible. 
Three relations can be formulated: 
a) The relation between diagnosis and symptom; 
b) The relation between symptom and attribute (symptom-aspect); 
c) The relation between attribute and facet (symptom-subaspect). 













If necessary the "frames" may contain a diagnosis-label. Pattern recognition, 
however, will be performed by comparing symptom-configurations with 
symptom-configurations. 
For the time being, such a knowledge base still lies in the future. The tools 
are there. We only need the resources and the co-operation of many general 
practitioners. 
109 
Chapter 6. Methods 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we will examine in more detail some of the hypotheses which 
are to be tested in the experiment and expand on them and on the questions 
which we hope to be able to answer with the results (section 6.2). Further 
on, the set-up and the proceedings of the experimental sessions will be 
explained (6.3). Then the selection of subjects (6.4), patients (6.5), and 
diseases (6.6) for the knowledge base will be described. Section 6.6 is an 
explanation of how the subjects of these sessions were trained in the use of 
the DDSS before the experiment, and finally section 6.8 tells what informa-
tion was collected during the experimental sessions. 
6.2 Hypotheses and questions. 
From the discussion of the diagnostic process in Ch. 3, and the general 
problem formulation in Ch. 5, a number of specific hypotheses and questions 
have been formulated, which as we have seen previously may be arranged 
under the headings of (1) data acquisition, (2) storage and retrieval of data, 
(3) the reasoning processes, (4) the knowledge base, (5) constraints of 
clinical practice, and (6) technical aspects. For each of these six headings we 
have formulated a number of specific points, to be tested in the experiment. 
In the text, "subjects" refers to the doctors who tested the system. 
6.2.1 Data acquisition 
During a session, the specific medical questions asked are in themselves not 
very significant, since they will differ with the doctor, the patient and the 
circumstances, and yet may refer to the same symptom. The important thing 
is that there should be no great discrepancy between the number of questions 
asked and subjects' ability to locate the corresponding item(s) in the SCS. 
From the number of questions asked estimates can be made of the relative 
difficulty of the cases, etc. 
H4 The user is able to find the shortest paths in searching for specific 
items in the SCS tree. 
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Subjects should be able to locate the object of his question in the SCS; any 
path found from node a to node b in the tree is necessarily the shortest path. 
But users may be tempted to explore other menus merely by seeing them, 
discarding their original course. 
There are at least two possible modes of questioning the patient using the 
DDSS with the built-in SCS: a) subjects may follow the structure of the SCS 
in determining the order of their questioning, so minimizing the number of 
actions necessary to encode the symptoms found in the system; or b) subject 
may elect to follow his or her own customary routine, and attempt to encode 
the symptoms in that order, which requires more navigation through the SCS 
menus. Or c) subject may use a mixture of both. This strategy may also 
change with the specific patient seen or with the experience of the subject 
with the system. This behaviour may be diagnosed by looking at the logged 
data of the symptom entry during the consultations. Analyzing different 
parameters with respect to this behaviour may give important clues as to how 
the system is working with the user. 
H8 By the presentation of the menus doctors will question their patient 
more widely (more categories of symptoms and signs) than when 
unguided by the system. 
Doctors would be expected to query their patients more widely when 
confronted with the DDSS menu system. "Widely" to be interpreted as 
asking for a larger range of symptoms. This can only be tested subjectively 
by asking the subjects; an objective comparison is not possible without a 
control group. However, a previous investigation has been done with the 
same patients under similar circumstances, except that no computer system 
was used. [Rid89] To a certain extent the results of both studies may be 
comparable. 
HIO By the presentation of the menus doctors will be stimulated to probe 
deeper with their questions, and so to get a more detailed picture of 
the patient. 
The SCS should also stimulate the doctor to probe deeper with his questions, 
and so get a more detailed picture of the patient. The level of detail of the 
data gathered may be gauged by looking at the patient record produced; an 
objective measurement of whether this is deeper than without he use of the 
system is not really possible without a control group, but we can ask sub-
ject's opinion about his behaviour in this regard. 
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6.2.2 storage and retrieval of data 
Symptoms are the result of questions which "hit the mark", i.e. of questions 
which return an answer about an abnormal phenomenon in the patient. If the 
diseases as doctors know them, or rather the mental pictures the doctors have 
of diseases, were identical, the "not-having" of a specific symptom might be 
a useful indicator. However, as explained at length before, this is not the 
case. Between the question and the search for a symptom (-aspect) in the 
SCS there should normally be a relation: the presence of the symptom in the 
SCS. On the other hand subjects may not be able to locate a specific item in 
the SCS by virtue of its sheer size. This requires an understanding of its 
structure which the subject cannot be expected to come by all at once. 
H9 Doctors will be able to encode all their observations within the SCS. 
This is not the same point as is referred to in H4 in the previous section: that 
refers to questions asked, this one to answers recorded. There may be a 
discrepancy. This can be determined directly from observation of the subject 
during the interview, from his own remarks about it, and from secondary 
sources such as the use of the comment facility to annotate symptoms. 
H6 The system is proof against accidental erasure of data. 
We can observe if accidental data loss does actually occur in the experiment, 
and its cause. 
H7 The use of colours will help the user to orient himself within the 
menu tree. 
There is no way to test this except by the impressions of the observers and 
the opinion of the subjects themselves. 
Hll Doctors are able to handle the standardised terminology without 
trouble. 
We clearly expect subjects to be able to use the system and to locate nearly 
all symptoms under their own steam, not needing any help. They will be 
able to translate their idea into a coding within the SCS. This may be 
checked by direct observation during the experimental sessions: misunder-
standings quickly become clear. Some areas may give more trouble than 
others. 
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H12 It will only rarely be necessary to make specific notes in the free-text 
field for specifications beyond the levels of specification within the 
SCS. 
If the description offered by the SCS is sufficiently complete, doctors should 
only very rarely feel the need to add a comment. Comments are easy to 
count from the log-files; subjects may also be asked. 
H13 The doctor will be able to retrace his previous steps of data acquisi-
tion at any moment in the process. 
Symptoms entered and the time needed for this may have a relation with the 
difficulty of the case. Doctors will probably want to make use of the option 
to review the data they have gathered for this patient. 
6.2.3 the reasoning process 
H14 The doctor will consider more hypotheses in his decision making 
after having seen the system differential diagnoses. 
The differential diagnosis list of the D DSS should lead doctors to review 
their conclusions for the patient. This could be seen to occur in three ways: 
(1) after seeing the differential diagnosis of the system, the doctor decides to 
ask more questions to the patient, or (2) changes his own differential diag-
nosis, or (3) assigns different probabilities to his list of possible diagnoses. 
HI5 In undecided cases doctors will ask for more symptoms in order to 
confirm or reject particular hypotheses. 
Doctors might be expected to ask for more symptoms to confirm the diag-
nosis if they see the degree of concordance between their hypothesis and the 
symptoms. When a diagnosis scores low in the dd of the system, doctors 
might be expected to ask for additional symptoms. Subjects may research 
symptoms of the patient to different levels. (symptom -symptom-aspect, sub-
aspect etc.) These parameters may have a bearing on the number and 
correctness of their diagnoses. 
H16 By offering the degree of concordance (number of analogous symp-
toms) between the symptoms of the patients and symptoms belonging 
to a disease, the doctor is driven to ask for more symptoms of the 
patient (Confirmation = hypothesis given the evidence (Carnap). 
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When seeing a very low score for a diagnosis they have made, doctors are 
expected to reconsider a diagnosis that does not explain many symptoms. 
Diagnoses with low scores in the system DD might be expected to be subject 
to review sooner than high-scoring diagnoses. This information can be 
extracted from the log-files and the observer records. 
H17 Doctors will use the option of looking up symptoms for suggested 
hypotheses to assist them in their justification process and to trace 
missing symptoms. 
When confronted with the symptoms that make up a diagnosis in the data-
base, doctors are expected to look for missing symptoms in their configur-
ation. We may conclude that this has happened if a doctor examines the 
symptoms that make up a diagnosis in the knowledge base of the computer, 
then decides to ask for symptoms which are present in the description. This 
information may be extracted from the log-files. 
The medical record present in the DDSS should make many errors 
retraceable. We were not able to ask the subjects to review their own 
decisions later. We may try to reconstruct why some conclusions went 
wrong by inspecting the patient record and the logged performance of the 
doctor. 
6.2.4 the knowledge base 
Is the present knowledge base adequate for the collection of patients seen? 
What are the particular problems encountered in extracting textbook knowl-
edge for the knowledge database? 
What are the problems encountered when attempting to encode the symptoms 
found within the SCS? It should be possible to encode nearly all symptoms 
found in textbooks within the SCS. This is a first test of the completeness of 
the SCS. 
Does the knowledge base contain errors in the description of the diseases; 
Does it contain gaps in its description of the symptoms? 
6.2.5 constraints of clinical practice. 
These are of two kinds: the system should be easy to learn, and easy to use. 
114 Ch. 6 
6.2.5.1 How easy is the system to learn? 
H2 For users with some general computer experience the use of the 
system is easy to grasp. 
After the three-hour training programme the subject should be able to use the 
system on his own, possibly with help from the manual. 
The learning programme and the learning process for the test subjects should 
be scrutinized for points which appear to be difficult. 
Use of the manual and assistance from the observers of the experiment 
should be carefully monitored. 
It may be possible to draw some conclusions about how easy or difficult it 
would be to reach expert level. If we look at the distribution of the level of 
expertise in the subjects, and the level of those who have designed it, and 
who can therefore to be assumed to be intimately familiar with it, we may 
draw some tentative conclusions. 
6.2.5.2 How easy is the system to use? 
HI Doctors do not find the use of the system disturbing. 
How is subject's interaction with the patient influenced by having to work 
with a computer during the consultation? We cannot ask the patient, but we 
can observe the interaction in the experiment and we can also ask the doctors 
themselves. 
H3 The use of the manual and assistance of the observers during the test 
is minimal. 
For a user with some general computer experience the manual should not 
really be necessary in order to be able to use the system. 
H5 The user has an intuitive feeling of what is going on in the system. 
Use of the on-line help facility should be carefully monitored. 
The sequence of events takes place in time. By keeping track of the time in 
minutes and seconds one can get a clear picture of what happens during the 
process. The many combinations of the observable elements of the process 
(questions asked, information stored, hypotheses formed, and conclusions) 
with respect to time are good indications of the problem-solving process of 
the subjects and of the working of the system. One of the primary hypot-
heses of the system is that it is usable during the consultation. This also 
means that it should be able to function within the time which a doctor 
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normally has available for a new patient. A question to be answered is how 
much time the support takes during a consultation. 
Subject should feel in control of the operations. 
6.2.6 some technical aspects 
The system should perform correctly, giving reproducible and accurate 
results. Data storage, modification, and retrieval should be possible, while 
accidental data loss should be guarded against. Database integrity and 
consistency should be guaranteed. Any errors in this area should be recorded 
and analysed. 
Breakdowns of the system should be carefully recorded and analysed in 
terms of technical (hardware) malfunction, software malfunction, and user 
error. 
It must perform within a specific time, depending on the application. The 
time needed in typical and worst-case applications should be measured. 
It should recover gracefully from error conditions, whether the error is made 
by the user or present in the programme itself. Any difficulties in this regard 
should be logged and analysed. 
It should perform on a specific hardware platform, the specifications of 
which form part of the system. The hardware should be easily and cheaply 
available, and the system should be tested on a number of different 
machines. 
The system should guard against user error, without becoming patronizing. 
Accidental deletion of data should not be possible. Actions associated with 
data loss should be confirmed. 
There should be clear procedures for error recovery and restarting the 
system if the user ever encounters a fatal error. 
Errors encountered during the first practical testing of the system will give 
an indication of places where improvement is desirable. 
6.3 Description of the experimental situation. 
For a first test of the system it is necessary to control as much of the 
environment as possible, so that we can concentrate our attention fully upon 
the doctor, his modes of reasoning and his interactions with the DDSS 
system. 
In order to provide a constant and comparable reference, simulated patients 
were used. The location of the experiment was also invariant: a quiet room 
in the Institute for Family Medicine, not the subject's own surgery. 
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Each of 20 subjects was given 5 patients, randomly selected from a collec-
tion of eight. Every doctor had two hours to complete the series, but was 
otherwise free to divide his time over the individual patients. This gave 
subjects 20 minutes per patient, slightly longer than most doctors would use 
for a new patient. The extra time was included to compensate for the 
unfamiliarity with the system and for the time needed to fill in the several 
forms required by the experiment. If too little time remained to see the last 
patient, their consultation was not started. So, we expected to gather a 
hundred cases. 
The simulated patient was acted by an experienced doctor. Subjects could 
take the history of this "patient" in the normal way, but the physical examin-
ation had of course to be replaced by specific questions (e.g. "What do I 
hear if I listen to your heart"), and laboratory examination results could also 
be asked ("Let's do a Hb"), the results of which would be given if available. 
X-rays and other specialist examinations could also be requested and with the 
photograph the conclusion of the interpreting radiologist would be given if 
any such results were available. Subjects were told explicitly before the start 
of the experiment that every patient had a 'real disease'. 
They were encouraged to perform a normal consultation, different only from 
their customary routine in that they were asked to enter all patient data into 
the system. When either they were satisfied for themselves that they knew 
what was the matter with the patient, or when they had arrived at the point 
where they would normally stop the interview in their own practice, they 
were asked to write down their own conclusions. This was the first stage. 
After that they were asked to consult the diagnostic module of the DDSS, 
which showed them a list of diseases which might fit the symptoms entered. 
Subjects were then given an opportunity to reconsider their conclusions or 
ask more questions if they chose. When this second stage was over, the 
subject's final diagnosis was noted and the next consultation would start. 
This way of using the DDSS is not the only one imaginable; in the experi-
ment, we enforced the order of the proceedings by requiring that subjects 
first do a complete consultation before viewing the system's differential 
diagnosis. In this way it is possible to isolate the effects of seeing this dd 
from the rest of the consultation. We can also imagine a mode of use where 
after entering a few main symptoms doctors would ask for the system's 
"opinion" to give them ideas for hypotheses, then proceed to check these. 
This mode of use was not tested in the experiment. 
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6.3.1 Description of the doctor's role 
The doctor was expected to use the system as it had previously been taught 
to him in two training sessions of one hour, but was otherwise encouraged to 
perform just as he normally would in his or her own consulting room. He 
was only required to enter the patient's symptoms into the DDSS system, 
and encouraged to write down any hypotheses which he entertained at any 
given time as soon as he became aware of them. He was encouraged to 
interview the patient in his or her own style, not using medical jargon in his 
questions. (As the patient was himself played by a doctor, this could be a 
temptation, but the subject 'did not understand' jargon questions.) 
6.3.2 Description of the simulated patient 
The patients were all played by a single person, himself a doctor with 14 
years of experience as a general practitioner. Each simulated patient's data 
were minutely and fully described in a specially-prepared written record, 
with which the 'patient actor' was intimately familiar. The written record 
was immediately available for reference if the doctor should ask a question 
which the patient could not answer from memory. Every patient introduced 
himself or herself in exactly the same words to each doctor, whom it was 
assumed he or she had never seen before. The conversation then was 
allowed to flow naturally, according to the doctor's questions and the 
patient's reactions to them. At all times it was attempted to keep the conver-
sation natural, with the patient just answering questions if the doctor had a 
closed-questions interview style, or opening up a little and volunteering 
information in response to a more encouraging attitude of the doctor. The 
patient would express information in lay terms, not understanding questions 
couched in medical jargon. The translation of these terms then was the 
subject's task. The patient would introduce extraneous (irrelevant from a 
medical standpoint) material from time to time, just as real patients some-
times do. 
6.3.3 Description of the observer's role. 
The observer could not be seen by the doctor, being seated behind his back. 
The same observer was present during every consultation. His responsibil-
ities were the correct set-up of the system, the presence of the required 
forms, the synchronization of the clock in the room and the clock of the 
system, and the registration of the actions of the subject in so far as these 
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were not captured in the system log files. He kept tally of questions asked to 
the patient. Finally, only in case of malfunction or other unforeseen prob-
lems he would help the subject, each time carefully making a note of the 
problem and of the intervention required to solve it. 
6.4 Subject selection procedure 
Subjects were all doctors or advanced medical students who had links with 
the Institute for Family Medicine in Rotterdam. They were only eligible to 
participate if they had no previous experience with the system, and had not 
taken part in its design or implementation. Candidate subjects were 
approached personally and asked to participate in the experiment. No attempt 
was made to form a representative selection of general practitioners repre-
sentative of GP's in the region, although deliberately subjects of different 
sex, age and experience, both medical and with computer systems, were 
invited. 
6.5 Patient selection procedure 
The patients were the same as had been used for an earlier research project 
by Ridderikhoff, and have been described in detail there [Rid85]. In sum-
mary, they are based on real patients, whose data have been carefully 
collected and recorded with the goal of a simulated patient in mind. Besides 
medical, also social information was gathered and recorded. The eight 
patients were deliberately selected to represent four relatively rare and four 
relatively common diseases in general practice. 'Rare' and 'common' in this 
context means that an average family practitioner will see a patient with such 
a disease about once a year or about four times a year. 
Of these eight patients, each doctor was confronted with a random selection 
of five. The selection of five from the collection of eight for all subjects was 
made by a randomizing computer programme before the identity of the 
subjects or the diseases of the patients were known. The first generated 
pattern in which not more than two doctors would get all four 'rare' or all 
four 'common' patients was accepted. Patterns were checked for bias after 
the experiment in several ways: a) the number of times each patient occurred 
in the total series, and b) the average order of each patient in the sequence. 
(It would be possible that some patient nearly always occurs as the first or 
last patient in the sequence of a subject.) 
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6.6 Selection of diseases in the medical knowledge base 
The diseases in the medical knowledge base would ideally have come from 
general practice, but no such information was available. Instead, we chose to 
include the diseases of the eight patients in the experiment, supplemented by 
a number of diseases which would appear in the differential diagnoses for 
each of these diseases. This gave us a list of 45 diseases. For these 45 
diseases information about their symptoms and signs was extracted from a 
number of commonly used general and specialist textbooks on medicine. 
These lists were then translated to the SCS coding system by the author and 
entered into the DDSS knowledge base, without any knowledge which 
diseases the patients to be used in the investigation were suffering from. 
6.7 Description of the training scheme of subjects 
Subjects were trained in the use of the system in two sessions of one hour to 
one and a half hour each. These three sessions should fall within the space of 
two weeks ideally. 
In the first session, a general orientation in the purpose of the system was 
given, with an explanation of the SCS coding system and examples of how to 
use it to code patient data. Subjects were shown the DDSS in action and 
given a first chance to get some hands-on experience with it. They also 
received the DDSS manual (35 pages) to read at home if they wanted to 
know more. This was optional, not required. A manual was also on hand 
during the experimental sessions. 
In the second session, subjects were instructed in the basic principles of the 
user interface. They were given symptoms to encode for themselves, with 
assistance being given if problems developed. 
Test symptoms in the training stage were chosen so as not to bias subjects 
for the cases they might have to solve. 
6.8 Description of information gathered during the sessions 
During the training sesssions and during the experimental sessions, informa-
tion about the subjects, the programme and their interaction was gathered. 
This information can be divided into four categories: (I) questionnaires, (2) 
observation (3) patient data files and (4) computer log files. 
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6.8.1 questionnaires 
Every subject filled in two questionnaires: one before the first training 
session, and one after seeing the last patient. The pre-training questionnaire 
was intended to give an impression of the attitude of the subject towards 
computers in general and their use in medicine, and his or her experience 
with personal computers. The last questionnaire was intended to gauge 
subjects' reactions to the system. 
In addition, every doctor was asked to fill in a form for every patient during 
each consultation, on which subject was encouraged to write down any 
diagnostic hypothesis that was entertained, however fleetingly. Directly after 
each consultation the subject was asked to give an opinion on how hard he 
found the problem and how realistic the patient seemed to him or her. 
6.8.2 observation 
During the patient consultations the observer could see the patient's face and 
the computer screen. For every question asked by the doctor, a tally was 
kept on a special form, timed accurate to the nearest minute. We therefore 
have a record of the number of questions asked during each consultation and 
of the temporal relations between them, but not of their content. In addition, 
any failures in the hard- or software, subject errors in using the system, and 
points where subject needed help from the manual or from the observer were 
recorded. Finally, anything which struck the observer as remarkable was 
noted. 
6.8.3 patient data files 
The patient's medical records were stored in the computer in the normal way 
during the consultation as they would be during routine use of the system. 
They were not used in the analysis as the next item gave the same informa-
tion with much additional detail. 
6.8.4 log-file of user actions. 
Just for the experiment a special version of the DOSS programme was used 
which monitored a number of specific user actions by writing them to a 
special log-file. Stored in this way were: 
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- the times of entry and exit of the different modules of the programme, 
- any use of the "Help" key, 
- any symptoms entered, and 
- any deletions, 
- any editing of data already entered, 
- any use of the support module and the dd given 
Every one of these was registered together with the time at which it 
occurred, accurate to the nearest second. (Before every session the clock in 
the room was synchronized with the internal system clock). This gave us an 
extremely accurate record of the way in which the subject used the pro-
gramme. The extra time needed for the construction of these log-files is 
imperceptible and the system is not slowed down at all. 
6.8.5 Analysis 
The data were entered into a spreadsheet programme with extended graphics 
capabilities, (Borland's 'Quattro Pro') which was used for the analysis of 
most data. Since no complex statistical analysis was necessary, this was 
perfectly adequate for the purpose. Log-files for the sessions were extracted 
with different filter programmes to look for a large number of different 
occurrences. The filter programmes were written in A WK, a pattern-action 
language which is very suitable to this sort of application. [Ah078] 
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Chapter 7. Results 
In this chapter we will look at the course of the experiment on a broadly 
chronologic and step-by step basis, examining and describing each part of 
the process as it occurred. In addition, hypotheses formulated in the previous 
chapters will be discussed in the places where such a discussion seems most 
appropriate, and an attempt to verify or falsify these hypotheses will be 
made. 
7.1 Description of participants in the experiment. 
7.1.1 Recruitment of subjects 
Subjects were taken from the group of doctors and advanced medical 
students who have links with the Institute for Family Medicine of the 
Erasmus University, Rotterdam. 
Requirements for candidate subjects were that they had no previous experi-
ence with the system, and had not taken part in its design or implementation. 
Twenty-one subjects of different sex, age and experience, both medical 
experience and experience with computer systems, were approached per-
sonally and invited to take part. The resulting group is rather mixed, as the 
statistics below show. One of the subjects had to withdraw after the first 
training session because of lack of time. Data for this subject were not taken 
into consideration in the remainder of the chapter. 




Our group consisted of 20 persons, 7 women and 13 men. 
The average age of our subjects at the time of the experiment was 
38 years, ranging from 24 to 63 years. 
Subjects were a mixture of trainee doctors and experienced gen-
eral practitioners. (see table 1.) 
Table 1. Medical status of subjects 
General Practitioner 12 
'basisarts' 5 
trainee GP 2 
last-yr med student 1 
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Subjects formed a heterogeneous group of doctors, allowing us to assess the 
qualities of the system in its interaction with doctors of different age, skill 
and experience. 
The total medical experience of our subjects, measured in years, also 
differed widely, with a large presence of both the very experienced and the 
very inexperienced. (table 2) This gives us an opportunity to check whether 
medical experience influences several parameters of the diagnostic process 
and the subject-system interaction. 


















Most subjects owned a personal computer (table 3). The possession or non-
possession of a personal computer enabled us to assess the impact of this 
characteristic on several aspects of using the system, e.g. using the mouse, 
keyboard, software. Many subjects had some experience with specific 
information systems according to the HIS model for general practitioners. It 
will be interesting later on to see whether such experience is of help in using 
the DDSS system - the expectation is that it will not, because of the com-
pletely different nature of both types of program. 










Table 4 shows a broad measure of the experience of our subjects with 
computer use on an (arbitrary) scale of 0 to 100, computed from their own 
reports of familiarity with different types of computer programme (word 
processing, databases, programming languages, medical administrative 
systems, medical expert systems and computer games). Nearly all subjects 
had some experience with wordprocessing software, usually WordPerfect. 
Other programs were much less often used. Thus, most subjects had some 
experience with computer programs but only one or two considered them-
selves to be expert users. 
Attitude of subjects to computer use in general practice 
In the questionnaire administered before the start of the trammg process, 
there were some questions intended to give an impression of the attitude of 
our subjects to the use of computers in medicine and general practice. 
Subjects were asked to express their agreement or disagreement with the 
following statements: 
"I believe the computer can be a useful tool, but just for administrative 
purposes." (O-disagree, lO-agree) 
The average score for this question was 2.73 (sd 2.4, n=20). 
In retrospect this was a bad question because logically, disagreement can be 
construed either to mean that subject did not think that computers could be 
useful at all or that they could be used for much more than just administra-
tion, but we believe the latter opinion to be the correct interpretation: 
computers can be used for much more than just administrative purposes. 
The next statement was: "I believe computers in general practice can 
contribute to diagnosis" (O-disagree, 10-agree) 
The average level of agreement with this sentence was 6.76 (sd 1.84, n=20), 
indicating a fairly general belief in at least the theoretical ability of com-
puters to aid doctors in diagnosis. 
With regard to the statement: "I would accept the advice of the computer if 
it had been proved that it could do something better than I" (O-disagree, 1 0-
agree), 
the average score of 5.6 hides a sharp division of opinion: (sd 3.05, n=20) 
While some unhesitatingly endorsed this opinion, others expressed strong 
disagreement, indicating an irrational attitude toward the machine. Even 
assuming that its judgement had been proved superior to their own under 
certain circumstances, they would not follow the machine's advice! This is 
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also interesting in view of the effects of the feedback of the system on the 
subject's actions, as discussed later on in this chapter. 
When asked to express their opinion on the statement: "I do not believe that 
computers will ever be a competitor to the general practitioner" (O-disagree, 
100agree) the result, an average score of 8.7 (sd 1.2, n=20) indicates 
almost unanimous agreement. 
The subjects were also asked to answer a multiple-choice question: "How do 
you view the introduction of computers in the daily work of the general 
practitioner?" 
The responses are summarized m table 5. (Some subjects gave more than 
one answer.) 
Table 5. Reactions to introduction of computers in 
general practice. 
as a great promise 7 
with hesitant optimism 8 
with some suspicion 3 
with great suspicion 0 
as useless 0 
as a threat to the 
nature of the job 0 
otherwise 4 
Table 5 shows that our subjects are interested in the introduction of com-
puters in general practice, and have high expectations of this development, 
although in some this is tempered by a slight mistrust or a wait-and-see 
attitude. Open opposition to the introduction of computers is absent, which in 
our opinion indicates that computers have noiselessly found their way into 
the mental baCkground of the profession; even those doctors who do not 
themselves expect to work with a computer are not opposed to the machine 
per se. This is also illustrated by the answers to another question asked 
before the experiment: 
"Could you ever learn to trust the expertise of a computer programme m 
your area o~,expertise?" 
Results 
The answers to this question are shown in table 6. 
Table 6. Responses to the question: "could you ever learn 
to trust the computer in your own area of expertise?" 
yes 12 
maybe 7 
probably not 1 
never 0 
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This is perhaps also an indication of a more general change in attitude in 
society towards computers. Only a decade ago, it was quite common for 
computers to be the subject of anecdotes about people not getting paid for 
several months, or getting paid grossly incorrect amounts, or anecdotes 
where the inflexibility of computers was illustrated by examples of condi-
tions which could not be handled satisfactorily by a database system, e.g. 
two unmarried people living at the same adress, or getting increasingly 
acerbic reminders for a bill for a zero amount. People often had a strong 
emotional resistance to 'being reduced to a number' in a database and had 
little faith in the outcome. This seems to grow less as the sophistication of 
the hard- and software improves, although new concerns are springing up as 
a consequence of the large number of databases in which data about a person 
are registered, and the more or less unpleasant possibilities which could 
result from combining the data in several databases. It is therefore important 
that the data of our patients are stored in the DOSS in such a way that 
medical information can be extracted anonymously. 
We have seen that the test population consisted of doctors of different age 
and medical experience, and also with different levels of experience with 
computers. Their attitude to the use of computers in general practice was 
interested but only guardedly optimistic. Later on we will see whether the 
level of medical and computer experience made any difference in the process 
of learning the system or in the performance of the doctor-system team when 
confronted with the simulated patients. 
7.2 The training process of our test subjects. 
Teaching sessions were planned within one week of one another whenever 
possible, and the experimental session was planned soon after that. 
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Participants were instructed in two sessions in the use of the system. The 
duration of each session was one hour, but in more than half the cases 
participants needed less time to achieve a sufficient degree of fluency in the 
use of the system. This especially occurred in young participants and in 
participants who had much experience with personal computers. There was 
also a strong tendency of subjects to assume that they would be able to 
navigate the system without trouble, once the general principle had been 
explained and just a few trial runs had been made. We clearly observed that 
the logical structure of the system induced confidence in the subjects that 
they would be able to handle it. Sometimes this confidence developed so 
quickly that we could not quite yet share it. 
Learning to use the hardware. 
The keyboard. 
The keyboard as a data entry device was familiar to most subjects, although 
some had previously encountered it only in the form of a typewriter. 
Most subjects had some typing skill, although none had advanced beyond the 
two-finger stage, and some still belonged to the 'hunt and peck' school. This 
could be a slight handicap in the filling in of screen forms with names and 
adresses but it did not present difficulties once the support programme was 
running, as typing is normally completely avoided during the consultation. 
The mouse. 
Hardly any of the subjects had used a mouse before, as their experience with 
computers was usually limited to traditional, non - mouse-driven programs 
running on an IBM compatible machine in text mode. 
Nevertheless, due to its intuitive function, using the mouse was not a 
problem for most users, although two or three older users who had no 
previous experience with a mouse had some difficulty keeping three different 
fingers each to a fixed button and tended to push each mouse button with the 
index finger instead. This forced them to look away from the screen, 
interrupting their train of thought. 
Learning to use the software 
The introductory screens 
We had thought beforehand that the introductory screens, where subjects 
were asked to identify themselves or their patient to the system, would 
present the least difficulty. We had believed this because of the intentional 
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similarity of these screens with many existing standard applications. Surpris-
ingly, these turned out to be rather harder to learn than the extremely 
straightforward SCS menu system. (For an example of these screens, see 
Chapter 4.) Especially the 'user-friendly' additions and niceties calculated to 
reduce user effort when filling in the screen forms, such as pop-up menus 
with codes to be selected for certain fields, or automatic repositioning of the 
cursor on the next field when the previous field is filled in, were often 
surprising to 'computer-naive' subjects and tended to disorient them. One 
possible explanation might be that although at least some subjects used 
software with a similar interface at this point in their own practice, the 
administration of these data would normally be done by the doctor's assist-
ant, not by himself ... 
A form where the screen behaves as the paper in a typewriter probably 
presents the least surprises to the inexperienced user: he always repositions 
the cursor himself, and the machine makes no attempts to out-guess or 
correct the user when it is not absolutely necessary. 
Despite the above, the screens of the programme did not present many prob-
lems to the user. Fields in the database screens sometimes had to be 
explained by giving an example (e.g. 'marital status' -> married, divorced, 
etc.). 
The menus of the symptom coding system (SCS) 
As there were only the three mouse keys to be remembered, navigating these 
menus was immediately obvious to nearly all users. Browsing through the 
tree of possible symptoms by using the left and middle mouse buttons came 
naturally because of the direct feedback of every action. Only for the act of 
entering a symptom of the patient in the patient record users occasionally had 
to be reminded to press the right button; confirmation of this action is given 
in the form of an unobtrusive momentary flash of the relevant text in another 
colour, easy to miss if the subject had not learned to watch out for it. 
The structure of the symptom coding system (SCS) 
Learning the structure of the symptom coding system (SCS) was more of 
a problem, because by virtue of its sheer size it could not be fully explored 
within the time limit of the training sessions. Here, teaching had to be 
confined to the construction principles of the system. As already stated in the 
introductory paragraph to this section, users very quickly picked up on the 
structure and gained confidence that they could work out for themselves 
where a specific item should be located. After having done just a few 
exercises, the task of data entry was perceived to be so easy that subjects 
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frequently lost interest. We encountered surprisingly little difficulty in 
teaching the subjects to use the system in this phase. 
SCS - Special terminology 
A few words of special medical terminology used in some screens of the 
SCS had to be explained to all users. These were words created for this 
application, e.g. the new word 'gezwelling' was introduced to describe any 
tumor or swelling regardless of its cause, as a combination of the two Dutch 
words ' gezwel' and ' zwelling', because of the malignant overtones of the 
first and the non-neoplastic overtones of the second. This usage is unique to 
the SCS and therefore has to be explained to every user. All in all, there are 
just a few of these special cases where a doctor cannot be expected to choose 
the correct item just from the context of his medical knowledge and the 
specific menu structure given. There were no cases where a subject did not 
understand the terminology used, after the few exceptions to generally 
accepted medical terminology had been explained. Of course, they might 
have used different expressions for the same symptom themselves, but the 
expressions used in the SCS were perfectly acceptable to them. This con-
firms our earlier hypothesis: 
Doctors will be able to handle the standardised terminology of the SCS 
without much trouble (HIl). 
Later on, after the experiment, subjects also gave their own opinion about 
the terminology used (and the reader should note that this was after they had 
entered, on average, nearly a hundred symptoms using the system, most of 
which they saw for the first time in the SCS while doing this!) 
In response to the question: "Did you find the terminology used in the 
SCS ... " (O-easy, 10-hard) the average score of our 20 subjects was 5.5. This 
average conceals a wide range of answers, from 2 to 8.6 (sd 2.(0). Although 
from this it appears that at least some subjects found the terminology of the 
SCS hard, we nevertheless cannot say that from the standpoint of the 
observer it was badly understood, as nearly all symptoms entered were, in 
our opinion, an adequate encoding of information received from the patient. 
Our own observations do indicate a number of mistakes and difficulties 
which occurred again and again in specific places in the SCS, which particu-
lar places therefore should be subject to review in a later version of the SCS. 
One aspect of the system software seemed to give many users some trouble: 
when browsing through the symptom tree they sometimes had to be 
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reminded that seeing a symptom on screen was not the same as entering it 
into the record for their patient, and that they had to push the third mouse 
button explicitly for that. Especially those users who needed to look at the 
mouse for this task tended to miss the short flash of the text on screen 
indicating that the item had been entered. Subjects regularly made use of the 
option to inspect the symptoms gathered so far, and reflected om the case 
while looking at it. 
From all these experiences, teaching the use of the keyboard, mouse, 
database menus, SCS menus and the underlying structure of the SCS, we can 
fully confirm our hypothesis from ch. 5: 
For users with some general computer experience the use of the system is 
easy to grasp. (H2) 
Even for users without previous computer experience it turned out to be 
quite feasible to achieve an acceptable working knowledge of the system 
within the allotted two hours of training time. 
A young subject, even if he or she had no computer experience at all, could 
be taught to use the SCS menu system correctly with the help of the mouse 
within 10 minutes, as we repeatedly demonstrated. Older subjects without 
previous computer experience needed more time and repetitive instruction, 
but all subjects reached a sufficient level of fluency to be able to take part in 
the experiment within the allotted 2 hours of instruction time. We shall also 
see the good grasp of the system users had when we examine their perform-
ance in the experimental sessions. 
The system only assumes its users to be medically, not technically, trained. 
Persons who have such medical knowledge encounter few problems. We 
believe that this could be achieved mainly because the system was designed 
for routine medical use by people who know what practical medicine is 
about. 
7.3 The experimental sessions. 
The interval between the second teaching session and the experimental 
session was 12.0 days on average. Before the session was started, the paper 
forms to be used during the experiment were shown to the subject and 
explained. The subject was only asked to write down during the consultation: 
1) any hypotheses, however vague, he or she formed during the consultation 
about the cause of the patient's complaints, and 2) the final diagnosis. 
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Additionally, each subject was asked to provide an estimate of the likelihood 
that any hypothesis formed might be true. For this estimate three values were 
obtained, once immediately after the hypothesis had been written down, once 
after the subject's own diagnosis had been made, and finally after having 
seen the system differential diagnosis. The estimates were entered on a 
'Visual analogue scale', (II AS), an open bar of 10 cm length, representing a 
SUbjective probability estimate ranging from 0 to 1, the latter value repre-
senting full confidence in the hypothesis. 
All in all, 99 consultations were done instead of the intended 100. Only one 
participant did not have enough time left to start on the last patient. This was 
caused by a misunderstanding: before the experiment, subjects had been 
explicitly informed that the patients they were about to see were in no way 
special, but such patients as they might expect to encounter in their practice. 
However, this particular subject seemed to regard the experimental set-up as 
a test situation where the goal was to trap him into making an error by 
putting especially treacherous cases before him, and so acted with much 
greater circumspection and caution than usual. This caused him to need 
much more time than the others. All other subjects easily completed their 
five consultations within the time frame set for the task. 
7.3.1 The experiment: Starting the program. 
As this was something most users had only seen done once or twice before, 
they sometimes had to be prompted which command to type (,DDSS') to 
start the programme. Otherwise, no specific difficulties were encountered. 
Logging in. 
The database screen on which the subject was invited to log in as a user of 
the system was negotiated without trouble, especially since the users had 
already filled in their forms during the training sessions and needed only to 
type the first letters of their name to arrive at the correct entry. The com-
puter log files show that on average, subjects spent 29 seconds at this screen. 
This is not just the time needed to fill in the form, but includes time needed 
for explanations and for the subject to familiarize himself with the proceed-
ings and the protocol. There was a slight problem with the user interface dis-
covered at this point: some users paused after finding their entry in the 
database, then hit the < return> key while or after accidentally touching the 
mouse. Since moving the mouse has an identical effect to pressing the arrow 
keys within the program, this sometimes caused them to move inadvertently 
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to another user's record before confirming the selection by hitting the return 
key. Usually, subjects did not notice this error themselves. In 5 cases (out of 
20 logging-in procedures) this mistake occurred, necessitating going back 
and re-logging in. Therefore, in future versions of the programme the 
interface should be modified to make this mistake unlikely. 
7.3.2 Selecting the patient. 
The screen where the patient was to be selected gave rise to no problems, 
other than the one with the mouse movement mentioned earlier. According 
to the computer log files, the time the subject spent in this screen was 75 
seconds on average, but this is not an indication of trouble with this screen 
but rather a consequence of the tendency of many doctors to start questioning 
the patient with this screen still in front of them to provide background 
information about age, sex and occupation of the patient. 
The subjects' own opinion about these first screens was obtained from a few 
questions of the the post-experiment questionnaire: 
"What did you think of the filling in and the overview of the personal data of 
the doctor and the patient'?" (O-easy, 10-hard) 
The average score of 1. 9 (sd 1.53) shows that subjects perceived the screens 
for entry of personal data of the patient and the doctor as rather easy. 
In our own observation, the most difficult part of the system was the 
sequence of 5 keystrokes, including two decisions about saving or not saving 
the data and adding or not adding a text comment to the data, necessary to 
store the data of one patient and to go on to the screen to select the next one. 
Nearly every subject needed some hints from the observer at this point. In 
the course of the session most subjects did tend to become familiar with 
these keystrokes. 
With regard to the selection of patients: 
"How easily could you find your way in the menus to select a new patient?" 
(O-easy, 10-hard) The average score of 2.4 (sd 1.47) leads to a similar con-
clusion. 
Finally, when subjects were asked "How easily could you find your way in 
the non-symptom menus?" (O-easy,IO-hard) The average score was 3.4; (sd 
1.69). These answers indicate that finding the way through these menus was 
not perceived as difficult by our subjects. 
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Presentation of the patient. 
In order to set the subjects off to an equal start, each patient presented 
himself or herself, by mouth of the actor, in the same words to every doctor. 
Additionally, the text of the initial complaint was shown to the doctor on a 
printed note, to reduce the effect of accidentally differing emphasis. The 
initial presentation was modelled upon a common mode of presentation of a 
patient in general practice, where a symptom and one piece of additional 
information are volunteered by the patient as introduction to the consultation, 
e.g. "1 have a bad pain on the chest and I feel dizzy, doctor". 
This introduction usually immediately engaged the attention of the subject 
doctors, who had as a rule had very little trouble adjusting to the experimen-
tal situation, although some doctors tended to forget their role in the first 
few minutes and attempted to query their patient in medical terms, as in a 
discussion among doctors. As the 'patient' then started to complain about 
difficult words and pretended not to understand the questions, the subject 
was quietly and automatically coerced back into the intended role. Many 
physicians clearly enjoyed their role and played their part so well that they 
gave their 'patient' advice on diet, smoking, lifestyle etc. 
On the whole, subjects perceived the patients as being quite realistic. Every 
doctor was asked to score the realism of each patient on a sliding scale just 
after finishing his consultation with that patient. The average perceived 
realism for all patients together was high: 80.9 on a scale of 0 .. 100. This 
may not be altogether surprising as all simulated patients were indeed 
faithfully based on real cases; nevertheless, it is also a tribute to the acting 
performance of the doctor who played the patients. Perceived realism was 
slightly higher among experienced doctors than among inexperienced doctors 
(83 % vs 77 %). A possible explanation is that inexperienced doctors are less 
aquainted with the usual wording of complaints in the GP's office. 
7.3.3 The consultations. 
Although we had intended that every subject should enter each piece of 
medical information into the system as soon as it became available, it quickly 
became clear that that many doctors, especially the older, more experienced 
ones, found this too much an interruption of their usual routine. They 
sometimes shifted to another modus operandi whereby they would first 
question the patient, sometimes keeping notes on paper to keep track of their 
thoughts, and then enter all the symptoms in a batch. This behaviour, which 
we dubbed 'non-simultaneous data entry' occurred in 54 out of 99 consulta-
tions. The other 45 cases were performed in the intended 'simultaneous' 
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mode. Strikingly, all (young) doctors with less than 3 years' experience 
exclusively used the simultaneous style of data entry; the experienced doctors 
used either mode, often trying the simultaneous method for one or two 
patients and then falling back into what seemed to be for them a more 
comfortable style. 
The difference between these two groups may be a consequence of the 
assumed greater flexibility of inexperienced, and hence younger, doctors, or 
alternatively it is possible that the inexperienced participants felt more in 
need of guidance and structure in their interviews, for which they looked to 
the SCS. Our impression is that the second explanation certainly played a 
role in a number of consultations. The experienced physicians tended more 
to regard the menus offered on screen as a distraction of their own train of 
thought, while the inexperienced doctors were led to use it as a source of 
ideas. 
The non-simultaneous style of consultation defeats one of the original 
purposes of the system, i.e. trying to reduce or eliminate distortion of the 
observed facts through selection and memory recall errors. It was therefore 
interesting, and unexpected, to note that there was no difference between the 
two groups of simultaneous-style and non-simultaneous consultation in 
number of questions asked, number of symptoms entered, fabrication or 
unwarranted interpretation of symptoms, time needed for the consultation, 
accuracy of the diagnosis, or any other of the parameters we looked at. 
(Table 7) 
Table 7. Differences between several parameters for groups using 
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The questions our subjects asked of the patients are our next object of 
scrutiny. Scoring the number of questions was not so straightforward as the 
reader might suppose, and some subjectivity came into this. Many doctors 
asked questions in quick succession, without waiting for an answer. In this 
case each question was scored separately. Sometimes they asked after several 
items in the same question. (e.g. "Do you have diarrhea and vomiting?") In 
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this case the items were scored as separate questions if they were sufficiently 
different. Sometimes the doctor posed the same question in two different 
forms, right after another (e.g. "Did you vomit? bring up your food?"). In 
this case only one question was scored. It was remarkable how often ques-
tions were asked to which no answer seemed to be expected because the 
doctor would continue with the next question without waiting for the patient 
to give an answer. 
The full matrix with the number of questions asked by every doctor of the 
patients seen by that doctor is given in Table 8. 
Table 8. Number of questions asked by each doctor to each pa-
tient seen 
doctors -> 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 p Q R T U 
A - 19 -17 38 27 28 - 17 18 27 - 28 - 26 40 
C 13 - 18 - 24 - 19 19 17 42 15 - 17 38 15 11 
E - 23 24 13 41 48 28 - 42 20 29 41 15 - 36 33 23 - 24 
G 16 19 9 37 71 16 16 10 - 13 15 19 47 28 
B 20 33 - 26 41 - 13 34 37 23 - 23 - 46 - 31 45 34 21 
D 27 - 75 36 - 76 - 19 - 29 30 28 - 37 - 33 
F 22 - 33 - 39 58 23 62 - 29 26 - 56 - 36 11 21 
H - 28 33 13 41 - 16 - 49 - 24 38 - 10 36 - 28 22 
Table 9 shows the number of questions asked by each doctor for his first to 
fifth patients. 
Table 9. Number of questions asked by each doctor to the 
first ... fifth patient 
doctors-> 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 p Q R T U 
1 16 19 75 26 41 76 13 62 49 20 29 38 13 15 10 47 28 36 21 24 
2 13 28 24 36 39 58 16 17 24 10 30 41 29 18 19 56 45 34 26 21 
3 27 19 33 9 41 48 16 34 38 23 28 19 15 42 37 31 28 23 28 22 
4 20 33 33 13 37 71 28 19 37 27 24 28 17 46 15 36 33 33 11 11 
5 22 23 18 13 41 - 23 16 42 29 19 23 17 26 27 36 17 38 15 40 
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On average, each subject asked 29 questions of each of his or her patients. 
See Table 10. 
Table 10. Average number of questions asked to each patient. 
Pat ACE G B D F H 
# quest 25.9 20.7 29.3 24.3 30.5 39.0 34.7 28.2 
There were marked differences in the number of questions asked of patients 
between the group of relatively rare diseases and the group of the more 
common ones. The rarer diseases needed more questions to diagnose, with 
the exception of patient H. (A case of iron-deficiency anaemia) 
This is in accordance with our model of the medical problem-solving 
process, because a) a doctor has the patterns for common diseases more at 
his fingertips than for rarer ones, and is thus able to produce a stock list of 
questions quickly, and b) he will sooner arrive at the correct diagnostic 
hypothesis, because the pattern is fresh in his mind, thus wasting less 
questions on hypotheses which are later discarded. Cf. Balla: "The strength 
of a physician's initial disposition to regard his patients as having a certain 
illness is directly proportional to the incidence of that disease in the popula-
tion he serves." [BaI82] and "The difficulty of the cases was reflected in the 
percentages of of data per case and cues per case"; "Obviously, the difficulty 
of a case is reflected in the physician's task of data aquisition" [Rid93]. 
There was also a difference in the number of questions asked of patients 
depending on their order in the sequence of five. See table 11. 
Table 11. Average number of questions and number of 
questions asked per minute as a function of the order 













Remarkably, by and large the number of questions asked declined with every 
patient seen in a session. To account for this phenomenon several theories 
may be advanced, e.g. it is possible that it is an artifact of the experimental 
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situation: at first the doctors want to perform well in this extraordinary 
situation where they are being monitored, while for the next patients they are 
able to relax more and slip into their real routine; alternatively, increasing 
time pressure may prompt a more economical mode of data gathering. 
Finally, because the number of questions per minute stays fairly constant for 
consecutive consultations, we believe that possibly the doctor asks questions 
just to fill the time: while he is working with the program, he asks a few 
questions just to keep the patient busy. If the programme becomes familiar 
and does not need as much time as in the beginning, the extra chatter 
decreases. As we will see later, the amount of information gathered with the 
increased number of questions, as expressed in symptoms of the patient 
entered in the patient record, is zero. 
This difference in number of questions to the first and last patients was not 
caused by an accidentally uneven distribution of hard and easy patients over 
the sessions: 
Table 12. Average position of each patient in the sequence 
of 5 patients. 
Pat ACE G B D F H 
3.2 2.9 3.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.4 2.8 
Table 12 shows that when we average the position in the sequence of every 
patient for all sessions in which he or she was used, most patients end up 
close to the ideal average position of 3 (the average position we would 
expect to see if every patient occurs in position 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 with equal 
probability.) 
We posed a hypothesis earlier: 
By the presentation of the menus doctors are will query their patient wider 
(more categories of symptoms and signs) than when not guided by the 
system. (H8) 
This hypothesis cannot be strictly confirmed or denied because of the lack of 
a control group. However, during the experiment we frequently observed 
subjects scanning the menu and then asking a question, which seemed to 
originate from seeing a menu item on screen. In a number of cases this was 
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also explicitly stated or admitted by the subject. 'Let me see, what else can 
we ask ... II 
After the consultations, we asked our subjects whether they thought they had 
gathered more information: 
"Did you find that the menu-structure invited you to ask less or more 
questions?" (O-Iess, 10-more); To which the average answer score was 6.5 
(sd 1.80), indicating that subjects assigned a modest increase in the number of 
questions asked to the system. This is in agreement with our own observa-
tions. 
However, it is interesting that in our study the number of questions asked 
to the patients is somewhat lower than in the earlier study of Ridderikhoff, 
who used a closely similar experimental setup with the same patients, but 
without a computer providing menus. In this experiment, the number of 
questions asked to each patient was on average just over 34 for the group of 
family physicians, which group conforms most closely to the subjects in the 
present experiment. [Rid85, p. 207]. To account for this difference, several 
hypotheses may be advanced, none of which can be proved at the present 
time. 
I) The difference may be merely a consequence of a slightly different 
scoring policy; as explained above, it is not always obvious how many 
questions a physician asked. 
2) It may be that the circumstances of the earlier experiment, which took 
place with more people in the room because each consultation was also 
videotaped, made the doctor feel less at ease and so try harder to arrive at a 
correct diagnosis. 
3) It may be that having to cope with the computer and the patient at the 
same time occupied the attention of the doctor, leading him to focus less on 
the patient's problem. 
4) It may be that the attention-focusing influence of the system enabled the 
physician to gather the same information with fewer questions. In this 
context it is interesting to note that the information entered into the system 
remained nearly constant when averaged over the first, second etc. patient; 
but as we have seen the number of questions decreased rather strongly with 
each consecutive patient. 
The order of questioning employed by our physicians fitted the design of the 
SCS; all used the customary medical order of history, physical examination, 
and lab tests and special examinations, although sometimes during the 
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physical examination or lab test stage they would fall back into history taking 
as a new idea crossed their mind. This confirms the second part of our 
hypothesis 5: 
The user will have an intuitive feeling of what is going on in the system. (lI5) 
All subjects followed the traditional, 'natura!' order of of events in their 
consultations: history, physical examination, laboratory results, diagnosis. 
This is the order that is also the most natural to follow when using the 
DOSS. However, one typical error pointing to disorientation of the user did 
occur from time to time: Sometimes when users were in the middle of 
physical examination, they would revert to the history-taking, and then 
attempt to encode history items as physical findings. This indicates a certain 
confusion, or lack of awareness of the difference between subjective evi-
dence of the patient, and the subject's own observations of the patient. 
Otherwise, no specific difficulties were noted. On the whole, the users did 
have a good grasp of what was going on inside the system, which confirms 
the first part of the hypothesis. When asked after the experiment: "What did 
you think of searching through the hierarchical structure of the SCS Cthe 
actual symptom tree)?" CO-easy, 10-hard) the average result was 5.0, with a 
considerable disagreement in the answers: (sd 2.42, range (1.2-8.8) This indicates 
that some users subjectively found the structure of the SCS tree much harder 
than others. This self-assessment frequently did not coincide with our own, 
made with the advantage of being able to compare different subjects. 
A similar result was obtained in answer to the question: "Did you find the 
terminology used in the SCS" CO-easy, 10-hard) 
average 5.5 (sd 2.00, range (2-8.6)). 
Users had an accurate sense of the structure of the data involved, and 
correctly decided for themselves when they had made an error in input, or 
when to review the data they had gathered for a patient. 
7.3.3.2 Time. 
The time needed for the consultation of every doctor with every patient is 
shown in table 13; the time as a function of the first, second etc. consultation 
of every doctor is shown in table 14. Both tables show the time from the 
start of the consultation to the point where the doctor has made his diagnosis 
and filled in the forms up to that point. 
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Table 13 
Time needed for every consultation, until doctor's diagnosis 
(minutes). ( = Phase 1 ) 
doctors-> 
A B C 0 E F G H I J K L M N 0 P Q R T U 
A - 14 -11 15 13 15 -11 15 lS - 20 - lS 19 
C 10 -11 S 9 19 11 26 S - 14 16 16 12 
E - 11 13 9 24 23 S - 11 13 14 22 14 - 14 lS 12 - 13 
G 12 S - 11 13 29 6 13 7 - 14 13 10 24 20 
B 12 17 - 23 17 - 10 21 14 14 - 14 - 30 - 16 23 23 20 -
0 14 - 3S 21 - 46 - 12 - 14 16 20 - 24 - 17 
F 9 - 14 - 23 23 10 37 - 20 20 - 31 - 29 15 16 
H - 13 17 12 22 S - 15 - 12 lS - 11 19 - 24 17 
Table 14. Time needed for consultation until diagnosis for first 
to fifth patient 
doctors-> 
A B C 0 E F G H I J K L M N 0 P Q R T U 
1 12 14 3S 23 24 46 10 37 15 13 14 lS 14 13 11 24 20 29 20 13 
2 10 13 13 21 23 23 S 11 S 7 16 22 20 15 10 31 23 23 lS 16 
3 14 S 17 11 17 23 6 21 15 14 15 19 14 26 24 16 20 12 24 17 
4 12 17 14 9 13 29 S 12 14 13 12 20 11 30 S 19 lS 17 15 12 
5 9 11 11 12 22 - 10 13 11 14 9 14 11 20 lS 14 14 16 16 19 
The average time needed for the consultation is shown in table 15 for the 
individual patients and in table 16 for the first to fifth patients seen. These 
tables show (T. 15) that for the patients with the less prevalent diseases the 
subjects needed more time, and also (T. 16) that there is a very clear ten-
dency to shorter consultations as familiarity with the system increases. 
Table 15. Time needed for the phases before (T1) and after (T2) 
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Table 16. Average time needed per patient for the two phases of 
the consultation, for the first to fifth patients. 
Pat T1 T2 
1 20.4 1.3 
2 16.6 1.4 
3 16.7 1.0 
4 15.2 1.3 
5 13.9 1.4 
The average duration of a consultation, from the first presentation of patient 
to the conclusion, was 17.9 minutes. This is considerably longer than was 
found in the experiment of Ridderikhoff with the same patients, but without 
the use of the system. (11.25 minutes, sd 3.87). [Rid85, P 207J. Even when 
we subtract the 1.3 minutes the subject spent on average in our experiment 
on the system's differential diagnosis, an interval not present in the other 
experiment, the resulting 16.6 minutes is still longer. An encouraging 
observation is that although the time needed for the first patient was 20.4 
minutes on average, by the fifth patient the time had dropped to only 13.9 
minutes, which is just slightly longer than the time found by Ridderikhoff. 
It should also be noted that in the Ridderikhoff experiment, the total avail-
able time per patient was shorter, possibly causing his subjects to hurry 
more. 
The maximum number of symptoms entered into the system in one minute 
for every consultation is shown in the following figure. It shows the maxi-
mum number of symptoms entered in a single minute for each consultation, 
and hence the greatest speed of data entry reached in every consultation. 
Subjects were able to find the items sought for in the menu system in a 
reasonable time. On average, the subjects asked 28 questions in 16.6 minutes 
for every consultation. Additionally, in this same time interval, on average 
19 symptoms were entered in the database. 
This shows that most users could reach a reasonable speed when entering 
symptom data into the system. Maximum speeds of up to 4 or five symptoms 
per minute were quite common. This indicates that the speed of the com-
bined system/user team can be quite acceptable in our view. 
Overall speed increased significantly from the first to the last experimental 
session, probably from increasing familiarity with the system. There were 
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max speed of data entry 
(symptoms/min) 
top spood In syptoms per minuto 
fig. 6 Distribution of the maximum speed of data entry for every 
consultation. 
some differences between the first and last patients, pointing to a clear 
learning effect while using the system. (Table 17) 
Table 17. Averages for several parameters as a function of the 
order of presentation of the patient: total time needed, number 
of questions asked, number of symtoms entered, depth of symptom 
rank time # ques #sympt depth 
needed asked entered 
1 21.7 32.9 18.6 6.38 
2 18.0 29.2 18.5 6.31 
3 17.7 28.1 19.8 6.42 
4 16.4 28.6 18.8 6.37 
5 15.3 25.5 19.3 6.39 
We see that while the number of symptoms entered, and the level of detail 
with which symptoms are entered do not change with the order of the patient 
in the sequence, there is a clear trend toward shorter interviews, as experi-
ence with the system grows. At the same time, there is a decrease in the 
number of questions asked. 
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7.3.3.3 Looking up and entering symptom data. 
If the physician had acquired an item of information from the patient, he 
should enter it into the decision support system. Those physicians who had 
followed their reasoning on screen by selecting the relevant menus as they 
asked questions could immediately click on the relevant item; those who had 
let the system be for the moment while concentrating on the patient's 
problem had to look the symptoms up first. Neither style presented many 
problems to the subjects. As we have seen earlier, there were .few differ-
ences between the group who performed their consultations simultaneously 
and the one where the entering of data was done separately. 
The subject of entering data brings us to our earlier hypothesis 11: 
Doctors will be able to encode all their observations within the SCS (H9). 
In a number of cases, the subject could not find an item in the tree. 
The cause of this could be either that the item was indeed absent; or that its 
encoding was not sufficiently intuitive to the subject that he might locate it 
by himself. In such cases, the subject was helped and the offending symptom 
noted. A few items were consistently hard to find for most subjects, indicat-
ing a real problem with the symptom coding tree. Examples of such items 
are noises of different kinds in the lungs or the heart, or the results of tests 
of the neuromotor system, such as reflexes, or nerve root irritation. Rarely, 
a symptom was found to be completely absent from the tree: this occurred 
about 10 to 20 times in all. Therefore, more than 99 % of symptoms could be 
encoded without trouble, given an accurate knowledge of the tree. Hypoth-
esis 11 can therefore on the whole be confirmed. 
One of the problems sometimes encountered was a confusion of the subject 
between a bodily function and its product: e.g. coughing and phlegm, 
miction and urine, etc. Once this was pointed out the correct category could 
always be found without any trouble. 
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The data entered were divided over the main areas of the SCS: history, 
physical examination and test results, as shown in table 18. 
The medical history accounts for about 60 percent of the data gathered, 
while the lab and other special tests account for only a small percentage of 
the information. This is highest in those conditions where a specific test is 
decisive for the diagnosis, e.g. in hyperthyroidism and anemia. The patient 
with suspected gall stones was frequently , sent to the radiologist' for diag-
nosis. Otherwise, our subjects reached a diagnosis with very little informa-
tion besides history and physical examination. The idea that doctors are very 
keen on lab tests cannot be confirmed from these data. 
Table 18. Relative proportion of different areas of information 
(History, Physical examination, lab results) in the patient re-
cord. (percent of total information) 
Pat Hist PE Lab etc. 
A 54 43 4 
C 64 35 1 
E 65 21 15 
G 49 49 2 
B 64 34 2 
0 52 47 1 
F 48 36 16 
H 58 25 16 
Table 19 shows the average total number of items gathered and entered into 
the database for each patient. Patient D (ectopic pregnancy) is slightly above 
average, probably because more hypotheses were tested on average for this 
patient, but the other patients show a remarkably uniform distribution. 
Table 19. Medical data items entered into the system, averaged 
over all consultations per patient. 
Pat 
count 
ACE G B 0 F H 
21.1 18.4 18.1 18.2 17.125.018.317.2 
Table 20. Number of data items ( 'symptoms' ) entered into the 
system as a function of the order of the patient. 
Pat 
Items 
1 2 3 4 5 
18.6 18.5 19.8 18.8 19.3 
Table 20 shows that the number of medical data items entered did not vary 
appreciably with fue ordering of the patients within a session, indicating that 
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the amount of information gathered did not vary with growing familiarity 
with the system, although the number of questions did decrease markedly, as 
we have seen before. This means that data gathering became more efficient 
as the subject gathered experience with the system; to elicit the same amount 
of information, less time and fewer questions were needed. 
By the presentation of the menus doctors are stimula1ed to probe deeper with 
their questions, and so to get a more detailed picture of the patient (HIO). 
This is not a hypothesis which can be strictly judged for lack of a control 
group. Comparison with the earlier Ridderikhoff experiment [Rid85l [Rid87] 
shows that questions do seem to be more specific. The average depth of the 
symptom encodings is about 6.3, corresponding to a considerable level of 
detail. For example: 
patient datal history/ tr. circ/pain/ localisation/ thorax 
patient datal history/ tr. circ/pain/ since / minutes 
patient datal history/ tr. circ/pain/ irradiation / left arm 
would be represented as three symptoms of depth 6 in the SCS. 
Level of detail of the symptoms entered. 
This is hard to measure objectively; however, because every additional level 
in the SCS tree represents a refinement of the information stored, we can 
compare the level of detail in patient records by looking at the average depth 
of the symptom tree for that patient. 
Table 21. Averages of time needed, number of questions asked, 
number of symptoms entered, and depth of entered symptoms as a 
function of the patient. 
Pat A C E G B D F H 
time 16.9 14.7 15.9 14.7 19.2 23.9 22 .1 16.7 
# quest 25.9 20.7 29.3 24.3 30.5 39.0 34.7 28.2 
# sympt 21.1 18.4 18.1 18.2 17 .1 25.0 18.3 17.3 
depth 6.57 6.30 6.34 6.46 6.26 6.51 6.33 6.29 
There were some clear differences between individual simulated patients 
(table 21). 
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This table shows differences between patients with common and somewhat 
rarer diseases: the commoner conditions are handled more quickly, and with 
fewer questions. There is no clear difference between the number of symp-
toms entered and the level of detail of these symptoms in both groups, 
however. 
Our subjects were of the opinion that with the use of the system there would 
be more data gathered and stored in the medical record than without it, as 
the answers to the next two questions show. 
"Did you think the number of gathered data items increased because of the 
use of the system? (O-no effect,IO-important effect)" 
The average score of 4.9 is indicative of a considerable effect ascribed to the 
system by our subjects; but opinions differed considerably as the standard 
deviation shows. (sd 2.74, range (0.3·8)) 
"Do you think that by using the system more information about the patient 
will find its way into the doctor's record system?" (O-No,IO-Yes) 
produced a similar response: average 6.6 (sd 2.42, range (0.2·8.9)) 
Now, with regard to our earlier hypothesis: 
The user will be able to find the shortest paths in searching for specific items 
in the SCS tree. (H4) 
We observed that when exploring a symptom for the first time, subjects 
often looked under several menus when in doubt how a specific item would 
be coded. However, they learned very quickly, and because of the internal 
consistency of the system, were frequently able to extrapolate successfully 
their previous experience with the coding scheme to new symptoms. After 
gaining some experience with a particular part of the tree, they could usually 
find the required item without looking up wrong menus and having to retrace 
their steps. 
The subjects themselves had mixed feelings about the search of the system 
for the location of symptoms: 
"What did you think of searching through the hierarchical structure of the 
SCS (the actual symptom tree)?" (O-easy, 10-hard) 
average 5.0; (sd 2.42, range (1.2.8.8)) 
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Under-reporting 
Some doctors did ask a considerable amount of detail but only entered a 
fraction of their positive findings in the system, causing a loss of sensitivity 
for the diagnostic module and an incomplete registration of the patient's 
information in the data record, e.g. in the case of subject G, there was a 
clear gap between questions asked and symptoms entered (cf. table 17). 
While on average, for every three questions asked two data items were 
entered, in 28 out of 99 consultations the ratio was below one item per two 
questions. This may be just a consequence of a low 'hit rate': since questions 
to which the answer is normal, i.e. which do not uncover some abnormality 
in the patient, are not registered, it is possible that few symptoms were 
found with many questions. But also in absolute numbers, the number of 
symptoms entered must sometimes be considered insufficient for the diagnos-
tic module to produce a useful differential diagnosis: 33 of the 99 consulta-
tions ended with less than 15 symptoms entered, and 19 even ended with less 
than 10 symptoms. Although 15 data items may seem a lot, the reader 
should keep in mind that the specification of "dull aching pain on the chest 
irradiating to the left arm and chin, starting an hour ago" in the SCS would 
take up about 6 items. Any differential diagnosis based on so little evidence 
almost inevitably becomes shaky. By comparison, the number of data items 
present for the diseases in the knowledge base ranged from about 60 to over 
200. 
In diagnostics, the doctor always has the edge over the machine in the 
quantity of information he has available about the patient because although 
the machine can work with the same amount of data as the doctor, in 
practice it will always be less, because of conscious and unconscious selec-
tion on the part of the doctor what to enter and what to leave out, and of 
course also because of limitations to what is codeable within the system. 
Over-reporting 
Conversely, in the records of 13 consultations (13%), involving 5 different 
doctors, subjects were observed to encode symptoms which they had neither 
asked for, nor heard from their patients, thus fabricating evidence to match 
the idea of the patient's disease in their head! This seemed to occur sponta-
neously, and certainly without ill intentions. Even more frequently, subjects 
selected an interpretation of something they had heard from their patients 
which was more specific than they had a right to assume at that point. This 
illustrates the avidity with which the physician seizes on any point where he 
can construct a resemblance between the patient and the pattern he is trying 
to match. 
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Entering the patient's data in the electronic record system. 
In nearly alI cases, the standard method of data entry by mouse click 
sufficed. The subjects were aware of the option to view alI gathered symp-
toms by pressing F2, and frequently made use of this option. Due to an 
oversight in the experimental design, the exact number of times this occurred 
has not been recorded, but it is estimated to lie between one and three times 
per session of 5 consultations. Sometimes the symptom editor was used to 
delete an item erroneously gathered, either by an accidental push of the 
wrong mouse button or because of a misunderstanding between doctor and 
patient. Such deletions were rare: 13 in 99 consultations, and out of 1879 
symptoms collected in total. 
Need for assistance with the program. 
During the experiment, subjects sometimes asked a question to the observer 
regarding the use of the system, the structure of the symptom tree, or other 
subjects. These questions were noted down, but answered only if this was 
necessary for the natural conclusion of the consultation. Most questions were 
about the structure of the SCS tree: "where can I find such and such a 
symptom", or "how do I encode this symptom"; a few were about the 
software, e.g.: "how do I get from here to the next patient?" Usually this 
latter type of question could be solved by the subject without outside help 
from the observer; subject felt somewhat uncertain but could perform the 
desired action without any real trouble. Such software-related questions 
occurred mostly with the first one or two patients. As stated in the section on 
training, because of the size of the SCS, the subjects could not be familiar-
ized with its fulI contents during the training sessions. In a number of cases, 
unfamiliar situations led to questions to the observer. Of 265 such questions 
in 99 consultations, 204 were related to coding an observation within the 
SCS. 
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Fig. 7 shows that the number of such questions was highest during the first 














Nr of questions to the observer 
in consultation 1 .. 5 
The manual had been given to every subject before the training sessions 
started, with the instruction that it contained information about how the 
system worked and why it worked that way, but that the subject would not 
be tested on the knowledge of its contents. Subsequently it was found, 
naturally, that practically none of the subjects had read the manual. Never-
theless it proved possible to teach the system without the use of the manual. 
During the experimental sessions the manual was not used at all although it 
lay on the subject's desk in a prominent position during the experiment. 
Of course, the availability of the observer to answer questions about prob-
lems uncovered during use will inevitably result in less use of the manual. 
But on the whole, users were quite able to find out for themselves what they 
wanted to do and how to do it. 
As assistance of the observer was mainly limited to the structure of the SCS, 
we are confident that in a longer experiment, after a short initial training 
period, the subjects could manage the programme perfectly well on their 
own without reference to outside help or even to the manual. 
This largely confirms our earlier hypothesis: 
The use of the manual and assistance of the observers during the test will be 
minimal. (H3) 
'Minimal' is perhaps not the correct expression to use to describe a rate of 
several interventions per consultation; but the rapid decrease of requests for 
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help after the first experiences with the system had been made, from over 4 
to less than 2, shows that this is not a structural problem. 
Use of the free-text option. 
For those cases in which the SCS did not provide enough detail to record the 
patient's data faithfully, there existed an escape option: by adding the 
required information as free text doctors could enter any information they 
wished to record. This option was used only 15 times for the 1879 symptoms 
entered in all consultations together « 1 %). This is another clear indication 
of the relative completeness of the SCS, and it also confirms our hypothesis 
15: 
It will only rarely be necessary to make specific notes in the free-text field 
for specifications beyond the levels of specification within the SCS. (liJ2) 
Our observation agrees with this, in that we rarely had the impression that 
the attainable level of detail was considered insufficient by the subject. In the 
few cases where a particular item could not be coded satisfactorily, subjects 
did not seem to mind but happily continued with the next item. Most subjects 
were quite prepared to adapt their method of questioning to the structure of 
the SCS tree. Tolerance of the limitations of the system was high. 
Use of the keyboard. 
The keyboard was not used at all during the consultations beyond those few 
occasions where a deletion of an entered symptom was necessary or a free 
text note had to be added to a symptom in the SCS. The completely mouse-
driven interface is therefore a realistic option for medical software of this 
type. 
7.3.3.4 Hypotheses during the consultation. 
Before the start of the experiment, subjects had been asked to write down 
any hypotheses they might entertain during the consultation, however vague 
these might be. Nevertheless, we observed that many subjects were relatively 
reluctant to write down such ideas. Sometimes they did not seem to be aware 
that they entertained any, even if to the observer there was clearly a purpose 
in the questions to the patient, pointing in a specific direction. In some cases, 
when gently prompted not to forget writing down any hypothesis he might 
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have, the subject actively denied having a hypothesis, despite just having 
asked after three symptoms characteristic of only one specific disease in 
quick succession. We cannot fully explain this behaviour. It is possible that 
although the subject does have a hypothesis, he or she is not fully conscious 
of it; or that the subject is reluctant to be pinned down on a specific guess 
before he is ready to believe in its correctness. After all, it is still quite 
common for students to be admonished 'to get the facts first' before attempt-
ing to fit them into a pattern. 
Because of this observation, we must assume that the number of hypotheses 
entertained by the subject during the consultation is probably somewhat 
larger than our records show, especially with regard to hypotheses that are 
formed in the beginning of the consultation, and discarded before they take 
on much substance, perhaps at the next question. 
We did observe that generally questioning certainly seems to be guided by 
the hypothesis currently at the top of the list. (Hypothesis-driven data 
collection) This has also been observed by many students of physicians' 
problem-solving behaviour. [Barn] [Els78] [Rid89] We also noted that the 
behaviour of the subject yields strong clues whether any hypothesis is 
currently being entertained or not: the questioning in the first case is swift 
and purposeful, with little pause for thought in between. If no clear hypoth-
esis has been formed, the questions are formed slowly, and without obvious 
connection even to the medically trained observer, seemingly at random. 
This situation was rare, but it was especially evident in some very inexperi-
enced doctors, who might be expected to have a smal\er stock of hypotheses 
in readiness. Once a clue had been obtained, they could swiftly shift into a 
purposeful line of questioning; but it often took them somewhat longer to get 
to this point than an experienced physician who seems to be able to generate 
a hypothesis on the spot for every patient presented. In the great majority of 
cases our physicians started a clear and purposeful line of questioning 
immediately after having heard the presenting complaint (early hypothesis 
generation). 
In the words of Johnson-Laird and Wason: "The distinction between con-
scious deductions and everyday inference is probably a reflection of a more 
general contrast that can be drawn between explicit and implicit inferences. 
The inferences that underlie problem solving are often slow, voluntary and at 
the forefront of awareness; they are explicit. The inferences that underlie the 
ordinary processes of perception and comprehension are rapid, involuntary, 
and outside the consious awareness: they are implicit." 
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Table 23 shows the number of hypotheses written down for every consulta-
tion between doctor and patient. Fig. 8 shows the distribution of the number 
of hypotheses written down in the first phase of the consultation, i.e. before 
seeing the system dd. 
Table 23. Number of hypotheses written down for each consultati-
on, before seeing the system differential diagnosis. 
doctors-> 
A B C D E F G H 
A 1 4 
C 1 1 
E 3 1 2 4 5 1 
G 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 
B 2 2 2 2 2 4 
D 1 6 1 1 2 
F 1 1 6 5 2 5 
H 1 1 2 4 1 
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The average number of hypotheses noted down per consultation is only 2.25, 
which is low even if we take into account that some ideas probably were not 
registered. Ridderikhoff found an average number of hypotheses of 2.94 for 
a subject population which besides general practitioners also contained a few 
general internists, which latter group may be presumed to have increased the 
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Possibly also the instruction to write down every diagnostic idea was 
communicated with more force in that experiment. 
In phase 2, i.e. after seeing the system dd, only a few subjects added a new 
hypothesis to their list. See Table 25. 
Table 25. Number of hypotheses added by subjects after seeing 









An added hypothesis was ususally one which appeared high in the system 
differential diagnosis, and which had not been considered by the subject 
before. 
The level of detail of hypotheses written down differed widely, ranging from 
the highly specific ("Myocardial infarction"), to the extremely vague ("some-
thing with the stomach", "psychosocial "). 
Confidence of subjects in their own hypotheses was fairly high; the average 
subjective probability for the first hypothesis at the time of writing it down 
was 57.0%, rising to 65.6% when the consultation was over. This rise indi-
cates that the first hypothesis written down was very often also the fmal 
diagnosis. 
If we look specifically at the hypothesis which in retrospect is going to be 
the diagnosis, the initial subjective probability (at the time of first writing it 
down) is 62.9%, the final subjective probability for the diagnosis is 82.4%, 
and after seeing the system dd this goes up another 2 percent to 84.3 %. 
In undecided cases doctors are expected to ask for more symptoms in order 
to confirm or reject particular hypotheses. (HI5) 
In the majority of cases doctors ended their consultation without having 
explicitly rejected all but one hypothesis. Usually, at least one other hypoth-
esis remained, with an estimated probability which could be from only 
slightly to very much lower than the diagnosis selected. No additional 
attempts were made to increase the difference in certainty between competing 
diagnoses. This hypothesis must therefore be rejected. 
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7.3.3.5 diagnoses of subjects 
At the end of the consultation, all subjects had made a diagnosis. However, 
usually not all other hypotheses considered along the way had been dis-
carded: they still had a residual subjective probability, as shown by the 
indications of our subjects, and sometimes this subjective probability for an 
alternative hypothesis was only very slightly lower than that for the diag-
nosis. Thus, hypotheses were only rarely rejected. They fell into disuse, they 
might be forgotten, but they were not struck off the list. This is hard to 
explain if we assume a deductive model for the diagnostic process, but quite 
obvious if we assume the model explained in previous chapters, where the 
process of diagnosis is seen as an attempt to match a pattern in the doctor's 
head with symptoms of the patient. At any time, only one pattern is being 
examined; if the matching process does not develop satisfactorily a new 
pattern is generated and tested against the patient's data. Hardly any critical 
testing takes place; the doctor is quite able to believe with equal strength in 
two mutually exclusive hypotheses at the same time. Hypotheses which are 
no longer current recede to the background without being rejected, and can 
be re-activated at any time by a cue from the patient. As already mentioned 
above, the subjective certainty of our subjects of their own diagnosis, 
reached (with the help of the SCS menu system) before they had seen the 
system's differential diagnosis, was high: 82.3 %. This increased only 
minimally after seeing the system dd: 84.3 %. This subjective certainty of 
our subjects was strikingly higher than in the earlier study by Ridderikhoff 
[Rid85l. He found a final subjective probability of 73.9% in his experiment 
with the same patients. The initial subjective probability estimate for the first 
hypothesis was 44.2% in Ridderikhoff's study, which is also lower than the 
57% we found. The increase in certainty is similar in both studies, however. 
Whether this was an effect of the use of the system or a consequence of the 
slightly different conditions of the experiment cannot be determined; in the 
current study doctors had more time available, and although the extra time 
was mainly needed to interact with the system, it may have had a beneficial 
effect on the subjective certainty of the subjects. 
Quality of subjects' diagnoses. 
When we strictly judged the subject's diagnosis for correctuess, assigning 1 
point for a completely correct diagnosis and 0 points for an incomplete or 
incorrect one, 43 % of consultations resulted in a completely correct diag-
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nosis. (Of course many of the diagnoses which we had to discard as incor-
rect for this measurement were approximately correct). 
This did not differ between users of the simultaneous or non-simultaneous 
consultation style. 
Experienced doctors, defined as doctors with more than 3 years' experience 
in practical patient care did not diagnose better than inexperienced subjects, 
with less than one year of experience. Likewise the number of actual 
diagnostic blunders, serious mistakes with possibly dangerous consequences, 
did not differ between experienced and inexperienced doctors. Experienced 
doctors asked slightly more questions, and found the paper patients slightly 
more realistic. 
7.3.3.6 system diagnosis 
The results of the system diagnosis are summarized in Table 26 below. 
Table 26. Diagnostic accuracy of the system for the different 
patients. Only the cases where the correct diagnosis topped the 
list are counted. 
Pat Diagnosis #1,% N 
A MI 45 11 
C at. eczema 8 12 
E gallstones 53 15 
G asthmatic br 31 13 
B Ischialgia 77 14" 
D ectopiC preg 0 10+ 
F hyperthyroid 50 12 
H iron def. an. 42 12 
-In one case the system dd was not consulted. 
+The database representation for this disease contained an 
error, making it nearly impossible for the system to select this 
disease. 
The table shows the percentages for the correct diagnosis at the top of the 
system's list. The bad performance for ectopic pregnancy was caused by an 
error in the database; the bad performance of the eczema patient was caused 
by the difficulty subjects experienced in describing the symptoms within the 
SCS. 
The knowledge base consisted of descriptions of diseases closely related to 
the disease of the patient. The differential diagnosis given usually 
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encompassed a fairly large number of diseases, from three to fifteen. Most 
of these had very low scores for the number of matching symptoms between 
the patient and the pattern, except the first two or three. The correct diag-
nosis was to be found among the first three options in the system's list in the 
great majority of cases. 
7.3.3.6 The second stage: reactions to the system differential diagnosis. 
The second stage of the experiment was started when subjects had made a 
diagnosis on their own and formally confirmed that they were ready. They 
were then asked to press F4 to set in motion the system's diagnostic module. 
This they did with enthousiasm, often waiting with an extended finger above 
the key: "Can I press it now? Can I press it now?". They were very curious 
to see what the machine would do. 
The most striking aspect of the experiment at this point was the extreme 
shortness of the second stage. Doctors on average spent less than two 
minutes, and many spent less than one minute, in contemplation of the 
system differential diagnosis. Perhaps related to their confidence in their own 
diagnosis, which was remarkably high, they were not inclined to take any 
other suggestions into consideration. Subjective probability after stage I is 
already so high (82 %) that little improvement is possible. After the second 
stage, subjective probability has improved by two percent. Subject's confi-
dence in his own diagnosis was observed to be high even if the diagnosis 
was wrong. In all 99 consultations, only 16 new hypotheses were considered 
in 14 different cases after the subject had seen the system differential 
diagnosis. In just one case this led to rejection of an incorrect diagnosis and 
acceptance of the top system diagnosis, which was correct. In only 6 cases, 
subjective probabilities shifted enough after seeing the system dd to bring 
another hypothesis to the top of the subjects' list. In three cases, the result 
was an improvement, in one case, a deterioration, and in two cases, the 
result was neutral. In several cases where the subject's diagnosis was wrong, 
and the system differential diagnosis was topped by the correct diagnosis, the 
subject did not even seem to reconsider his own opinion. 
The typical pattern of subject's behaviour after seeing the system DD was a 
short glance at the screen, and if no surprises occurred there, no change to 
subjects' own conclusion was made. Our subjects seemed to take reassurance 
from seeing the system dd even if it was bad, perhaps because they did not 
see anything they should have looked at in their own decision-making process. 
We believe that we must therefore on the whole reject our hypothesis 14 
from chapter 5: 
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The doctor will consider more hypotheses in his decision making after having 
seen the system differential diagnoses. (H14) 
Although the option to do so was always clearly indicated to the subject, in 
only 14 cases, subjects started a new round of data acquisition after having 
seen the system differential diagnosis. This second round was usually 
confined to just one or two additional questions. If doctors considered more 
hypotheses after seeing the system dd, we certainly did not see much 
evidence of it, nor did subjects remark on it. 
We also had entertained another hypothesis beforehand: 
After seeing the degree of concordance (number of analogous symptoms) 
between the symptoms of the patients and symptoms belonging to a disease, 
the doctor will ask for more symptoms of the patient (Confirmation = 
hypothesis given the evidence (Carnap).(H16) 
This phenomenon was not observed at all. The hypothesis is rejected. 
Subjects answered a few questions about the system dd after the experiment: 
"What did you think of the diagnoses offered by the system:" (O-superflu-
ous, 10-very useful) 
The average score of 5.4 (sd 1.81, range (0.6-7.9)) seems to indicate that subjects 
found the system differential diagnosis rather useful, but this is in complete 
contradiction to their actual behaviour. Even in cases where a subject 
reached a wrong diagnosis, and where the system diagnostic support list was 
topped by the correct diagnosis, subjects did not change their mind about 
their own diagnosis, or asked extra questions of the patient after seeing the 
system diagnosis. 
Score-numbers 
A score-number was given next to every element of the system differential 
diagnosis, representing the degree of overlap between the patient's symptoms 
and the correcponding disease profile in the knowledge base. 
"What did you think of the score-numbers given with the diagnoses?" 
(O-superfluous, 10-very useful) 
The average score of 3.9 (sd 2.70, range (0.5·8.3)) is rather low; observations 
made during the experiment confirm that many subjects had hardly noticed 
these scoring numbers next to the diagnosis in the I ist. The three non-
responders had not seen them at all. 
Results 159 
Doctors will use the option of looking up symptoms for suggested hypotheses 
to assist them in their justification process and to trace missing symp-
toms.(HI7) 
This occurred very rarely. In no case did this lead to additional questions to 
the patient. The hypothesis must be rejected. 
7.3.4 System breakdowns: hard- and software errors. 
System breakdown ocurred three times, and in every case this was an 
instance of the same software defect: the mouse stopped working. This 
situation could be remedied every time by saving the state of the system, 
using the keyboard equivalents of the mouse buttons, and restarting the sys-
tem. No data loss ocurred, and only a slight time delay of about two minutes 
was incurred. 
7.3.5 User errors 
User errors were scarce; in no case did this lead to any data loss. Sometimes 
users accidentally entered an incorrect symptom for the patient and decided 
to erase this. This occurred 13 times, on a total of 1879 symptoms entered. 
Some symptoms were erroneously entered twice, which has no effect at all 
but is an indication that the subject may have forgotten that the symptom in 
question had already been entered. Such duplicate entries occurred 28 times 
on a total of 1879 different symptoms. We see that users rarely made 
mistakes in the use of the system, and that these mistakes did not detract 
much from the overall efficiency. 
The online help facility was used only three times in all 99 consultations put 
together. 
7.4 Miscellaneous items 
There remain a few points yet to discuss. 
At any point, the Fl key, when pressed, brings up a pop-up menu with 
information about the options open to the user at that point. Meaningful 
information about the semantics of the SCS cannot currently be given, 
although the software has been designed with a view to keep this option 
open. The function of the Fl key is advertised on the bottom line of every 
screen in the system. 
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The presence of the observer provided an invitation to the subject to ask 
questions about the proceedings, rather than attempt to find out for hinself. 
This tendency was guarded against by only giving assistance when it was 
really necessary. Most problems could be solved by the subject on his own. 
The absence of a really context-sensitive help function, sensitive to the 
position of the user in the SCS tree, was regretted by several subjects. 
The system is proof against accidental erasure of data. (H6) 
No data were accidentally lost during the entire experiment; within the 
system it is possible to erase patient data, but if the user selects this option a 
special 'confirmation dialog box' with a warning pops up on the screen. It is 
currently not possible to erase other programme data (e.g. doctor informa-
tion) from within the programme. To do this, maintenance staff can gain 
access to the database using standard dBase tools. It is assumed the user will 
not need to do this. 
Currently, there is no standard backup procedure from within the system. 
This is not as it should be. Ideally, the system should automatically make 
regular backups of all data on a separate device, such as a tape drive, so that 
the system can be fully restored if a catastrophic failure of the hardware 
should occur. At the moment, the only way to make backups is by hand, 
copying all necessary files to another medium. 
The use of colours will help the user to orient himself within the menu 
tree.(H7) 
Although this feature is currently implemented in the system, so that e.g. the 
history-taking occurs against a blue background, and entering the laboratory 
values against a black one, we feel that the familiarity of the subjects with 
the system did not become great enough within the current experiment to 
establish this as a subconscious cue. None of the subjects remarked on it. 
None seemed to use it consciously, and mistakes where subjects wanted to 
encode history data in the differently-coloured physical examination part of 
the tree did still occur. Beyond these general remarks not much can be said 
about the effect of colour in the user-interface on the subjects. 
The doctor should be able to retrace his previous steps of data acquisition at 
any moment of the process. (H13) 
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This is certainly possible; by pressing a function key the user can get an 
instantaneous overview of all symptoms gathered for the patient so far. This 
option was used fairly regularly by our subjects, indicating that they knew of 
the possibility. The hypothesis is confirmed. 
Data gathered in previous consultations can also be reviewed, but this could 
not be tested because there were no previous consultations in our experi-
ment. 
7.5 An overall assessment of the functionality of the system 
Having read all of the above, at this point we may attempt to evaluate one of 
the main hypotheses of the experiment, posed in chapter 5. 
Doctors do not find the use of the system disturbing. (HJ) 
Design. 
The presentation of the system and its parts should intuitively fit the user's 
needs. This means in our case that the user recognizes the different parts of 
the system, can use the methods implicitly present in its structure, knows 
how to select items, has an overview of the menu structure, can orient 
himself in the tree by means of the background colour of the screen and the 
path window, and knows how to get from one menu to another and why. 
Therefore it is essential that systems like this one should be designed by 
people who know what doctors actually do. We believe that the design of 
such a system by doctors, troublesome as the process can be when expertise 
in computer science is lacking, has shown that a new light can be shed on 
the user interface and the user-friendliness of such a system. The DDSS has 
sprung from a line of research into the decision-making processes of general 
practitioners and general internists. Part of its success must be attributed to 
the insight this has given in the processes of routine practice, as opposed to 
demonstration cases in journals. 
Its standardized terminology is a necessary hurdle which, as it turned out, 
our subjects were well able to take. 
Speed. 
As should be clear from the section 'time' above, the system enables the user 
to work with near-normal speed during a normal consultation after only five 
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patients have been seen. Further improvement is to be expected with increas-
ing experience. The response of the system is fast enough on modem 
hardware never to give the user the sense of having to wait; all screens 
appear instantaneously. 
Ease of use. 
Especially the almost complete avoidance of typing while using the pro-
gramme will recommend it to the physician-user. Increasing familiarity with 
the screens will make operation nearly automatic after only a short while. 
Immediate feedback. 
The advantage of being able to consult the software while the patient is 
there, and without having to get up, pick up a book, or sit in another chair 
should not be minimised; they are prerequisites for any system if it is to be 
accepted in general practice as the daily companion of the general practi-
tioner. 
Leamability. 
Doctors as a rule do not have much spare time; it proved difficult sometimes 
in our experiment to find an open space in the diaries of our subjects. Yet 
we were able to teach them the use of the system within two hours, to a 
level where they could almost handle it on their own. 
Accomplishing the task at hand. 
In the experimental setting, all users were able to proceed satisfactorily with 
their normal problem-solving process: the initial presentation, initial informa-
tion-gathering leading to hypothesis generation, leading to more information 
gathering, sometimes more hypotheses, more data-gathering, and finally a 
conclusion. All subjects were able to integrate the use of the system with 
their own problem-solving process. However, especially the older subjects 
had a strong tendency to tackle the experimental situation by splitting their 
task: first they would concentrate on the patient, then on entering the data 
into the machine, after which they would return to the patient again, etc. All 
subjects reached a normal conclusion of their consultation, using the system. 
Opinion of subjects 
For any system to be acceptable it must of course be accepted by the people 
who work with it. What did our freshly introduced users say after having 
had hands-on experience with the system for less than three hours? 
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"In what degree did you find using the system disturbing for the consulta-
tion?" (O-not disturbing, IO-seriously disturbing) 
results: average score 6.5 (sd 2.53, range (2.2-9.8» 
On average therefore, the subjects did indicate a considerable level of 
disturbance to the normal doctor-patient contact because of the use of the 
system. Interestingly, our own observations indicate that there was a rather 
poor correlation between subjective judgement and objective performance 
here: some subjects who, in our opinion, were very fluent in the use of the 
system indicated that they found its use very disturbing, while others who 
seemed to us to have much more trouble with it did not indicate so in the 
questionnaire. 
Our fmal conclusion with regard to hypothesis HI is that although every 
effort has been made to keep the system as simple as possible, to a beginning 
user, especially an older beginning user without computer experience, the 
use of the system while doing a consultation simultaneously is still a strenous 
task. 
On the other hand we do believe that practice makes perfect, and that future 
users of the system will be able to achieve a fluency through practice which 
will make use of the system nearly automatic, freeing the attention of the 
user from the details of the operation of the machine and enabling him or her 
to use the system to assist in the making of a diagnosis, almost unconscious-
ly supporting the mental processes of the user instead of hindering them. 
Probably such users will be people who have familiarized themselves from 
an early age with computers and automated systems, unless an even simpler 




Chapter 8. Discussion and conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
The fallibility of human judgement has always induced people to invent and 
develop schemes and rules to improve their decision-making, or in other 
words, to maximize the predicted outcome. "Prediction is difficult, especially 
of the future" Bohr said cynically. Since the capacities of computers came 
within range of applying sophisticated mathematical procedures to compli-
cated problems, scientists have tried to develop programmes to support 
people in optimally predicting outcomes. 
It appears very attractive to combine the capabilities of human reasoning 
(with a fallible memory) and the perfect memory of computers (with rudi-
mentary intelligent reasoning capacities). But the question then remains 
whether these two elements can be connected and produce useful results, 
results at least slightly better than the performance of an average human. 
This now still remains an illusion, partly because the cognitive processes of 
human beings are only incompletely known and the processes and syste-
matics of computers simply do not reflect those of creatures of flesh and 
blood. 
Exploration of decision support systems has mainly been focused on the 
application of statistical and mathematical methods to processes which were 
supposed to mirror, or at least partially reflect, reality. As a consequence of 
the use of sequentially operating computers for such models, sequential data 
processing was also assumed to occur in the formation of judgements in 
human beings. In this line of thought Ledley (a mathematician) and Lusted (a 
radiologist) [Led59] formulated 'reasoning foundations of medical diagnosis' 
for more structured diagnostics. This publication was the start of the devel-
opment of a large series of computer programs implementing various types 
of decision-making for the medical profession. 
More than 95 % of all systems created for diagnostic support did not survive 
the voyage from laboratory to clinic. [Lun87] 
"I know", Feinstein [Fei7?] said, "of no published work, or clinical setting, 
or specific world situations, in which statistical methods have made a 
prominent contribution that could not have been achieved just as easily 
without statistical formula." 
Croft [Cro72], testing 10 of the most commonly used mathematical diagnos-
tic models on the same large data set, found their diagnostic accuracy to be 
more sensitive to variations between diseases than to variation between the 
models. He recommends to future researchers that they should not continue 
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with increasingly sophisticated mathematical techniques, but instead concen-
trate on the real obstacles in practical medical diagnosis. 
"Instead we should concentrate on what people actually do and develop 
descriptive models to account for decision processes", said Howell [How82l· 
Any investigation that does not take into account the real situation in medical 
practice is likely to fail as explanatory of medical methods. Or, as Bi6rck 
[Bi677] stated: "This type of investigation has to be done by people who 
know what doctoring means". It has to be adapted to the level of health care 
at which the doctor really makes his decisions. Taylor [Tay76l wrote in 
1976: "It is, therefore, more promising to begin projects of this kind with an 
analysis of the decision made by the physician in the appropriate area of the 
health care system so that from the beginning the proposed system will fit as 
closely as possible to the needs of the existing system and to the physician 
who will use it." 
The present study started with an in-depth investigation of decision-making 
behaviour of general practitioners and general internists [Rid89l. 
8.2 The philosophy of the DOSS 
The majority of developers have often ignored the many human, contextual 
and cultural factors that determine whether a new system will be accepted by 
end-users [Lun87l. As many support and expert systems (the difference is 
irrelevant in this context) have been developed without identifying the real 
barriers, needs and desires of the target population, the initial enthusiasm for 
these types of system subsided. Attention shifted towards simpler systems 
such as computerized administrative systems. 
Benefiting and having learned from past failures we developed the Diagnostic 
Decision Support System (DOSS) with an open eye to the daily work of the 
general practitioner. 
We started from the theory of problem-solving as formulated by Newell et 
al. [New58l. 
a) it should predict the performance of a problem-solver handling specific 
tasks; 
b) it should explain how human problem-solving takes place; 
c) it should indicate what processes are used; 
d) it should indicate what mechanisms perform these processes; 
e) it should predict the incidental phenomena that accompany problem-
solving, and the relation of these to the problem-solving task; 
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1) it should show how changes in the attendant conditions - both changes 
"inside" the problem-solver and changes in the task confronting him -
alter the problem-solving behaviour; 
g) it should explain how specific and general problem-solving skills are 
learned, and what it is that prOblem-solver "has gained" when he has 
learned them. 
Briefly, it can be stated that validity may be assumed when the model 
predicts the operations actually employed in the task performance. 
From this we could formulate our own conditions for DDSS. 
1) Use of the system whilst seeing patients. "Practice makes perfect"; a 
repetition of activities leads to perfection in performance and subse-
quently to acceptance of the system as a valued support in decision-
making. 
2) Acceptability depends also on the (perceived) complexity of the 
system. Most people seem to be afraid of handling a computer. Quick 
and easy learning are prominent assets for a system that wants to gain 
acceptability. 
3) A prerequisite to easy learning is a very effective user-interface. We 
designed the interface with great care, profiting from suggestions of 
various people, among whom were colleagues and students of the 
Technical University Delft and lecturers [Rub87]. 
4) No more typewriting! In order to enter data the physician has often 
been required to take part in a long and complicated technical dia-
logue, not to mention the impediment of a keyboard, a tool designed 
and developed during the 19th century, to accommodate 20'h century 
equipment. 
5) The system should be adapted to the usual procedure of data acquisi-
tion of the doctor, which means the routine of medical history fol-
lowed by physical examination, etc. It should also be capable of 
following every sudden jump in the train of thought the doctor may 
(and certainly often does) make. 
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6) The use of a standard terminology. If typewriting is to be avoided 
and feedback is to be provided, standardization of terms is a logical 
consequence. Most problems in implementation of this type of 
information systems stem from a lack of standard medical definitions 
[Cro72]. 
7) Completeness of terminology, finding everything in the system the 
doctor wants to encode. Our design of a standard terminology encom-
passes a newly developed structure for medical data presentation 
(symptoms, signs, tests, etc.). Whether the user is able to find every-
thing he wants to encode is one of our main questions in the study. 
8) Reliable and valid registration of patient data. As medical items 
served as entries for data registration we wondered whether the 
doctor and the patient could easily agree on certain entries. Patients 
who can check certain interpretations of the doctor will certainly help 
to validate the patient records and clinical data bases [Gar78]. 
Patients should actually be encouraged to participate in the com-
munication. Electronic registration also carries the advantages of 
unbiased and complete recording. 
9) Easy recording and support screens may invite the doctor to acquire 
more and more detailed data, and to explore additional organ sys-
tems. In a recent study Ridderikhoff [Rid93a] found that patient-
physician interviewing is laborious, time-consuming and ineffective in 
eliciting specific data. Studies in problem-solving [Bar72] [Bl080] 
[Els78] [Gro8S] [Rid89] have shown that physicians start narrowing 
their vision very early in the diagnostic process which detracts from 
optimal data acquisition and decision-making. 
10) The system should support the usual reasoning processes of the 
practising doctor. Whereas Ledley & Lusted [Led59] advocated a 
sequential process of logical steps, others have found different 
descriptions of doctors' inference processes. The hypothetico-deduc-
tive method was assumed to be "a nearly universal characteristic of 
human thinking in complex, poorly defmed environments" [Els78]. 
This stance was challenged by McGaghie and others [McG80] 
[McC086] [Rid91]. We followed the conclusions, based on direct 
observations, of the earlier study of decision-making [Rid89], which 
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established inductive reasoning as the leading method of inference 
[Rid93b). 
11) The diagnostic procedure is mainly a matter of pattern recognition, 
[Eng63) [Cr074) [Rid91) where the pattern is viewed as a configur-
ation of observable phenomena in the patient. These configurations 
may vary from patient to patient but also from doctor to doctor and 
from textbook to textbook. If the diagnosis is primarily viewed as 
some composite of symptoms and signs it can be determined by 
pattern matching. The diagnostic judgement can then be quantified by 
the completeness of the match between the patient's data and the data 
of comparable diseases in the knowledge base. 
12) If some overlap exists between the selected diagnosis and a number 
of diagnostic alternatives with comparable symptom configurations 
then the doctor may come to reconsider, revise and rethink his 
judgement in the light of the additional information. He may decide 
to collect additional data, to order specific tests or perform special 
physical examinations. This can all be done whilst seeing the patient. 
Our maxim therefore is: Rethink - Reconsider - Retry - Recollect -
Restart. 
13) The system should be highly transparent, transferable and maintaina-
ble. It comprises the use of modern and flexible computer languages, 
a transparent structure, easy updating of shell and medical contents, 
and a modular construction. It must run smoothly on globally avail-
able hardware and must, if necessary, be adaptable to existing 
information systems in the general practice environment. It must give 
the user the feeling of being permanently in control. 
14) It must ensure the feeling of privacy for the patient as well as for the 
doctor. On the other hand, there exists an opportunity to profit from 
the huge amount of empirical data and experience contained in the 
patient records and the physicians' data bases. With a strict guarantee 
of anonymity it may be possible to use this information source in the 
future. 
We shall discuss these matters in more detail. 
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8.3 Acceptability of the DDSS 
Many information scientists complain about the low grade of acceptance of 
decision support and expert systems in the medical world [Sch79]. 
Underlying this complaint is the tacit assumption that information science has 
much to offer to the practising physician. Whether this is true remains to be 
seen. Many systems are built to capture, encode and emulate the knowledge 
of human experts. But this expertise is primarily focused at the specific 
domain of the (group of) expert(s), which may widely diverge from the daily 
practice and the needs of general practitioners. Other systems require an 
intensive dialogue with the doctor which may hinder him in his finely-tuned 
observations which may explain the patient's behaviour and illness. Many 
doctors feel annoyed when the computer is described as an "artificial 
partner"; a partner, however, that does not exhibit intelligent behaviour, that 
does not have opinions. The doctor who looks to his metallic companion for 
an opinion, and who really thinks it is an opinion, might tend to forget that 
he is reading is a certain input designated to represent data according to rules 
of transformation which the programmer has chosen and built into the 
operation. [McM79] How the input data have been gathered is not initially a 
concern of the designers and programmers of such systems. Only when the 
main engine of the application is finished do they find that the results are 
very dependent on the quality of the data to be entered, and that the data 
gathered for any patient may differ considerably between observers. 
Likewise, most systems have been designed for use in an experimental 
setting, where the doctor comes to the machine in a context in which he has 
the complete data available, and tests them on the machine to see if it comes 
up with anything. In other words, the problem has really already been solved 
before the machine has even entered the proceedings. The experimental and 
laboratory settings in which most systems have been designed might be an 
important factor in the explanation of why these systems are so little used in 
practice. 
We have taken the stance that it is the user who decides over materials, 
procedures, decisions and outcomes. The user is free to enter those data 
which he thinks appropriate, to follow his own lines of thought, to question 
the patient in his own customary style, to process data particularly chosen 
for the occasion, and to choose among various options the one he thinks is 
most plausible. He decides, he is in control, he is the sorcerer and not the 
apprentice. Any decision he makes is his responsibility. The DDSS deviates 
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definitely from systems that dogmatically offer advice which is neither 
sought nor asked for [Cro72]. 
The discrepancy which sometimes crops up between participants' opinions 
(in response to questions in the questionnaire) and their actual performance 
with the DDSS migbt be explained by the negative image and bad publicity 
of such systems in the medical world. These adverse reactions will certainly 
subside when users get used to the system. The relative fluency with which 
they handled the machine and the system creates optimistic visions. 
Several other factors determine the acceptability. Among these is certainly 
the factor 'time'. Time is the doctor's most precious commodity. It is 
therefore of the utmost importance that the time for a consultation using the 
system does not extend beyond the normal duration of patient-physician 
encounters. Previous statistics of experimental encounters under very similar 
conditions [Rid89] showed an average consultation time for initial visits to 
general practitioners of approximately 12 minutes. In our study the average 
appeared to be 18 minutes, but the time decreased rapidly with increasing 
experience with the system. Participants who had some experience with 
computer use scored within the normal range for routine consultation. 
Besides, it is not realistic to expect doctors to be fluent in the use of the 
computer and the structure of the SCS after two hours of training. The 
results, however, are very encouraging and our expectation is that it is 
indeed possible to use the system within the routine time schedules of daily 
practice. 
These encouraging figures are partiaily due to our principle: No more 
typewriting! Of all the factors which are seen as a barrier to data processing 
the doctor believes typewriting to be the most serious one. Current adminis-
trative systems in general practice are most commonly used by the doctor's 
secretary. This leaves the medical module, if incorporated, somewhat 
neglected and certainly not a useful tool for scientific exploration. Writing 
and processing patient data with one mouse click appeared to be exhilarating 
to the participants. The sheer rapidity of this option (up to I 1 items in a 
minute!) seduced them to consult the patient record frequently. The easy 
editing of this record gave the participants a great deal of confidence. 
Next in line of acceptability is the quick and easy learning. Underscoring our 
statement about the doctor's secretaries' use of the administrative system is 
our observation that participants (of whom 75 % possessed their own com-
puter) had most trouble with what we beforehand had assumed to be easiest 
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part of the system: the introductory pages in which the doctor's and patient's 
identification and some demographic information is to be filled in. Just those 
few lines of typing, the use of the keyboard and some notion of the screen 
design (which, by the way, was very much comparable to that of current 
administrative systems) appeared to be a greater obstacle than the hundred 
thousand nodes of the SCS. An important time-saving can be reached in 
practice when these forms are filled in by the secretary beforehand so that 
the doctor may fully concentrate on his actual task. 
The remarkable ease of learning the various categories, menus and details of 
SCS will be discussed in the next section. 
8.4 Standardization of terminology 
"If there is one single change which would assist the development of infor-
mation science in medicine it would be the adoption of a standard, pre-
defined terminology amongst doctors everywhere" (de Dombal, [Dom78j). 
At any point during a process of developing a device specifically meant for 
the practising physician one has to face decisions between congeniality and 
practical demands. Congeniality means adaptation to the idiosyncrasies of 
every individual doctor; practical design, however, demands that the uni-
formity principle be adhered to that all doctors collect the same information 
from identical patients and express it in standard terms and formulas. Any 
support system presupposes generality of meaning and concepts across users, 
nations and cultures. As was outlined before, this assumption cannot hold for 
practising physicians. As Galen [Nut8!] in the 2'd century pointed out: 
"Cleavage of opinion comes from the failure to distinguish between the 
particular and the general. This schism is less one of doctrine than of 
method; it is one between diagnosis in terms of experience and diagnosis in 
terms of reasoning." 
As a support system is specifically meant to support doctors in their routine 
work, the system must be moulded to their procedures and not vice versa. 
But as these processes have, in their view, a unique and individual character, 
we are kept in a quandary. A generally applicable support system requires a 
standard and uniform concept and standard and uniform terminology. To 
achieve this a number of conditions have to be fulfilled such as: 
a strict defmition of the medical data; 
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the medical data have to be standard or to be standardized in nomencla-
ture and meaning; 
diagnoses have to be defined as configurations of symptoms and signs in 
their standardized terminology [Bl078]. 
Our solution to this problem was based on two ideas: 
a) the human body has a limited range of expressions for pathological 
stimuli, and 
b) questions to elicit medical data from the patient, can and should be 
adapted to the circumstances, while the items of medical significance 
elicited can be standardized. Standardized questionnaires are useless. 
By carefully screening medical textbooks and dictionaries, a database, 
containing most symptoms and signs which the diseased body can produce, 
was composed. This database was organized according to principles of 
hierarchical ordering, more or less in conformity with ideas of Gross 
[Gro77]. The system must contain sufficient detail to allow doctors to 
register almost all medical information used in practice without typewriting. 
Questions convey a special meaning. When we collect data we do so with an 
implicit or explicit idea in mind [pop77]. By defining nearly all possible 
symptoms in a detailed system of description, standardization of registration 
can be reached without restricting the form in which the questions are asked, 
as happens in systems which employ a questionnaire model for data entry. 
If the answer can only be a specific item in the SCS its recording can be 
ensured in a standard way. If we once have a patient record consisting of 
such standard items, a matching procedure with aggregates of likewise 
standardized items, contained in a medical knowledge base of diseases, can 
be accomplished, provided that the knowledge base was specifically created 
for this purpose. 
The test with the SCS consisted of three elements. 
1) The completeness of the mapping of symptoms and signs. 
2) Electronic registration and editing of patient data. 
3) Pattern-matching between patient data and the disease-patterns within the 
knowledge base. 
The criteria for evaluation were: 
the number of information items gathered per patient; 
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ease of search for specific symptoms; 
Ch. 8 
use of the built-in notepad for any particular information of the patient. 
The measures taken to facilitate the search for particular items in the SCS 
have contributed much to the success of the system. The various categories 
in which the clinical encounter can be distinguished: social and medical 
background, medical history, physical examination, tests, and treatments, is 
not only familiar to the doctor but makes his choice very easy. The classifi-
cation of the category of medical history by organ system, and of the 
category of physical examination topographically, was one well-known to 
every participating doctor and guided him/her easily through the tree. As the 
successive menus at similar levels are consistently analogously and repeti-
tively structured and the various items alphabetically arranged, the doctors 
learned to find their way so easily that some overconfidence could be 
observed after the first lessons. 
Since the participant had the opportunity to formulate his questions in his/her 
own habitual way (e.g. participants easily switched from a interview style as 
between colleagues to one between doctor and patient) he could follow two 
methods of interviewing the patient: I) guided by the system and 2) follo-
wing his routine method. Although we preferred the first, more direct 
approach, the possibility of adopting the second strategy gave the testing 
procedure an additional measure of realism. 
The Symptom Coding System must be regarded as one of the great successes 
of the project. What many had viewed as an overwhelmingly difficult or 
even impossible task [pau76l, the construction of a system to encode the 
patient's data in a quick, flexible way with a limited vocabulary, turns out to 
be quite possible with the rather simple tree-based hierarchical approach. For 
20 doctors in 99 consultations with 8 different types of patient to enter nearly 
2000 symptoms using this system and yet to find less than 20 instances 
where something they wish to enter cannot be encoded, is an amazing score 
for a system which has been constructed according to just a few guiding 
principles. Even if other workers in the medical field, e.g. clinical special-
ists, would choose not to use this particular configuration of the SCS, which 
was mainly designed for general practitioners, it is quite possible to design 
other, but similar, systems which allow for the peculiarities of the field in 
which they are to be tested. 
In addition, for a system with almost a hundred thousand nodes, the accessi-
bility and speed of use were excellent. Any node in the system can be 
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reached with less than ten or twelve clicks of the mouse button, and the 
construction of the tree is so logical, being designed with the doctor-user and 
his way of thinking in mind, that doctors can learn to traverse it correctly 
and pick out the items they want within a few hours of teaching, as has been 
convincingly shown. 
The lines and notepads that were reserved for otherwise unencodeable 
particulars of patients were not used. Either the SCS might be so complete 
that no addition was found necessary, or the typing barrier was so high that 
the participant refrained from using this possibility of the system. 
The SCS is the nucleus and the success of the DDSS. In the combination of 
a hierarchical system and a standardized vocabulary it is unlike previous 
attempts at standardization of terminology and therefore cannot be compared 
with any other system. Because of its internal structure and its detailed 
standardization of terminology the SCS is easily translatable into any lan-
guage used in countries where Western medicine is practised. 
8.5 The reasoning process 
Although Elstein et al. [Els78] believe the hypothetico-deductive method of 
reasoning to be "a nearly universal characteristic of human thinking", he and 
his co-workers have only observed one part of the method which consists of 
a combination of two distinctive sections: an introductory inductive section 
and a judgemental deductive continuation. This second part is seldom 
performed in practice and was observed neither in a previous study [Rid89] 
nor in the present one. Sadegh-Zadeh believes deductive reasoning to be 
contradictory to the daily task of a practising physician [Sad74]. The matter 
is important in so far that the DDSS tries to compensate and redress the 
imperfections that adhere to the inductive way of reasoning. The matter is 
also important in so far as it explains some of the findings in the experiment. 
For the benefit of the reader we list here a number of the elements which 
can be recognized in inductive inference. 
early in the prOblem-solving process a diagnostic idea ("hypothesis"') 
jumps to mind; 
this idea is based on only a few symptoms; 
1 The term "hypothesis" should not be taken in a strict scientific sense 
here. 
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the idea stems from the doctor's own experience; 
information acquisition is coloured by the early hypothesis generation 
(tunnelling one's vision); 
the doctor's purpose is to verify a plausible idea; 
verification, in contrast with falsification, restricts the information 
acquisition to only a small number of positive (= matching) findings; 
[Bri87] 
the verification strategy distracts from probing deeper for more details; 
the verification strategy distracts from probing wider around the problem 
(lateral thinking); 
the verification strategy leads to neglect of alternative explanations of the 
observed evidence and bars reconsideration of one's judgement. Indeed, 
discovering some similarity between one's idea and the perceived evi-
dence will inevitably lead to the conviction of being right [po158] 
[Osk6S] [Ein78] [Vre93]. 
The redressing capacities of DDSS concentrate on three elements. 
a) to probe deeper for more and more detailed information; 
b) to consider possible solutions and ideas in various directions; 
c) to reconsider one's judgement by contemplating alternative explanations 
for the present illness of the patient. 
In essence, these elements reflect the learning methods advocated by de Bono 
[Bon70] and Brandsford & Stein [Bra84]. The idea of "lateral thinking" 
(thinking in a more panoramic way) has been put best by de Bono: The 
difference between "funnelled" and "lateral" thinking is that between digging 
a hole deeper and deeper, and digging a number of holes at different sites. 
The 'hypotheses' entertained by our subjects were of a highly personal 
nature, reflecting personal experience as much as, if not more than, book 
learning. This is in agreement with observations of others: ideas jump to 
mind on the basis of just a few symptoms [Barn] [Els78] [Rid89]. It is the 
basic process of pattern recognition: a superficial resemblance suffices to 
recognize similarity; it is like recognizing a well-acquainted person in a 
crowd [McC86]. Pattern recognition is a process of which doctors are proud; 
it is his 'flair c1inique' which enables him to deliver immediate judgements. 
Pattern recognition plays a major role in inductive reasoning and prevents 
retracing of argumentation steps because of the implicit nature of the 
'pattern' or 'hypothesis': it is formed without its owner being conscious of 
any steps leading up to it. 
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As a consequence of the personal character of the 'hypothesis' little overlap 
between hypotheses for the same patient by different doctors was found. 
Besides, hypotheses were often on a rather general level which makes the 
subsequent arrival at a specific diagnosis unlikely. 
The verifying character of inductive reasoning carries another consequence: 
the so-called hypothesis-driven-data-acquisition. Once an idea has come to 
mind the doctor tries to find and select evidence in favour of this idea. His 
questions will be directed by the hypothesis he entertains at that moment. 
Only when patients' answers are evidently contradictory to the idea the 
doctor will switch to another idea and the process of hypothesis-driven-data-
acquisition starts again. 
By asking the participants to indicate the plausibility of the hypothesis (also 
called the probability statement) which he has just formulated, we obtained 
some insight in the mental state of the subject. His estimate of subjective, or 
predictive, probability usually reached far beyond the evidence the hypoth-
esis was based upon. Any comparison with objective (=frequentistic) 
probabilities such as prevalence or incidence rates is therefore pointless. 
Subjective, or inductive, probabilities indicate the degree to which the doctor 
is prepared to gamble on a certain idea which he believes to be the winning 
one. This high subjective probability lingers on during the diagnostic 
process, so that at the end the defeated hypotheses are still held dear. In a 
verification process rejection of hypotheses is indeed not one of the most 
prominent characteristics. 
The verification process leads also to (often unacceptable) selection of 
patient's answers or manipulation of data, an example of which is the 
entering of data which were not obtained from the patient but which served 
as valuable evidence in the light of the entertained hypothesis. These phe-
nomena of fabrication and unwarranted interpretation of symptoms were 
found both in the simultaneous (guided by the SCS system) and the non-
simultaneous (free interviewing and entering data afterwards) consultation 
style. Obviously, this effect is an innate characteristic of the verifying nature 
of inductive reasoning. One cannot expect doctors to discard such an implicit 
characteristic of their usual thought processes within the few hours of the 
experiment. 
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We do not intend to change an obviously usual behaviour of clinical prob-
lem-solving and decision-making. The DOSS is meant to make clear and 
explicit what is commonly hidden in the diagnostic process. 
8.6 Diagnosis 
The main purpose of diagnosis is to identify a disease in order to predict the 
future course of the illness in the patient. The predictive capability of a 
diagnosis is based on several premises: 
1) a unified concept of the particular disease. 
2) diseases are classified in a generally accepted taxonomy (nosology). 
3) diseases present themselves in a rather typical phenetic appearance. 
4) diseases can be distinguished by the observation of one or two different 
features (monothetic) or by the combined differences in their complete 
phenetic appearance (polythetic) [Sne73]. 
5) diseases follow a more or less pre-determined course. 
This conception, however, is not generally accepted. Commonly two trends 
may be distinguished: an empirical and a conceptual one. These trends stand 
for, as Boinet said, "les deux grandes idees doctrinales qui reviennent sans 
cesse a travers les siecles apres de long detours et avec des fortunes 
diverses". The empirical, and oldest, opinion starts from the thought that all 
suffering is unique and each patient shows his or her particular arrangement 
of symptoms and signs, and only when cases show considerable similarity a 
particular disease is suspected. This concept follows the adage: Post hoc ergo 
propter hoc. In this context terminology is just a way of expressing similarity 
between cases; it acts as a verbal shorthand for the doctor. For the empirical 
doctrine the words of Berkeley [Bl076] apply: "In truth there is no such 
thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to any general name, 
they all signifying indifferently a great number of particular ideas." 
The other doctrine, the conceptual one, stands for ordering and systemati-
zation of objects (diseases) into a hierarchical and discernible classification. 
Such a classification was first performed by Sauvages de Lacroix in 173l. 
His work found followers, regrettably mostly in differing directions such as 
etiologic, anatomic, and biochemical classifications. The ideal of one unified 
concept of disease appears to be illusory so far. 
The classes, or taxons, of a classification may contain the knowledge taken 
from numerous patient cases which represent the average picture and course 
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of the buzzing, blooming confusion that embodies the real world of illness 
and discomfort. It is the doctor's task to make a connection between the 
presentation of symptoms in the patient and the pre-defined picture as 
described in the taxonomy. Once the connection is, implicitly, established it 
is supported by the conviction of generality to the doctor. Generality exists 
not in its nature but in its use. An idea which is considered in itself as 
particular becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other 
particular ideas of the same sort [Bl078]. 
In daily practice these two conceptions merge into one single conception 
representing the doctor's wisdom gathered by experience and his knowledge 
of "official medicine". But such a coupling creates confusion and contributes 
to the irreproducibility of diagnostics, especially when just diagnostic names 
are coded and recorded. 
Diagnosis only becomes meaningful if its meaning (= underlying compo-
sition of phenomena observable in the patient; facts on which a doctor must 
decide) is clear and accessible to examination. King [Kin67] views diagnoses 
as congeries of factors selected to form a class or type which acts to organ-
ize experience. The selection of those factors which compose the disease 
entity is essentially arbitrarily except in so far as the disease description as a 
whole must convey some utility in the handling of experience. It made 
Dukes sigh: "Plenty of people are still dying of diseases which other people 
do not believe in." [Duk87] 
The result of these notions is far from encouraging. 
Taking the official medical nomenclature as used in medical diagnosis and 
judgement statistics show a gloomy picture. De Dombal [Dom92] found an 
overall accuracy of 41-53 % in the UK and mentions an estimated accuracy 
of 60-65 % globally. Zarling [Zar83] reported an accuracy of 44 % for 
myocardial infarction, a figure which is in the same range as in the study of 
van der Does & Lubsen [Doe78]. In an earlier study with the same patients 
as were used in the present test Ridderikhoff [Rid86] found a diagnostic 
accuracy of 46% and in the present test the accuracy was found to be 43 %, 
independent of the number of years of experience of the diagnostician. 
We wanted to follow the basic tenet of our theory for the DDSS, i.e. to trace 
the doctor's behaviour as closely as possible. To this purpose, we tried to 
combine the two concepts, the empirical and the conceptual, into one system. 
The ultimate goal was: 
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to allow the doctor to follow his habitual routine, and 
to confront him with the evidence upon which he bases his diagnosis. 
With King we regard diagnoses as combinations of symptoms and signs. 
Matching patients' symptoms with the symptoms of diseases found in the 
knowledge base may produce a complete match or a list of alternative 
explanations. Each name is accompanied by the number of matches so that 
the doctor may check the accuracy of the match. DOSS does not attempt to 
make any judgement about the results. It is entirely up to the doctor to 
decide and to take responsibility for his decision. 
From the observations mentioned before it is hardly amazing to find that 
doctors are fully convinced of their diagnoses, even in cases when substantial 
evidence was scarce. It is part of the empirical conception of medicine as 
well as inductive reasoning. What is really worrying is the observation that 
participants hardly considered the presented alternatives as possible incen-
tives for reconsideration and revision. 
Although all subjects were very anxious to have a look at the "diagnoses 
screen", they did not seem to bother about subsequent actions. This might be 
disappointing in the experiment, but it certainly challenges us to proceed 
with the DOSS and its implementation in actual practice. We are convinced 
that it will help in improving health care. 
A few words about the knowledge base. The knowledge base was composed 
of 46 diseases defined with their configuration of symptoms and signs as 
obtained from 10 - 12 different textbooks and various other sources. A 
mixture of the often widely varying descriptions of diseases was taken as an 
average picture. These pictures and their diagnostic names were entered in 
the knowledge base by means of SCS. Among these 46 diseases were the 
actual diagnoses of the presented patients and for every patient case 5-6 
diseases with similar symptom-patterns. The diagnostic performance must be 
viewed in this light. On the one hand the limited number of options, on the 
other the possibility that textbook descriptions hardly match the presentation 
of illnesses seen in primary health care. A real assessment performance can 
only be done if a proper knowledge base that complies with the doctor's 
special domain is constructed. For the experiment of testing the functioning 
of the system, a restricted knowledge base sufficed, but this precludes 
meaningful discussion about the diagnostic accuracy of the system. 
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8.7 System function 
The system was primarily designed for two purposes: 
a) keeping an administrative record of the 'raw' patient data, i.e. his or her 
complaints, symptoms, signs, etc, stored in a structured uniform way, 
and 
b) being able to use these structured data to aid the doctor in arriving at a 
diagnosis. 
Once the primary goal of symptom data storage in a highly structured and 
uniform format is attained, the problem of determining a diagnosis from the 
patient data may be explored in ways not previously considered. In order to 
obtain such a diagnostic goal the system should provide 
1) an extensive medical knowledge base that complies with the doctor's 
knowledge domain, and 
2) algorithms that make sure that when determining a diagnosis, one or 
more comparable diagnoses are selected from the knowledge base in 
which similar symptoms appear. 
These requirements led to the construction of the DDSS shell. 
By sticking to a method of systematic, structured design and programming, 
we were able to handle complex C and Clipper related issues. 
The use of the two languages together stressed the need for a strictly modu-
lar construction of the system. Modules written in one language should 
communicate seamlessly with modules written in another language. The 
communication between modules takes place by intermediate data files and 
by returning different DOS error levels. The separate modules are incorpor-
ated into a single working programme system by means of a DOS batch file. 
This has the advantage that the interface between different modules is easily 
completely defined, and substitution of one module by an improved version 
is very easy and guaranteed not to interfere with the working of the rest of 
the program. The disadvantages are a slight loss in speed and a greater 
complexity of the final working system, which consists of a number of files, 
all of which are necessary for the complete system to function. 
The Symptom Coding System can be developed completely separately from 
the DDSS programme code. The Symptom Tree is created with a separate, 
specially developed compiler from ordinary textfiles, and is then called by C 
modules. New developments in medicine, new ideas in clinical practice, 
opening of new domains and specifications for different medical disciplines 
can be smoothly incorporated without any necessary adaptation of the code 
for the DDSS programme itself. 
182 Ch. 8 
Apart from two occasions when a non-fatal, recoverable software error 
occurred, the system ran smoothly during approximately 100 hours of use, in 
99 patient cases and with doctors who treated the device sometimes rather 
unkindly. For a person with some computer experience, the practical use of 
the system could be learned within minutes. Finding the correct keys and 
using the mouse came so naturally that hardly anyone felt the need to use the 
manual, or the on-line help functions. This is as it should be. The main 
problem encountered was that one or two subjects found it hard to keep the 
fingers on the three buttons of the mouse, and tended instead to press each 
mouse button with their index finger. 
Users felt in control of the system and freely explored the SCS tree. 
Time lags hardly existed and even in extreme cases remained within annoy-
ance limits. 
The template matching algorithm's performance depends on the amount and 
quality of the data input. Given only a small number of symptoms the system 
comes up with a large list of differential diagnoses. This possibility might be 
interesting in the beginning of the consultation when the doctor is still 
walking in the dark. At any moment during the consultation the doctor may 
consult the knowledge base for further exploration, especially to compare the 
acquired data with the symptoms and signs of particular diseases as a quick 
reference. 
The menu-system appeared to be extremely user-friendly and efficient. 
Utmost attention has been paid to keeping the screen uncluttered, displaying 
only the information which the user needs at that point. 
The system is meant to operate in a stand-alone situation. This option was 
chosen because of the privacy of the information that is exchanged in the 
consulting room. However, to profit from all the accumulated empirical 
knowledge stored in the various records of doctors, exchange of information 
is worth pursuing. If anonymity can be guaranteed DDSS will open up roads 
to construct knowledge bases for specific domains as well as scientific 
research. 
The system functioned as it was meant to do. It stood all tests and (mis)uses 
that were likely to occur in daily practice. We are confident that the system 
will run smoothly and effortlessly to the satisfaction of doctor and patient. 
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8.8 Scaling up the system 
An interesting question to ponder is whether, and if so, how, the situation 
will change when the system is scaled up to include more diseases in its 
knowledge base and all the patients in a practice in its electronic record 
system. 
With regard to storage requirements there is little to fear; modem storage 
media provide ample space to store the consultation data, which in our study 
required only a few hundred bytes per consultation on average. A consider-
able economy of storage would also be possible by compressing the data 
with a standard data compression algorithm like that of Ziv-Lempel, or by 
leaving out the (redundant) human-readable form of the data, which is 
currently included in every record but which if needed can also be looked up 
in the SCS tree with a slight time penalty. The speed of the template-match-
ing algorithm in the current implementation was sufficient when the knowl-
edge base contained only about fifty diseases; but when this number rises 
there could be a detoriation in response time. Analysis of the programme 
execution time (profiling) showed that it is in its current form I/O bound I , 
and that a slight modification of the disk access routines would speed up the 
execution by a factor of four. Further tuning should be able to at least 
double the speed again; finally, the use of faster processors than the current-
ly used Intel 80386 at 25 MHz will enable us to double or triple the speed 
again, for a total gain of up to 25 times the current speed. If we regard a 
response time of 5 seconds for the differential diagnosis as acceptable, the 
size of the knowledge base which can be handled with such an improved 
system becomes about 1000 to 2000 disease patterns, and even more with the 
increasing computer power which will become available in the next few 
years. 
A more difficult problem is which disease patterns to include in the knowl-
edge base. There exist far more diseases than are ever seen by any single 
doctor; a catalogue of inherited and genetic abnormalities alone lists thou-
sands of diseases, most of which are so rare that most doctors never see one 
in their entire lifetime as a practitioner of medicine. Some criterium will 
have to be adhered to. For example, only those diseases which a doctor in 
the field where the system is to be used can expect to see (statistically) at 
least once every 5 or 10 years should be included, plus a number of rarer 
but 'dangerous' diseases which it would be very undesirable to miss. 
1 An expression meaning that the execution time is determined by the speed with which 
the disk can be accessed. 
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For the general practice, we estimate that 1000 to 2000 diseases would be an 
ample selection. 
There is yet another problem: how will the differential diagnosis look when 
such a large number of patterns is available in the knowledge base? Clearly, 
a list of tens or hundreds of possibilities, each with just two or three match-
ing nodes, is not much help when making a diagnosis. It will probably be 
necessary to establish a cut-off point, beyond which a partial template match 
will not be shown. This may be done in several ways, with a separate 
threshold being defined for. each pattern, or by looking at the relative quality 
of the match with regard to other diagnoses. A match with a score of 3 need 
not be shown if there is also a pattern which matches 10 items; but it may 
have to be shown if it is the best or only match. It is also possible to set the 
threshold according to the number of items entered for the patient, and to 
show a warning that not enough data are available for meaningful support. 
What will happen when the data for a patient are entered who is not ill in a 
medical sense? We must remind ourselves that in general practice, the 
majority of people who come to consult their doctor do not really suffer 
from any recognized disease; they are worried, they have complaints, but 
they cannot be helped by strictly medical means. Is there a danger that such 
patients will be assigned a diagnostic label, just because the computer comes 
up with a template match? As we have repeatedly stated before, it is the 
doctor who is in charge and in control of the system. The responsibility for 
the diagnosis remains squarely his. Although we strongly recommend that 
the data of every patient be entered into the system, the system does not 
make a diagnosis; its role is to give the doctor suggestions to ponder and to 
accept or reject as he sees fit. Since it has been frequently remarked that 
'hysteria has a remarkably high mortality for a neurotic disorder', perhaps 
even some of the 'non-diseased' patients will benefit from a correct somatic 
diagnosis. 
8.9 Conclusions and recommendations 
DDSS has given what we expected of it. In the hands of experienced 
physicians it may add a new dimension to their skills. But it will also 
challenge their competence and actions. For the doctor, the responsibility for 
his decisions remains squarely his own, even if the system's suggestions may 
not always coincide with his own opinions and judgement. It is entirely up to 
him how he will respond and behave. He has the option to rethink and 
retrace his steps. 
Discussion and conclusions 185 
For every hypothesis he might possibly entertain he can check the acquired 
information and examine the composition of symptoms and signs as they are 
represented in the medical knowledge base. 
In our experiment the retracing process proved of great value. The success-
ive steps in the form of generated hypotheses could easily be traced by the 
user and the experimenter. Any (standard) datum was registered in the order 
in which it was entered. This procedure provided insight in the variability of 
the acquired data, of the hypotheses, of the subjective probabilities assigned 
to these, and ultimately, to the diagnoses and the evidence on which the 
judgement was based. 
All these recommendations and conditions have led to what we consider to 
be our top priority: the immediate use of the system by the doctor himself 
during the patient contact. Our slogan is: discover and explore the possibi-
lities of DDSS whilst seeing the patient. It may take the practising doctor 
into the world of advanced informatics. If we indeed consider a compute-
rized medical diagnostic system a valuable asset in improving health care, 
DDSS gives the individual doctor the opportunity by critiqueing his judge-
ment, his management and his actions. Many doctors feel very uneasy if 
somebody is "watching over their shoulder". Most doctors are unaccustomed 
to being criticized. With DDSS every doctor has the possibility to verify (or 
falsify) his ideas and his plans, unobserved by others, in his own practice. 
And moreover, within the time limits given for normal consultations. 
Doctors are expected to profit from this experience. By it very nature, 
experience is subjective and therefore not transferable. But to learn only 
from one's own mistakes would be slow and unnecessarily costly to one's 
patients [McI83], apart from the notion that such learning does not contribute 
to accessible medical knowledge. DDSS may contribute to more explicit and 
testable learning by encouraging an attitude of constant and watchful examin-
ation of one's own steps and comparing this with the steps one's colleagues 
might have taken. 
We are encouraged to keep looking for even simpler and more user-friendly 
methods of input. Perhaps voice recognition will provide an answer here; we 
can easily imagine how it would be possible to adapt the system to voice-
driven menu selection. For the time being, the field of voice recognition is 
not sufficiently advanced yet to allow its use in such a programme as ours, 
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but with the current speed of developments this stage may be just a few 
years away. 
Also with regard to user-friendliness, many nodes in the SCS tree are 
currently taken up by menus to indicate the position of a specific complaint 
or phenomenon in or on the body. Such information is much more easily 
codeable by pointing to the location on a map of the body, rather than 
having to go through three or four layers of menus for every position item. 
This is an improvement which would be quite feasible to implement with 
current technology. 
DOSS must be viewed as a first and most successful attempt to structure and 
organize the diagnostic procedure of practising physicians. It is still in its 
infancy. New developments in computer software may improve further 
acceptability and user-friendliness so that many practising doctors may want 
to use this program. This is exactly what we want: many doctors with their 
great experience and the standardized data from their real patients contribut-
ing to the construction of that particular medical knowledge base that 
complies with their domain. It will benefit medicine as a science, the 
doctors, and, last but not least, their patients. 
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Summary 
In chapter 1, it is argued that at present the standardization of disease 
definitions and their classification into a nosology is chaotic at best. 
Different views on disease, diaguosis and the current state of nosology are 
discussed. It is argued that the prime purpose of diagnosis is the 
identification of the patient's disease on the basis of an existing classifica-
tion, thus allowing an accurate prediction of the outcome and the identifi-
cation of methods to influence this outcome favourably. In our view, simi-
larity of patients should be defined as much as possible in terms of easily 
distinguishable characteristics, using the clinical presentation of patients 
rather than (often unknown and ill-defined) presumed underlying causes. We 
try to classify the patient on the basis of similarities and dissimilarities 
between his or her signs and symptoms and those of a pre-defined pattern 
called a disease. 
In chapter 2, we take a look at the introduction of computers into medicine 
and examine the obstacles to success in applying computer technology to 
medical situations. It is argued that important obstacles to progress lie in the 
lack of standardization of medical terminology, incomplete understanding of 
the processes involved in human medical decision making, use of incorrect 
models to simulate these processes, lack of organized knowledge about 
medical conditions (partly because of the lack of standardization mentioned 
earlier), lack of structure of medical data records in currently used systems, 
and emotional barriers resisting the introduction of computers into the 
essentially human encounter between doctor and patient. 
In chapter 3, several approaches to the diagnostic process are discussed, 
notably prescriptive approaches such as employed in medical decision 
making, and the descriptive approaches explored in cognitive science. Some 
philosophical and probabilistic models are reviewed. A model is introduced, 
based on earlier research, according to which under normal, daily circum-
stances a doctor's diagnostic process is characterized by 1) early generation 
of a diagnostic hypothesis, and 2) an inductive, verification-seeking mode of 
reasoning, rather than the deductive or hypothetico-deductive and falsifying 
mode of reasoning often postulated in literature. It is argued that this leads to 
a number of characteristic weak points in medical diagnosis, notably over-
sight of other likely hypotheses and incomplete verification of diagnostic 
hypotheses, while the occurrence of hypothesis-<iriven data collection leads 
to wrong interpretations or unconscious fabrication of evidence to support 
the hypothesis currently held. 
In chapter 4, we explore the requirements to be met by the DDSS in the 
light of the model developed in the previous chapter. The goal of the DDSS 
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is to improve the diagnostic process at many points: better observation, both 
in depth and in scope of observation, and better recording of the observed 
facts, leading to better hypothesis generation and evaluation, and ultimately 
to a better knowledge base from which to derive diagnoses. We have also 
specified a large number of constraints for the system, notably that it should 
be compatible with existing standards for medical database design, that the 
user-interface should be extremely easy to handle and that the system should 
be used during the consultation. Finally, the doctor should at all times be in 
control of the consultation, with the system following his thought rather than 
prescribing it. 
In chapter 5, the design of the DDSS is explained and the mathematical 
methods and algorithms used in the programme are illustrated by examples. 
The DDSS is based on a systematic coding of the patient's symptoms by 
means of a menu-driven system called the SCS. The support the DDSS 
offers to the practitioner of medicine consists of two types of feedback. 
During the data-gathering phase, by showing the structured symptom menus. 
After the doctor has made a diagnosis, by offering on demand a list of diffe-
rential diagnoses produced by template matching with patterns stored in a 
pre-defined database. This database should be constructed specifically for 
every user group to contain the typical patterns seen by doctors belonging to 
such a group. The time and space requirements of a system using such data 
structures and algorithms are analysed. 
Chapter 6 contains a description of the experiment to be performed with the 
finished system, consisting of 100 consultations of 20 subject doctors, using 
8 different simulated patients presenting fairly common somatic complaints. 
A number of hypotheses, introduced in chapter 5, is further worked out to be 
tested by the experiment to follow. The ease with which subjects can learn to 
use the system, their experiences with it, the time needed for consultations 
using the system, the quality of the diagnostic support offered and the 
doctor-subjects' reactions to it are scrutinized with special care. 
In Chapter 7, the results of the experiment are presented and discussed. 
The main results are that the system is very easy to learn, that it can indeed 
be used during the consultation, that the interface is simple to Jearn and to 
use, that the time needed to use the system during the consultation is not 
prohibitive, that an extensive number of patient data end up in the medical 
patient database, and that the speed with which the diagnostic support is 
offered is sufficient. However, doctors do not appear to make much use of 
the diagnostic suggestions even in cases in which these suggestions are better 
than their own diagnoses. 
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In Chapter 8, the results of the experiment are discussed in the light of 
previous publications dealing with expert and decision support systems, and 
decision-making by doctors. It is argued that a system like the DDSS, which 
has been designed and built with a constant eye to the needs of the working 
general practitioner, is better suited to clinical use than many other systems 





In hoofdstuk 1 wordt beargumenteerd dat de standaardisatie van ziekte-
definities en hun ordening in een nosologisch systeem tegenwoordig nog op 
zijn zachtst gezegd in een chaotische toestand verkeert. Verschillende 
benaderingen van ziekte, diagnose, en de huidige stand van de nosologie 
worden besproken. De stelling wordt verdedigd dat het voornaamste doel van 
diagnose de identificatie van de ziekte van de patient in een bestaand c1assifi-
catiesysteem is, teneinde daarmee een nauwkeurige voorspelling te kunnen 
doen van de afloop van het ziekteproces en methoden te kunnen identificeren 
om dit verJoop gunstig te kunnen beinvloeden. De overeenkomsten tussen 
patienten zouden volgens ons zoveel mogelijk moeten worden gedefinieerd in 
termen van gemakkelijk vast te stellen kenmerken, waarbij meer nadruk 
wordt gelegd op de klinische presentatie dan op de (vaak onbekende of slecht 
gedefinieerde) veronderstelde onderliggende oorzaken. We proberen de 
patient te c1assificeren op basis van de overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen 
zijn of haar symptomen en verschijnselen, en die van een pre-gedefinieerd 
patroon dat ' ziekte' genoemd wordt. 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt de introductie van computers in de geneeskunde 
besproken en de belemmeringen die een succes bij de toepassing van com-
puters in de geneeskunde in de weg staan onderzocht. 
Er wordt bepleit dat belangrijke obstakels voor vooruitgang liggen in de 
gebrekkige standaardisatie van medische terminologie, onvolledig begrip van 
de processen die plaatsvinden bij menselijke besluitvorming, gebrek aan 
georganiseerde kennis van medische aandoeningen (gedeeltelijk ook door het 
eerder genoemde gebrek aan standaardisatie), gebrek aan structuur in de 
medische status zoals gebruikt in huidige computersystemen, en emotionele 
barrieres tegen de introductie van de computer in het essentieel-menselijke 
contact tussen arts en patient. 
In hoofdstuk 3 worden verschillende benaderingen van het diagnostisch 
proces besproken, vooral prescriptieve benaderingen zoals die worden 
gebruikt in de medische besliskunde, en de descriptieve modellen die door de 
cognitieve wetenschappen worden verkend. Verder worden enige filosofische 
benaderingen besproken. Gebaseerd op eerdere research wordt er een model 
geintroduceerd waarvan de voomaamste punten zijn dat het diagnostisch 
proces van de arts wordt gekenmerkt door I) vroege generatie van een 
diagnostische hypothese en 2) een inductieve, op verificatie gerichte rede-
neertrant, in plaats van de in de literatuur vaak gepostuleerde deductieve of 
hypothetico-deductieve redeneerwijze. Er wordt bepleit dat dit aanleiding 
geeft tot een aantal typische zwakke punten in de medische diagnostiek, met 
name het over het hoofd zien van andere mogelijk hypothesen en incomplete 
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verificatie van diagnostische hypothesen, terwijl het gebruik van hypothese-
gestuurde gegevensverzameling tot verkeerde interpretatie of zelfs onbewuste 
vervalsing van gegevens van de patient kan leiden om de op dat moment 
gehanteerde hypothese te ondersteunen. 
In hoofdstuk 4 verkenen we de eisen die moeten worden gesteld aan het 
DDSS in het licht van het in het vorige hoofstuk ontwikkelde model. Het 
doel van het DDSS is om het diagnostisch proces op veel punten te verbe-
teren: beter observeren, zowel in de breedte als in de details van de waar-
neming, en betere verslaglegging van het waargenomene, wat moet leiden tot 
een betere hypothesegeneratie en -evaluatie, en uiteindelijk tot een betere 
kennisbank waaruit de diagnosen kunnen worden afgeleid. Tevens hebben we 
een aantal randvoorwaarden voor het systeem opgesteld, met name dat het 
systeem verenigbaar moet zijn met bestaande normen voor medische data-
bases, dat de gebruikers-interface bijzonder eenvoudig moet zijn, dat het 
systeem gebruikt moet worden tijdens het consult, en dat de arts op op ieder 
moment het consult leidt, waarbij het systeem hem voigt in plaats van zijn 
handelen te bepalen. 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt het ontwerp van het DDSS uitgelegd en de wiskundige 
methoden en algoritmen die in het programma worden gebruikt met voor-
beelden geillustreerd. Het DDSS is gebaseerd op een systematische codering 
van van de symptomen van de patient door middel van een menugestuurd 
systeem dat SCS heet. De ondersteuning die het DDSS de uitoefenaar der 
geneeskunde biedt bestaat uit het geven van terugkoppeling zowel gedurende 
de fase van het informatieverzamelen, door het tonen van symptoom-menu's, 
en nadat de arts een diagnose heeft gesteld, door op verzoek een lijst met 
mogelijke diagnosen te tonen die door vergelijking van de symptomen van de 
patient met patronen uit een vooraf samengestelde kennisbank is opgesteld. 
Deze kennisbank moet eigenlijk voor ieder gebied waarop het systeem wordt 
ingezet speciaal op maat gemaakt worden om de typische patronen te 
omvatten die door artsen op dat gebied worden gezien. De rekentijd- en 
geheugeneisen die een systeem met deze gegevensstructuren nodig heeft 
worden geanalyseerd. 
Hoofdstuk 6 bevat een beschrijving van het experiment dat met het zo 
ontstane systeem wordt uitgevoerd, bestaande uit 100 consulten, door 20 
arts-vrijwilligers uitgevoerd op 8 verschillende gesimuleerde patienten die 
geenszins ongewone somatische klachten presenteren. Een aantal hypothesen, 
geintroduceerd in hoofdstuk 5, wordt verder uitgewerkt om te worden 
getoetst in het uit te voeren experiment. Het gemak waarmee proefpersonen 
leren het systeem te bedienen en hun ervaringen ermee, de tijd die ze voor 
consulten met het systeem nodig hebben, de kwaliteit van de verleende 
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diagnostische ondersteuning en de reactie van de arts-proefpersonen daarop 
worden met extra zorg bekeken. 
In hoofdstuk 7 worden de resultaten van het experiment gepresenteerd en 
besproken. De belangrijkste resultaten zijn dat de bediening van het systeem 
zeer eenvoudig te leren is, dat het inderdaad goed tijdens het consult kan 
worden gebruikt, dat de extra tijd die nodig is voor een consult met het 
systeem het gebruik niet onmogelijk maakt, dat een groot aantal gegevens 
van de patient ook inderdaad in het electronisch dossier terechtkomt, en dat 
de snelheid waarmee de diagnostische ondersteuning wordt geboden accep-
tabel is. De artsen leken echter weinig gebruik te maken van de diagnos-
tische suggesties van het systeem, zelfs in gevallen waar die suggesties beter 
waren dan hun eigen diagnosen. 
In hoofdstuk 8 worden de resultaten van het experiment besproken in het 
licht van eerdere publikaties over expert- en beslissingsondersteunende 
systemen, en beslissingsprocessen bij artsen. Er wordt betoogd dat een 
systeem als het DDSS, dat is ontworpen en gebouwd met voortdurende 
aandacht voor de behoeften van de praktizerende huisarts, meer geschikt is 
voor klinisch gebruik dan veel andere systemen die zijn ontworpen in het 
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Appendix 1: Pre-enquete 
Coo~ ____ ~~ __ ~~ 
(dczc regcl door onderzockcr in te vuilen) 





b) Een paar vragen over uw medische achtergrond: 





anders) 0 nl: 
Hoelang bent u aI arts? 0 jaar 





Eigen praktijk 0 
geslacht 0 
1 
c) Ben paa:r vragen over uw ervaring met computers: 
Rebt u ze!f een computer? 
Ja 0 
Nee 0 









Als u eruge ervaring met computergebruik hebt, hebt u dan misschien ervaring met 






































d) Een paar vragen over uw houding tegenover computers in de geneeskunde. 
Geeft u nu alstublieft uw mening over de volgende stellingen, door een dwarsstreep-
je te zetten op de schaal die door het vakje wordt aangegeven. 
Voorbeeld: Pit-bull terriers lOuden verboden moeten worden. 
oneens c· ====================:=" eens 
Ik denk dat een computer een nuttig hulpmiddel in de praktijk kan zijn, maar 
alleen voor het administratieve werk. 
oneens c· ====================:=. eens 
Ik denk dat computers in de huisartsenpraktijk een bijdrage kunnen leveren aan 
de diagnostiek. 
oneens c. ====================:::J eens 
3 
Appendix 2: Post-enquete 
Codenaam ppl ';: ==:::::; ____ ...J 
1 
systeemcode 1'--__ -' 
Datum 
Gebruik van de computer tijdens het consult. 
In hoeverre stoorde het gebruik van de computer het verloop van de consulten? 
niet i i ernstig 
In hoeverre vindt u dat het aantal door u verzamelde gegevens door het gebruik 
van het systeem toenam? 
geen effect i i belangrijk effect 
Denkt u dat er door het gebruik van het systeem meer gegevens over de patient in 
het registratiesysteem van de arts terecht komen? 
oneens ! i eens 
I 
Gebruik van het DDSS programma. 
Wat yond u van het invullen en het overzicht van de personalia van arts en 
patient? 
makkelijk ' , moeilijk 
Hoe gemakkelijk kon u de weg vinden in de menu's om een nieuwe patient te 
selecteren? 
makkelijk , , moeilijk 
Hoe gemakkelijk kon u de weg vinden in de niet-symptoommenus: personalia, 
diagnose, behandeling? 
makkelijk , , moeilijk 
Wat vond u van het zoeken in de hierarchische structuur van het SCS ?(de 
eigenlijke symptoomboom) 
makkelijk ' , moeilijk 
Yond u de in het SCS gebruikte terminologie 
makkelijk C' ================= moeilijk 
Yond u dat de menustructuur u uitnodigde tot minder of meer vragen? 
minder , i meer 
2 
Gebruik van de diagnostische suppon. 
Yond u de door het systeem geboden diagnosen 
oyerbodig 1====:::::==:::::=============1 zeer nuttig 
Wat yond u van de scoregetallen bij de diagnosen? 
oyerbodig 1 1 zeer nuttig 
Vindt u dat het yermelden van alternatieye diagnosen uitnodigt tot extra 
informatieinwinning van uw kant'] 
oneens i i eens 
Als u de diagnostische hulp beschouwt· als feedback op uw eigen handelen, vindt u 
dat dan 
storend 01 ====================:::J1 een goede hulp 
3 
Toekomst. 
We willen graag nog uw verwachting wctcn over vier facetten van het systeem: 
Het ddss kan in de toekomst een waardevolle bijdrage leveren aan de 
praktijkuitoefening van de huisarts, door standaardisatie van de terminologie. 
oneens i i eens 
Het ddss kan in de toekomst een waardevolle bijdrage leveren aan de 
praktijkuitoefening van de huisarts, door verbeterde patientenregistratie. 
oneens i j eens 
Het ddss kan in de toekomst een waardevolle bijdrage leveren aan de 
praktijkuitoefening van de huisarts, door hulp bij de diagnostiek. 
oneens i i eens 
Het ddss kan in de toekomst een waardevolle bijdrage leveren aan de 
praktijkuitoefening van de huisarts, door vergelijking van het gedrag van huisartsen. 
oneens i i eens 
Hebt u nog commentaar of suggesties? 
4 
